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Abstract  
Though some software development teams are highly effective at delivering security, 
others either do not care or do not have access to security experts to teach them how. 
Unfortunately, these latter teams are still responsible for the security of the systems they 
build: systems that are ever more important to ever more people. Yet many, perhaps most, 
security problems can be prevented with careful design, construction and configuration 
of the software and systems involved, so software developers have a major contribution 
to make.  
This research investigates how to help teams of software developers achieve better 
security. An initial qualitative survey of 15 secure software development professionals 
highlighted a range of security assurance and motivation techniques suitable for teams of 
developers, and emphasised the human interaction aspects. A further quantitative survey 
of 330 successful Android developers then identified a baseline of current security 
practices in software development.  
Based on these surveys, the author created an intervention package to help software 
developers. Action Research techniques were used to trial and improve it in two one-year 
cycles with a total of 19 development teams in 11 different organisations. The later 
development of the package concentrated on empowering the developers involved, and 
reducing the involvement required from the researchers. 
By proving that a set of structured workshops can have an impact on the security 
performance of a team for a reasonable cost and without the support of security 
professionals, this research offers a powerful means to enhance development security in 
the UK, creating more secure software and systems for all users.  
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1 Introduction 
Software increasingly affects everyone and everything we do. It contributes enormously 
to our quality of life and to our ability to communicate, learn, control and build. Software 
underpins virtually every form of business, much of our social interaction, and 
increasingly the behaviour of our homes and machines. Indeed, software is probably the 
most significant contributor to societal change and improvement in the past fifty years 
[1].  
Yet with the vast benefits of software come problems: the problem of software not 
behaving in the way desired (‘faults’); the risk of people finding ways to misuse software 
in ways detrimental to its intended users (‘security’), and the risk of revealing information 
in damaging ways (‘privacy’).  
Faults have been a familiar issue in software development from the beginning, and 
researchers have devoted much effort to finding effective ways to address them. Even 
security and privacy are hardly a new problem; banks have been using software since 
1950 [21]. But security and privacy have only began to become issues in mainstream 
software development in the last twenty years, and only in the last five years has there 
become to be public awareness of the problem.  
And they are now becoming major issues: almost every day we hear that several more 
organisations’ software systems have been compromised [142]. While there are many 
aspects to an organisation’s security and privacy, the design and implementation of the 
software used clearly has a significant impact on whether such breaches happen.  
Two industry trends contribute to this. First, changes in web architecture such as 
microservices and the increasing integration of Software as a Service (SaaS) components 
into systems mean that perimeter security is increasingly irrelevant, making security more 
a feature of the developed code and therefore the responsibility of the developers. Second, 
the DevOps (Development Operations) movement means that security issues that used to 
be the province of a separate operations team, such as the management of encryption keys 
and deployment passwords, increasingly is becoming the responsibility of software 
developers. Therefore, the effectiveness of developers at creating secure software is vital.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Unfortunately, there is evidence that developers are not delivering this security. A recent 
report from Veracode [177] concluded that “more than 85 percent of all applications 
have at least one vulnerability in them; more than 13 percent of applications have at least 
one very high severity flaw”.  A report from Microsoft [115] analysed storage and 
collaboration Software as a Service applications, and found a wide range of issues, 
including 28% of storage apps not supporting data encryption.  
All these surveys suggest that many errors were avoidable; developers could have made 
choices that would have prevented the issues. Yet the developers were just doing their 
job, subject to their constraints, and there is little evidence of deliberate or even careless 
connivance at security errors. Indeed, the Ponemon Institute carried out a IBM-funded 
survey in 2015 of 640 individuals from organisations developing mobile apps in the US 
[135], and found that 77% believed that “securing mobile apps is very hard”, and that 
73% percent believed that developer lack of understanding of security issues was a major 
contributor to the problem. 
This demonstrates that existing industry practices are insufficient to provide the 
application security and privacy we need. So, how can one support developers to deliver 
better security? 
1.1 State of the Art and Its Limitations 
In industry, the international not-for-profit Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) organisation runs regular events and provides web-based resources [206]. It 
delivers excellent, data-driven advice and materials, but is dominated by security 
professionals, and gets only limited engagement with software developers1. The SANS 
institute is a commercial organisation with a similar function in the USA and similar 
limitations. SANS is noted for its commercial training, and also for a comprehensive 
online library of security resources created by security professionals [146].  
There is increasing academic research happening in this area. Several research groups are 
looking at technical aspects of secure programming (APIs, user interactions) For 
example, teams in the universities of Bonn and Hannover have been investigating 
Android app developer behaviour; a team in the University of New South Wales is 
exploring the ‘process usability’ issues faced by developers. Former leading players like 
McGraw [112] are now working at CEO level; most security specialists work within 
practicing teams. In the UK, the Johnny project [139] is exploring security for solo 
developers; and the Jenny project [108] has looked at security for unsupported 
development teams.  
Survey evidence (see Chapter 5) suggests that few developers have any formal security 
training or experience. Even if some know how to achieve security, how are they to get a 
whole team to follow? 
 
1 Personal communication, Martin Knobloch, OWASP Chairman, OWASP AppSec Europe Conference 
2018 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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1.2 Conventions in this Thesis 
Many research questions distinguish ‘privacy’ (protection against unwanted disclosure of 
information to other users of a system2) from ‘security’ (protection against malicious 
theft, corruption, faking of information, or denial of service). This thesis uses the word 
‘security’ to include both. 
A software development team usually includes a range of roles: programmers, testers, 
project managers and product managers. Here, we use the word ‘developer’ to refer to all 
these roles, using the more specific terms where appropriate. Similarly, the responsibility 
of deciding development priorities and the allocation of financial and other resource 
might be have the title of product manager, line manager, technical lead—or indeed might 
be the responsibility of committee. Here we use the term ‘product manager’ to refer to 
any holder of this role.  
1.3 Research Objective 
Summarising the previous discussions, there is a need for better software security; 
developers are the main cause or otherwise of that software security; and few developers 
have any security training or formal security experience.  
The background of the of the author was mentoring and managing software development 
teams in both small and large organisations. In that role he found that there was little 
support available to help product managers and development teams with security, whether 
in the form of books or professional advice. He entered research to find a way to address 
that problem.  
Indeed, the scope of the problem is huge. There are some 200,000 software developers in 
the UK [159], and perhaps many more times that number worldwide.  
So, this research project has the aim of finding some way to support a worthwhile 
proportion of those developers in delivering better software security. In the terms of the 
UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), what is needed is an ‘intervention’ to 
provide that support3. Since a large majority of developers work in teams [157], it is 
reasonable to limit the intervention to team-based developers. Given the huge population 
of developers in the UK it is unnecessary to look further afield, which avoids the 
complexities of different cultures and languages. And finally, if many development teams 
are to adopt such an intervention, it must be cost-effective and usable in a wide range of 
organisations and situations. 
The research question for this thesis, therefore is: 
RQ 1. What is needed to make a cost-effective and widely applicable intervention to 
help UK software development teams achieve better software security? 
The remainder of this introduction explains how this question was addressed, defining 
further research questions as required. 
 
2 Other aspects of privacy are outside the scope of this thesis. 
3 Helen Lovekin, NCSC, personal communication 2017. 
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1.4 Research Summary 
This question makes this a topic in the field of Empirical Software Engineering [49]. The 
research started without preconceptions of the forms that interventions might take. 
Possibilities envisaged included a tool, a mentoring program, an online course, a book, a 
website, or even contributions to an audio or video program [190]. 
The wide scope of the question required a variety of different research techniques, and 
therefore the research involved five different ‘projects’. Figure 1 shows the interrelation 
of the different projects, which are described in the following sections. 
1.4.1 Expert Survey  
First, to generate theory and establish best practice, an ‘Expert Survey’ of face-to-face 
interviews with sixteen experts at improving software in development teams, asked open-
ended questions about what interventions they considered most successful. The research 
question for the Expert Survey was developed in conjunction with Helen Lovekin from 
GCHQ; it expands on RQ 1; and emphasises the identification of interventions: 
RQ 2. What interventions can change the environment for members of the development 
team to achieve good security, considering cost-efficiency, motivational factors, 
choice of tools, supporting processes, culture, awareness, training and skills? 
The analysis approach was Grounded Theory, and the main theoretical conclusion was 
that effective developer-centred security requires ‘active developers’, who themselves 
drive the security improvement rather than having it imposed on them. A further outcome 
was the identification of eight techniques the experts stated they found most effective for 
security improvement. 
 





Trialing first version of 
interventions
Expert Survey






Further Trials (Magid 2)
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1.4.2 Online Developer Survey 
To provide proof of the need for an intervention, and also a baseline of existing security 
practice in commercial development teams, an online Developer Survey was undertaken 
in collaboration with groups in the universities of Hannover and Paderborn. 
Pragmatically, the chosen participants were Android app developers worldwide, since 
both the developer contact details and their delivered software are publicly available. The 
research question for the survey was the following: 
RQ 3. To what extent, and how, does a perceived need for security and privacy lead to 
security-enhancing activities and interactions in an Android development team 
and result in better software security? 
The results showed that around half of Android developers worked in teams, most self-
identified as valuing security, they used a wide variety of development stacks; but that 
few had access to security professionals nor used the assurance techniques identified in 
the Expert Survey. They also suggested that security improvements were driven more by 
developers than forces external to the team.  
The Developer Survey also found correlation between the need for security and both the 
assurance techniques used and the security update frequency. However, there was little 
correlation between these factors and the measured security attributes of the software 
produced.  
1.4.3 Intervention Package Creation 
Returning to the primary research question, the Expert Survey and the Developer Survey 
provided a context for designing interventions. Specifically, the Expert Survey suggests 
that to be effective an intervention must: 
• Motivate ‘active developers’ to drive their own security improvements, and  
• Convey a knowledge of most cost-effective security assurance techniques to use. 
And the Developer Survey suggests that to have a wide appeal an intervention must: 
• Work with development teams, but not require security specialists, and 
• Be independent of specific development environments or domains. 
The next step, therefore, was to construct such an intervention. The author had expected 
it to take the form or a code analysis tool, a website, a book or a training course; in practice 
excellent versions of all of these exist already to support developers creating secure 
code—yet the need for an intervention still remains. 
Instead, the author created a package of workshops, ‘Developer Security Essentials’, 
requiring less than a day’s effort for a team. This involved two team workshops: a game 
using a case study to teach that security is a commercial decision; and a Threat 
Assessment to identify security requirements for the participants’ own projects. An online 
book, video, and materials [182] supported the package. 
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1.4.4 Package Trials (Magid) 
To test the proposition that the Developer Security Essentials intervention does indeed 
satisfy the criteria of RQ 1 by being cost-effective and widely applicable and by helping 
UK software development teams achieve better software security, the ‘Magid’ project 
explored the results of using it with professional developers in UK companies. The project 
used an ‘Canonical Action Research’ method [24], addressing the research question: 
RQ 4. What security outcomes did the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ package have, 
and what aspects contributed most to those outcomes?  
Development teams were recruited in three different UK companies, and the Developer 
Security Essentials workshops were led by the author. Recordings were made of 
interviews of a range of participants before and after the intervention, along with the 
discussion in the workshops themselves. These were then double coded for indications of 
improvements in security practice or knowledge, for candidate improvements for the 
package itself, and for indications of the issues and solutions involved in improving 
security. The coded dataset was then analysed both qualitatively, for examples and 
indications of what had happened; and quantitively to provide an indication of the 
frequency of different effects.  
The results suggested that the package was effective in improving development security 
in the two less experienced development teams, and in improving communication in the 
other. They also suggested two new and important requirements: 
• For others to deliver the intervention instead of the researcher, and 
• For developers effectively to present possible security improvements to product 
management, to allow informed decision making on where to spend effort and 
money on security. 
1.4.5 Further Trials (Magid 2) 
The author therefore modified Developer Security Essentials to satisfy these new 
requirements, by providing sufficient materials and instructions for others to deliver the 
intervention, and by adding a further experimental ‘Threat Sales’ workshop to support 
developers ‘selling’ security mitigations to product management. 
The effects of this change were tested in a second cycle of trials: the ‘Magid 2’ project. 
Canonical Action Research was rejected as methodology since it requires the same 
participants for each cycle; instead the project used Design-Based Research, which 
supports different participants in each cycle of trials, focusses on designing an artifact, 
and still can use Action Research techniques. 
The research question reflects an emphasis on making the intervention potentially 
scalable to use by large numbers of organisations:  
RQ 5. Which aspects of the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ intervention are effective 
at improving security when used independently by teams from a variety of 
cultures and different types of organisation, and why? 
Teams from a total of eight further organisations used the new version of the package; 
and this time the author’s involvement was limited to a training session for one or two 
facilitators taken from the development team, a brief overview presentation, and 
contributions to the discussions as a participant.  
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A further change was in the evaluation of the intervention’s impact. The analysis looked 
for and quantified improvements in ‘assurance techniques’: process improvements, 
understanding and skills that would generate better security in the longer term.  
The results showed improvements in understanding or adoption of security assurance 
techniques in all but one of the teams. Two organisations chose to carry out further 
workshops independently from the researchers, and the teams in five organisations 
showed major improvements in their security decision making.  
In particular, the results highlighted a value to presenting security enhancements in terms 
of their business benefits, and proved the ability of developers to do so with minimal 
guidance. 
1.5 Novel Contributions 
Table 1 summarises the research questions introduced over this section. Since research 
questions RQ 2 through RQ 5 were still relatively broad, each was broken down into sub-
questions; these sub-questions are introduced and answered in the chapters discussing the 
corresponding projects. 
The research makes the following contributions: 
• Identification of the importance that developers drive security improvements 
themselves (the Active Developer Model). 
• Evidence of very limited use of security assurance techniques by developers in a 
particular domain (Android Apps). 
• An existence proof that a simple ‘intervention package’ structured as a facilited 
series of workshops can improve the security of software developed by a team. 
• A new use of Design-Based Research, in the field of Developer-Centred Security  
• Identification of the importance of representing security enhancements in terms 
of their business benefit, and the ability of developers to do so. 
Table 1: Overview of Research Questions 
RQ 1 What is needed to make a cost-effective and widely applicable intervention 
to help UK software development teams achieve better software security? 
RQ 2 What interventions can change the environment for members of the 
development team to achieve good security, considering cost-efficiency, 
motivational factors, choice of tools, supporting processes, culture, 
awareness, training and skills?  
RQ 3 To what extent, and how, does a perceived need for security and privacy 
lead to security-enhancing activities and interactions in an Android 
development team and result in better software security? 
RQ 4 What security outcomes did the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ package 
have, and what aspects contributed most to those outcomes?  
RQ 5 Which aspects of the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ intervention are 
effective at improving security when used independently by teams from a 
variety of cultures and different types of organisation, and why? 
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1.6 Thesis Overview 
The following chapters in this work describe this research in detail. Specifically, the 
chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 2 explores existing peer-reviewed and ‘grey’ literature. It explores the state 
of knowledge and previous research on security as applied to software 
development teams; plus some key work in related areas such as 
programmer motivation and the involvement of security professionals. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview and justification for each of the methodologies used 
in the research. 
Chapter 4 describes the ‘Expert Survey’ of security practitioners working with 
software developers. It provides detail of the approach used, summarises 
the interviews; and describes the main result of ‘active developer security’ 
and eight specific techniques used by the practitioners.  
Chapter 5 describes the online ‘Developer Survey’ of successful (Android) software 
developers, establishing a baseline for developer knowledge of security. 
Chapter 6 describes the ‘Intervention Package Creation’ of a suite of facilitated 
workshops for a development team and the materials created to support 
those workshops. 
Chapter 7 describes the ‘Package Trials (Magid)’ project, trialling this package with 
development teams in three different organisations. It introduces the 
participants in detail and describes the results and analysis of those trials.  
Chapter 8 describes the ‘Further Trials (Magid 2)’ project, with improvements to the 
package trialled in eight further organisations. It describes the changes to 
methodology based on learning in the first cycle, and describes the results, 
analysis and conclusions reached.  
Chapter 9 discusses conclusions, both in terms of practical results and improvements 
to the package and in terms of wider theory gained. It contrasts work by 
previous researchers, and outlines a range of further work to take the 
research forward.  
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter provides an overview of the academic and related literature associated with 
this thesis topic.  
As a researcher in the field of Developer Centred Security (DCS), the author wanted an 
overview of the whole field with an indication of the relative importance of different 
topics. No current publications provide this, and so the first section of this chapter uses a 
rigorous method  to address this lack. 
The second section of this chapter reviews research related to the specific topic of this 
thesis: interventions for software developers.  
2.1 Developer Centred Security Literature 
This section provides an overview to introduce the reader to the discipline of DCS, with 
a rigorous analysis of the most important papers and books. 
2.1.1 DCS Review Method 
The scope of this review was peer-reviewed or professionally edited publications related 
to software developers’ implementation of security or privacy in their code: Developer 
Centred Security. This included developer behaviour related to security, developers’ use 
of static analysis and testing tools, and developer use of cryptography. Related topics 
were excluded, such as the design of static analysis and testing tools, non-security-related 
developer behaviour, the implementation of cryptography, and the work (including 
vulnerability analysis) of software security professionals. Identifying the works likely to 
be ‘important’ to a researcher in the field suggested the use of citation counts. 
The review started with an extensive list generated in the course of the research project. 
While no systematic search was carried out, the list includes the papers from a previous 
systematic search [165] plus all DCS papers identified by an AI-based recommendation 
service, so it is unlikely any highly-cited papers have been omitted. For each paper, the 
author then assigned the citation count taken from Google Scholar.  
Using citation counts alone strongly favours older publications that have had more time 
to accumulate citations. Instead, observe from Bai et al.’s chart of annual citation rates 
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for randomly selected papers in Figure 2 that the distribution of citation rates 
approximates to constant for a given paper after a certain time  [17], and therefore the 
annual citation rate is a meaningful figure. Given the relative youth of the discipline of 
Developer-Centred Security, it is important to give weight to recent papers, so in this 
review, the ‘important’ selection criterion was interpreted as ‘having a high annual 
citation rate’.  
A total of 173 peer-reviewed or professionally edited publications were found in the field 
of Developer Centred Security. These had between zero and 298 average citations per 
annum, with a median count of 6. From this set, 37 publications were chosen as 
‘important’: having more than 10 citations per year.  
To provide context to discuss the papers, they were categorised into topics as follows: 
Static Analysis Research on developers’ use of tools for the security analysis of 
both source code and binaries, including the adoption of such tools. 
Literature Information on secure development for use by developers, and 
analysis of how such information is used. 
Requirements Research into ways to identify security requirements, including 
Threat Modelling.  
Developer 
Behaviour 
Research into developer behaviour related to creating secure 
software. 
Roadmaps Suggestions for future Developer Centred Security research. 
To check the sensitivity of this selection criterion of 10 citations per year, the range of 
papers with 9 and 8 citations were also reviewed to see if they added further topics; they 
did not. The author also checked whether there were any unexpected omissions from the 
list; there were none. 
2.1.2 The Key DCS Publications 
Figure 3 shows the literature selected. It shows the publications organised by date and 
topic. Red text indicates particularly highly referenced publications—with more than 40 
citations per year)—and italics indicate published books. ‘Et al’ is abbreviated to ‘+’ 
throughout. A surprising proportion of the research dealt with mobile app development 
and these publications are indicated in navy blue. Each paper is described in Sections 
2.1.3 to 2.1.7, and the alphabetical list can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 2: Annual Citations of a Range of Papers (Bai et al. [17]) 
X. Bai, F. Zhang and I. Lee / Journal of Informetrics 13 (2019) 407–418 409
Fig. 1. Citation pattern of individual scholarly papers over time.
between papers) to predict the probability of a paper being cited. To characterize the citation dynamics of scientific papers, a
nonlinear stochastic model of citation dyn mics based on the copying-redirection-triadic closure mechanism was  port d
by Golosovsky and Solomon (2017).
3. Modeling citing behavior as a point process
3.1. Dataset
The American Physical Society (APS) dataset includes all papers published in 9 journals, including Physical Review A,
Physical Review B, Physical Review C, Physical Review D, Physical Review E, Physical Review I, Physical Review L, Physical
Review ST and Review of Modern Physics, from 1970 to 2013 (http://publish.aps.org/datasets). Each record in the APS dataset
includes paper title, author names, author affiliations, date of publication, and a list of cited papers. Because the APS dataset
does not provide unique author identifiers, we first do name disambiguation based on the method proposed by Sinatra,
Wang, Deville, Song, and Barabási (2016) in our experiments. Two  authors are considered to be the same individual if all
of the following three conditions are fulfilled: (1) Last names of two  authors are identical; (2) First names are identical or
with the matched initial; (3) One of the following is true: the two authors cited each other at least once; the two  authors
share at least one co-author; The two authors share at least one similar affiliation. We  select 183,336 papers as experimental
data in the APS dataset from 1978 to 1998. Scholarly papers with greater or equal to 5 citations within the first 5 years of
publication are used as the training data, and their citations in the subsequent 10 years are used as the testing data.
3.2. Prediction model
Intrinsic potential.  Citations reflect the impact of a research paper, which correspond to the authors’ impact which can
be quantified as Qi for an author i (Sinatra et al., 2016). A scholar with high Qi is expected to publish high-impact publications.
In this paper, we use the parameter Qi to indicate the intrinsic potential of a paper’s impact.
Paper impact decaying over time. As new ideas presented of each paper further grow in follow-up studies, the novelty
fades away eventually and the impact of papers decays over time (Wang et al., 2013). Fig. 1 shows the citation pattern of
individual scholarly papers over time. The vertical axis is the yearly citations of 100 randomly selected scholarly papers
published between 1978 and 1997 in t e APS dataset. The color represents to the publication year of each scholarly paper.
According to Fig. 1, each paper has its own inherent citation trend and the pattern may  not correlate to one another.
Early citers’ impact. Some prior studies have ignored the citers’ impact to the citation dynamics (Wang et al., 2013).
According to the study in Singh et al. (2017), influential early citers might negatively affect long-term scientific impact of
papers due to attention stealing, whereas non-influential early citers could positively affect the long-term scientific impact
of papers. Inspired by this idea, the early citers’ impact is used in PPI to model the citation pattern of a scholarly paper.
Early citation. Based on the behavior that high early citations lead to more itations in th  future, we model the Paper
Potential Index !d(t) of a scholarly paper d by extending a self-exciting Hawkes process:





where parameter ˇd is the coefficient of paper d impact decaying over time. QdMax indicates the maximum value of authors’
impact of paper d, and e!w1dt indicates the decay of a paper impact over time. Parameter ˛d is the coefficient that triggers
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Note that the vertical axis is not linear; earlier dates are spaced more closely than later 
ones to better represent the increasing amount of research taking place recently.  
The following sections explore each topic in turn: Static Analysis, Literature, 
Requirements, Developer Behaviour and Roadmaps. 
2.1.3 Research into Static Analysis for Security 
One approach to improving software security is to use a ‘Static Analysis’ tool to identify 
possible security vulnerabilities.  
Though a 2008 journal article mentions finding security bugs amongst other problems, 
using a static source code analysis tool at Google [15], in practice as Figure 4 shows that 
was only the start of a huge amount of research into static analysis tools [145]. Indeed, 
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the 3624 citations for Enck et al.’s 2010 paper on TaintDroid [54], and 1444 citations4 
for Arzt et al.’s 2014 paper on FlowDroid [11] suggest that this research has continued 
with similar intensity until now.  
However, the vast majority of this research considers only the effectiveness of tools 
created by researchers at detecting issues in source and binary code. Developer Centred 
Security is concerned with how developers interact with these tools. 
A survey by Johnson et al. analysed ‘Why don’t software developers use static analysis 
tools to find bugs’ and produced a set of recommendations for tool functionality; in 
particular the ability to avoid repeated false positives and support for ‘quick fixes’ [92]. 
Christakis and Bird [34] surveyed Microsoft developers’ opinions about such tools, 
finding that they consider security defects the most important for a code analysis tool to 
find, and that the key features they need are relevant results, speed, and the ability to 
suppress earlier warnings in incremental changes.  
Xiao et al. [199] interviewed around 50 developers to quantify the factors that caused 
them to adopt automated security tools, finding that recommendation by trusted peers, 
even those only known through social media such as Stack Overflow, was the main 
reason. Nguyen et al. [123] explored the impact on Android developers of integrating a 
source code analysis tool into their editing environment, concluding a high value for 
‘quick fixes’: changes requiring little effort on the part of the programmer. And Derr et 
al. [45] surveyed around 200 Android developers to find the extent to they keep library 
versions up to date, finding huge scope for solving vulnerabilities by library updating 
without changes in code, but that frequent backward incompatible changes and incorrect 
Semantic Versioning in libraries currently make such updates problematic. 
2.1.4 Research into Literature for Developers 
Some 20 years ago the Software Patterns movement provided a mechanism and 
community to include developing knowledge in academically acceptable formats. A few 
of the pattern authors considered aspects of software security. An early patterns paper by 
Yoder&Barcalow describes a range of software architecture techniques to achieve 
 
4 Google Scholar figures for 15 March 2020. Google appears to have conflated the figures for the initial 
2010 USENIX TaintDroid paper with a later extended journal version, but the number still suggests a huge 
research population. 
 
Figure 4: Android Static Analysis Papers (Sadeghi et al. [145]) 
As shown in Fig. 2, this study covers multidisciplinary
research conducted in various domains, such as software
engineering (including programming languages), security,
and mobility. Consequently, as depicted in Fig. 5, selected
papers are also published in different venues related to
such domains.
4.4 Threats to Validity
By carefully following the SLR process in conducting this
study, we have tried to minimize the threats to the validity
of the results and conclusions made in this article. Never-
theless, there are three possible threats that deserve addi-
tional discussion.
One important threat is the completeness of this study,
that is, whether all of the appropriate papers in the litera-
ture were identified and included. This threat could be due
to two reasons: (1) some relevant papers were not picked up
by the search engines or did not match our keyword search,
(2) some relevant papers that were mistakenly omitted, and
vice-versa, some irrelevant papers that were mistakenly
included. To address these thre ts, we use multiple search
engines, including both scientific and general-p rpose
search engines. We also adopted an iterative approach for
our keyword-list construction. Since different research com-
munities (particularly, software engineering and security)
refer to the same concepts using different words, the itera-
tive process allowed us to ensure that a proper list of key-
words were us d in our search process.
Another threat is the validity of the proposed taxonomy,
that is, whether the taxonomy is sufficiently rich to enable
proper classification and analysis of the literature in this
area. To mitigate this threat, we adopted an iterative content
analysis method, whereby the taxonomy was continuously
evolved to account for every new concept encountered in
the papers. This gives us c nfidence that the taxonomy pro-
vi a good covera f r the variations and conc pts that
are encountered in this area of research.
Another threat is the objectiveness of the study, which
may lead to biased or flawed results. Tomitigate this risk, we
have tackled the individual reviewer’s bias by crosschecking
the papers, such that no paper received a single reviewer.
We have also tried to base the conclusions on the collective
numbers obtained from the classification of papers, rather
than individual reviewer’s interpretation or general observa-
tions, thusminimizing the individual reviewer’s bias.
5 TAXONOMY
To d fine a Android security analysis taxonomy for RQ1,
we started with selecting suitable dimensions and proper-
ties found in existing surveys. The aforementioned studies
described in Section 3, though relevant and useful, are not
sufficiently specific and systematic enough for classifying
the Android security analysis approaches in that they either
focus on mobile malware in general, or focus on certain
sub-areas, such as Android inter-application vulnerabilities
or families of Android malware software, but not on the
Android security analysis as a whole.
We thus have defined our own taxonomy to help clas-
sify existing work in this area. Nonetheless, the proposed
taxonomy is inspired by existing work described in
Section 3. The highest level of the taxonomy hierarchy
classifies the surveyed research based on the following
three questions:
1) What are the problems in the Android security being
addressed?
2) How and with which techniques the problems are
solved?
3) How is the validity of the proposed solutions
evaluated?
For each question, we derive the sub-dimensions of the
taxonomy related to the question, and enumerate the possi-
ble values that characterize the studied approaches. The
resulting taxonomy hierarchy consists of 21 dimensions and
sub-dimensions, which are depicted in Figs. 6, 7, and 8, and
explained in the following.
5.1 Approach Positioning (Problem)
The first part of the taxonomy, approach positioning, helps
characterize the “WHAT” aspects, that is, the objectives and
intent of Android security analysis research. It includes five
dimensions, as depicted in Fig. 6.
5.1.1 Analysis Objectives (T1.1)
This dimension classifies the approaches with respect to the
goal of their analysis. Thwarting malware apps that com-
promise the security of Android devices is a thriving
Fig. 4. Distribution of surveyed papers by publication year.
Fig. 5. Distribution of surveyed papers by publication venue.
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security functionality [203]5. Schumacher at al. later composed several such papers to 
create the book ‘Security Patterns’ [148]. And Yoskioka et al. later produced a survey of 
the security patterns literature, positioning it in the context of wider security and software 
methodology work [204].  
Several foundational DCS books date from 2006-2009. Steel et al., though not 
participants in the software patterns community, produced a book with ‘Patterns’ in the 
title describing techniques for Java security architecture [160]. Howard et al. published 
the book ‘Deadly Sins in Software Security’ (the number of sins varied with the edition), 
containing practical support for developers to avoid coding security issues [88]. And 
Anderson published ‘Security Engineering’, which provides guidance at a higher level 
than code, covering economics, usability, architecture and development process [9].  
More recently, a group in L.U. Hannover studied how developers learn from such 
information. Acar et al.’s ‘You get where you’re looking for’ [3] uses several surveys and 
experiments to explore the effectiveness of different information resources at helping 
solve security issues. From a survey of nearly 300 successful app developers worldwide 
they concluded that developers learned security using web search and from peers. From 
a practical experiment with over 50 Android developers to evaluate the effectiveness of 
several different ways of learning app security they found that copying from Stack 
Overflow led to a variety of security problems, and also the surprising result that 
programmers using only digital books achieved better security than those using web 
search.  
Fischer et al. explored copying from Stack Overflow in more depth, concluding that about 
15% of apps contain insecure code introduced in this way [60]. Acar et al.’s ‘Developers 
need support, too’ explores the online guidance available to developers6, identifying a 
need for resources written for other people than specialist software security experts [6].   
2.1.5 Research into Security Requirements 
Four well-cited publications suggest ways to elicit security requirements. Sindre & 
Opdahl propose ‘misuse cases’, as a way of drawing on the popular ‘use case’ 
methodology to address security [155]. Similarly, Faily & Flechais took the ‘Persona’ 
concept from user-centred design to provide a method to analyse the motives and 
approach of attackers [58]. Shostack’s book ‘Threat Modeling’, though following 
Microsoft’s tradition of ‘Threat Modeling’ meaning finding vulnerabilities rather than 
assessing threats, also offers developers valuable advice on techniques for security 
requirements [154]. And Perera et al. took earlier work identifying generic privacy 
requirements to create and demonstrate a method to identify privacy issues within IoT 
infrastructure [131]. 
In the last couple of years, two parallel7 systematic literature reviews have explored threat 
assessment. Tuma et al. categorised the papers they found, finding a majority of the work 
to be about applying threat modelling, with a minority describing specific threat 
modelling methods  [170]. Xiong & Lagerström analysed the specifics of individual 
papers finding most threat modelling techniques to be manual and graphically based 
 
5 Barcalow, the industry author, worked at that time at the same group in Reuters in Chicago as Charles, 
one not noted for security requirements! 
6 Charles is a co-author on this paper. 
7 Neither paper cites the other. 
Using Workshops to Improve Security in Software Development Teams 
28  Charles Weir - October 2020 
[201]. Both observed a lack of automation in the process and a lack of means to quality 
assure the outcomes.  
2.1.6 Research into Developer Security Behaviour 
This topic has only received research effort relatively recently: focusing on aspects of the 
software developer’s job and investigating how improvements and changes might help 
support more secure code.  
Fahl et al. used several forms of research with developers to evaluate how SSL problems 
could be reduced in mobile apps, proposing changes to the Android SSL framework [57]8. 
Balebako et al. surveyed and interviewed developers about implementing privacy needs, 
finding widespread ignorance of the privacy implications of third party libraries, 
especially in small companies [20]; Balebako & Cranor suggested several possible 
ecosystem improvements to encourage the implementation of effective app privacy [19].  
Nadi et al. investigated developers’ experiences with cryptographic APIs, concluding that 
most APIs were too low level for practical use [117].  Green & Smith explored the 
implications of this, advocating ‘developer-friendly security’ as a target [76].  
Other researchers have explored different aspects of software development. Hilton et al. 
explored Continuous Integration, highlighting the security threat of attackers changing 
delivered code [85]. Votipka et al. investigated the extent to which software testers, rather 
than specialist penetration testers, might find vulnerabilities; they found that, instead, 
security training and experience was key to finding such defects [180].  
There has been some research into how developers handle security aspects of 
programming. Yang et al. explored the security questions developers ask on Stack 
Overflow, finding more than half related to Web Security, and particular interest in 
passwords, hashing, signing and SQL injection [202]. Naiakshina et al. used a small-scale 
study with students to investigate the causes of developer errors in password storage, 
recommending nudges: asking for security, and secure-by-default frameworks [118]. And 
Assal & Chiasson surveyed developers in industry to explore their security practices, 
finding that corporate pressures meant that few kept to the best practices defined in the 
Secure Development Lifecycle literature [13].  
Finally, there is the possibility of paving the way for future research. Acar et al. 
investigated the validity of experiments on student participants rather than professionals, 
using a programming study with Python open source developers, and finding the 
determinant to be participants’ experience using the language, and not their status as a 
student or professional, nor their security experience [5].  
2.1.7 Roadmaps 
Lastly, two frequently cited papers propose roadmaps: justified lists of topics for future 
DCS research. Devanbu & Stubblebine’s 2000 paper explores topics of relevance to 
software engineering, exploring a range of different issues and possible approaches to 
their solution, and highlighting five areas for research: cost-benefit analysis of security 
requirements; architectures to support changing security policies; models of adversary 
behaviour; verification tools; and infrastructures for the security administration of 
deployed systems [46].  Acar et al. in 2016 explored existing research and suggested a 
 
8 Google subsequently implemented these changes. 
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three-part research agenda: how to do experiments on developers; influences on 
developer behaviour; and improvements in APIs, documentation and tools [4]. 
2.1.8 Limitations of this Review 
To conclude, though this review approach provides a good overview to the discipline, 
there are limitations in the selection criteria.  
The number of citations is an inaccurate way to estimate the importance of a paper to 
Developer Centred Security: citations may be for a variety of reasons and do not indicate 
that the citing papers were in the same field; and citations do not necessarily prove quality.  
Another limitation is that using citations excludes very recent papers that have had 
insufficient time to be cited.  
2.2 Security Interventions Literature 
The reader will observe that the ‘mainstream’ Developer Centred Security research 
identified by the review in the previous section included little work on interventions to 
improve developer security behaviour. One paper did suggest API changes to better 
support SSL development that have since been adopted [57]; another suggested a set of 
guidelines for cryptographic APIs [76]; a third provided advice to include security in 
requirements and to make security APIs opt-out only [118]; but none have provided 
validation of the effectiveness of carrying out their suggestions. 
This section, therefore, reviews literature applicable to the research topic of this thesis: 
interventions. That is both narrower than the selection criteria for the review in the 
previous section, in that few widely cited DCS papers deal specifically with interventions; 
and wider, to include interventions and related developer behaviour research not related 
to security. Accordingly, this section defines a range of topics, and reviews publications 
related to each topic.  
Research related to interventions for secure software has taken a variety of approaches. 
In this section, we explore several areas in turn: research into security requirements; ways 
to get developers to adopt process improvements; ways to get developers to adopt analysis 
tools; consultancy and training interventions; using interactions with security specialists; 
motivating developers to improve their processes; and motivating employees more 
generally to adopt secure practices. Each section also outlines omissions and 
opportunities arising from that area of research so far. 
2.2.1 Security Requirements 
There has been further research into security requirements, especially related to privacy. 
A literature survey by Türpe [171] found a range of research related to security 
requirements, mainly exploring Threat Modelling techniques, but no agreement on 
terminology or approach. Senarath and Arachchilage [150] used a programming task 
given to 35 developers to explore issues related to user privacy, finding it to be difficult 
to understand such requirements and translate them into engineering techniques, and 
recommending solutions in the specification of privacy requirements. Similar research by 
the same authors [151] found that developers use their own privacy expectations to guide 
software privacy decisions; these differ from the expectations of non-developer users, 
though the authors point out there is no easy solution for this problem.  
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Other researchers have explored requirements for security updates and fixes. Nayak et 
al. [122] found that less than 15% of known vulnerabilities were actually used in attacks, 
suggesting an opportunity for a more nuanced approach than just fixing everything. 
Vaniea and Rashidi [176] used a survey to analyse user thinking around the update 
procedure, deriving advice for developers planning such mechanisms including a 
recommendation for a ‘recovery path’. 
A few researchers have developed means to gamify the finding of security requirements. 
Shostack’s Elevation of Privilege [154] concentrates on technical issues and 
vulnerabilities; Denning’s Security and Privacy Threat Discovery Cards [149] 
concentrate more on high-level security assessment; and Merrill [113] successfully used 
a role-playing game with professional developers; none have been evaluated in any detail. 
One may conclude from this and the analyses in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.5 that there is a 
need for ways to support developers in determining wider security needs, finding effective 
ways to identify both a Threat Assessment, and wider security-related requirements.  
2.2.2 Adoption of Security-Enhancing Activities 
To achieve such motivation and culture changes, one possibility to change development 
processes and there has been significant research into applying such changes to software 
security improvement. Indeed, prior to about 2010 the accepted way of improving 
software security was a ‘Secure Development Lifecycle’ (SDL), a prescriptive set of 
instructions to managers, developers and stakeholders on how to add security activities 
to the development process. A paper by De Win et al. compares the three major SDLs of 
that time, OWASP’s CLASP, Microsoft’s SDL and McGraw’s Touchpoints, contrasting 
their features in the context of a simple project [197].  However, other research from that 
time suggests resistance from development teams to adopting a prescriptive methodology. 
For example Conradi and Dybå found in a survey that developers are sceptical about 
adopting the formal routines found in traditional quality systems [37]; others came to the 
same conclusion [83,103,141]. Indeed Geer’s online survey of 46 developers recruited 
from those already specialising in secure software development found only 30% of them 
using SDLs [70]; Xiao et al.’s later survey of 40 developers [199], found only 2 using 
them. While these sample sizes were fairly small, the findings provide a plausible 
explanation for the abandonment of SDLs. Since 2010, SDLs have been replaced in the 
research literature by ‘Security Capability Maturity Models’, such as BSIMM [207], 
which measure the effectiveness of corporate security enhancements rather than 
mandating how they are achieved9.  
Caputo et al. [32] used three case studies to explore several theories about what changes 
in software development might lead to more usable security, concluding a need for the 
alignment of security goals with business goals. Recently Assal and Chiasson [13] 
interviewed developers from 13 different teams and organisations about their security 
practices, concluding ‘a need for new, lightweight best practices that take into account 
the realities and pressures of development’. Van der Linden et al. found from a task-based 
study and survey [107] that developers tend to see only the activity of writing code to be 
security-relevant, suggesting a need for a stronger focus on the tasks and activities 
surrounding coding. 
Taking a different approach, Such et al. investigated the economics of software security, 
surveying 150 security specialists to analyse the economics of different assurance 
 
9 The author is aware, however, of several multinational companies still successfully using SDLs. 
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techniques [164]. The survey defined a taxonomy of twenty assurance techniques and 
found wide variations in the perceived cost-effectiveness of each. It found Public Review 
and (tool-based) Static Analysis to be the most cost-effective, and Formal Verification 
and Cryptographic Validation to be the least. Interestingly the researchers also identified 
frequently used combinations of techniques, finding that the combination of Architectural 
Review, Configuration Review, (manual) Penetration Testing and (automated, web-
based) Vulnerability Scan was seen as most cost-effective.  
These results suggest a need for more work exploring lightweight, cost-effective, 
enhancements to development practices to improve security.  
2.2.3 Encouraging the Adoption of Tools 
In addition to the work described in Section 2.1.3, there has been other research on how 
to support developers in adopting static and dynamic security analysis tools. Though 
insufficiently well-cited to qualify in the earlier survey of key DCS papers, these are 
particularly relevant to the topic of this thesis. 
Witschey et al. [198] suggested that adoption of tools could be modelled by Rogers’ 
Diffusion of Innovations theory [143], and used a survey of 40 developers recruited 
opportunistically to explore the model. They concluded that more experienced, and more 
inquisitive, developers are more likely to adopt tools, and that key deterrents were the 
difficulty of trialling new tools, and their invisibility – that developers are unlikely to 
notice a colleague using one.  
Xiao et al. [199] reported a similar Diffusion of Innovations study, interviewing 40 
professional developers to explore the social factors that led to security tool adoption. 
They found the main reason for adoption was recommendation by trusted peers, including 
high-rated experts in discussion forums. Interestingly company policies mandating the 
use of such tools were highly effective; all 13 who had security tools mandated did use 
them.  
An article by Bessey et al. [29] describes the experience of Coverity in building and 
marketing a source code checking tool. In particular they describe the motivation and 
issues with creating code checkers for large codebases. Their main interest is in the 
politics of tool purchasing; for example, the tool needs to deliver a true defect in its first 
three error messages to generate a sale.  
There is a discrepancy between the large amount of work on analysis tools (Section 2.1.3) 
and the relatively small amount of research on getting those tools adopted; given the 
availability of such tools, this suggests that techniques to help developer adopt such tools 
will have large impact. 
2.2.4 Consultancy and Training Interventions  
Turning to the question of how to promote security enhancements, several research teams 
have explored the impact of training and external involvement on teams’ delivery of 
secure software. Türpe et al. [172] explored the effect of a single penetration testing 
session and workshop on 37 members of a large geographically-dispersed project. The 
results were not encouraging; the main reason was that the workshop consultant 
highlighted problems without offering much in the way of solutions.  
Poller et al.’s later study [134] followed an unsuccessful attempt to improve long term 
security practices in an agile development team of about 15 people. The study 
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investigated the effect of security consultants whose task ‘was not to advise the product 
group on how to change their organisational routines, but to challenge and teach them 
about security issues of their product’. This proved insufficient, for two reasons. First, 
pressure to add functionality meant that attention was not given to security issues. Second, 
developers had trouble ‘improving security’ because their normal work procedures and 
ways of structuring their work did not support that kind of quality goal. The authors 
concluded that successful interventions would need “to investigate the potential business 
value of security, thus making it a more tangible development goal;” and that security is 
best promoted as a team, not individual, effort. 
Others have investigated the effect of programmer learning on security improvement. 
Yskout et al. [205] tested if ‘security patterns’ (such as those described in Schumacher et 
al.’s book [148]) might be an effective intervention to improve secure development in 
teams of student software developers; the results suggested a benefit but were statistically 
inconclusive.  
In terms of practical support for developers, a recent book ‘Agile Application Security’ 
by Bell et al. [28] provides guidance, a discussion of tools and detail on a range of 
assurance techniques; regrettably it is not selling widely10. 
The research findings do leave, as an alternative to traditional training, books or 
interventions based on penetration tests, the possibility of a team-based intervention. 
 
2.2.5 Improving Security Experts’ Interactions with Developers 
Other work has investigated the impact of stakeholder relationships on software security: 
Werlinger et al.’s ethnographic study and survey [194] explored the relationships of 
security practitioners (mainly operations staff) on the effectiveness of security, and 
proposed several tool enhancements to improve this, particularly in the control of 
information being communicated to other stakeholders. Haney and Lutters found from a 
survey of security practitioners [81] that the role is service-oriented and requires both 
customer service and advocacy skills.  
Ur Rahman and Williams [175] surveyed web-based information and nine teams of 
developers to investigate how DevOps—the  integration of operations procedures into 
code—incorporates security into projects, finding increased collaboration between 
developers and security specialists, and security benefits in the automation of testing, 
configuration and deployment. Lopez et al. [109] identified from interviews with one 
professional team that security was introduced through a complex combination of 
processes, standards, practices and training. 
Ashenden and Lawrence [12] took a proactive approach, using an Action Research 
method to investigate and improve the relationships between security professionals and 
business people in a single company, and found the approach effective in improving 
communication, though no evidence is yet available of longer-term impact. Their Action 
Research approach offers a suitable methodology for trialling other forms of intervention.  
Werlinger et al [194] explored the relationships of security practitioners (mainly 
operations staff) on the effectiveness of security, and proposed several tool enhancements 
to improve this, particularly in the control of information being communicated to other 
 
10 Amazon rank 202,000, March 2020. #361 in Computer Security. 
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stakeholders. Weir et al. [183] used interviews with a dozen security specialists to elicit 
ways of improving developers’ implementation of mobile app security, and concluded 
that the major opportunities were in encouraging ‘dialectic’: specific kinds of challenging 
communication with both the specialists themselves and a range of other stakeholders. 
Another technique used to improve software security is code review by peers or 
specialists. OWASP have published a Secure Code Review Guide Book [129]. However, 
research on the effectiveness of code review has been limited to more general software 
improvement: Baum et al. reviewed a variety of earlier work and interviewed 24 
professionals in 19 German companies. They conclude that cultural issues, rather than 
practical ones, determined whether code reviews were used, and that reviews were best 
embedded in the development process from the beginning of a project [25].  
All this research concluded—or assumed and did not conclude otherwise—that the 
security impact of interactions between security specialists and developers is positive. 
There is a relative scarcity of security specialists, with a 2016 UK total of 58,000 [167] 
compared with 308,000 programmers (not to mention testers and managers) [159], so 
there is a definite need for cost-effective ways to leverage those interactions more 
effectively to empower developers to write secure code. 
2.2.6 Motivating Change in Development Teams 
To move from delivering insecure code to delivering secure code requires a change in 
thinking in the development teams. A variety of research has explored how to engender 
similar changes in software development teams. 
Dybå [48] performed a wide-ranging quantitative survey of Software Process 
Improvement (SPI) in 120 organisations, and concluded that organisational factors were 
as least as important as technical ones. In particular, he identifies business orientation, the 
extent to which SPI goals and actions are aligned with explicit and implicit business goals 
and strategies, as one of the factors with the strongest influence on SPI success; together 
with employee participation, the extent to which employees use their knowledge and 
experience to decide, act, and take responsibility for SPI. Surprisingly, management 
commitment was not required. The paper also strongly recommends that, for SPI, 
measurement systems be designed by the software developers themselves.  
Beecham et al. [27] conducted a literature review of 92 papers on programmer motivation 
in 2008. Though virtually all of the research cited is about motivation to do the job of 
programming rather than motivation to change behaviour, the survey identifies that 
professional programmers tend to be motivated most by problem solving, by working to 
benefit others and by technical challenges. Hall et al. [79] framed these as ‘intrinsic 
motivators’ (things done for their own sake), relating them to Self-Determination Theory, 
a theoretical framework that argues that a person’s perceptions of their own autonomy, 
competence and relatedness (close personal relationships) provide the strongest 
motivation [67].  
Fear of failure was not among Beecham et al.’s list of motivators, which suggests that 
merely frightening developers into security (“a terrible thing might happen”) is unlikely 
to be an effective strategy to promote secure software. This is consistent with Xie et al.’s 
interviews of 15 professional programmers [200] to investigate why they believed they 
made security errors; they found a consistent tendency to treat security as ‘someone else’s 
problem’. 
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Umarji and Seaman [173] adapted two social psychology models to help analyse when 
developers might accept Process Improvement techniques. However, Riemenschneider et 
al. [141] used a ethnographic field study of 128 developers to compare five social 
psychology models of how developers adopt new ‘methodologies’, and concluded that 
none of the models matched actual practice, pointing instead to the need for an 
‘organisational mandate’, compatibility with the developers’ working practices, and 
acceptance by colleagues. 
Singer [156] proposes 25 interventions to improve software development, suitable for a 
project manager or coach (such as ‘Recommend similar and more proficient peers to less 
proficient developers’), citing real-life examples for each; the approach was trialled 
successfully in a student experiment to encourage adoption of version control systems.  
In terms of indirect influencing, an ideas paper by Lewis [105] suggests a score of 
‘gamification’ approaches to encourage users to engage with software. Underlying such 
work is Fogg’s book ‘Persuasive Technology’ [62], a seminal work on persuading people 
using computers. Fogg specifies three ways we see computers: as tools, as media 
(simulation), and as social actors (individuals in their own right); he describes some 40 
‘principles’, aspects of software behaviour that can be persuasive. 
Lopez et al., in the research project, ‘Motivating Jenny’ at the Open University [108], 
have investigated means to encourage developer teams in doing security. Based on 
ethnographic research, they concluded a need to raise developers’ security awareness 
[109]. They explored formats for workshops to engage professional developers in 
discussions about security [110], ultimately releasing them as a series of workshop 
instructions and information sheets for developers to use themselves [111]11. 
The work described in this section offers a range of possible approaches to influence 
developers to adopt secure practices. 
2.2.7 Motivating Security Changes in Employees 
The study of behaviour changes in people belongs to Social Psychology and Management 
Theory12. Fogg explored motivation for human behaviour, finding that individuals need 
to be motivated to perform the required behaviour; to have the ability to do it; and to be 
triggered to perform it [63]. Myers and Titgjen explored motivation in the form of job 
satisfaction, finding that positive motivations do not cancel out negative ones [169].   
Research into corporate security behaviour has built on Fogg’s theory; in this thesis we 
shall call motivating factors and triggers, ‘Motivators’; and lack of ability, ‘Blockers’. 
Thus, Motivators are events and factors that encourage a new behaviour, and Blockers 
are events and factors that discourage it.  
Exploring how to promote effective security practices, Kirlappos et al. found from a large 
survey of  employees in two organisations that a strong Blocker to the introduction of 
effective security lies in many organisations’ attitude to security: information security 
was seen as a ‘bolt on’ compliance exercise at odds with the employees’ main productive 
work [94]. Kirlappos et al. found in a later survey that this frequently results in ‘shadow 
security’, where the employees find their own ways to achieve security, different from 
 
11 Most of that content was written by the author of this thesis, based on work done by Lopez et al.  
12 The references in this section come from an introduction to Blockers and Motivators by the author and 
Ingolf Becker [185]. 
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the organisation-enforced approach, with varying effectiveness [95]. Both surveys 
proposed a solution of empowering employees to create effective security rather than 
enforcing particular company-wide security strategies. Blythe et al. used two different 
behaviour change theories to explore employees’ security practices, interviewing 20 
employees in two organisations, explicitly identifying blockers; they conclude that 
feedback on the effectiveness of employees’ security measures are likely to be more 
effective as Motivators than compliance approaches.  
Pfleeger et al. analysed a range of social psychology literature to find its applicability to 
security behaviour, identifying Motivators such as a ‘keystone habit’ (a comprehensible 
goal and steps to achieve it), and ‘moral foundations’ (appealing to people’s sense of 
rightness); and mentioning a few Blockers, such as the way existing security systems have 
conditioned people to ignore security warnings [132].  
Moving to Developer-Centred Security, Assal and Chiasson explored security Blockers 
and Motivators in development teams [14], finding a frequent Blocker to be ‘lack of 
management and process support for security’, and an effective Motivator to be 
‘identifying the importance of security.’  
The Blockers and Motivators concept offers a simple but powerful means to analyse the 
working of practical interventions.  
2.3 Summary and Limitations of Existing Literature 
In summary, the field of Developer Centred Security has followed four main topics of 
research: 
• Adoption of static analysis tools (especially for Android); 
• Literature providing guidance to developers; 
• Means, such as Threat Analysis, to establish security requirements; and  
• Research into developer security-related behaviour. 
Little of this, even the last, relates to means to influence or change developer security 
behaviour. So, for interventions research we looked further afield, considering a range of 
topics and identifying outcomes from each as shown below: 
Process 
improvements 
A need for cost-effective ways to support developers in 
determining wider security needs 
Analysis tools Techniques to help developer effectively to adopt analysis 
tools will have large impact. 
Consultancy and 
training interventions  
The possibility of a discussion-based intervention 
emphasising the positive business value of security 
enhancements 
Interactions with 
security specialists  
A need for ways to improve communication between 
developer and security specialists 
Motivating process 
improvement 
A range of possible approaches to influence developers to 
adopt secure practices 
Motivating general 
secure practices 
Blockers and Motivators provide a powerful means to 
analyse the working of practical interventions 
 
The review found relatively little research discussing successful security interventions to 
support development teams, even though the security track records of many large 
companies suggest that such interventions must exist. In the research discussed above, 
even code analysis tools required other interventions to get them adopted; and other 
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approaches required both security professionals and interventions that were costly in 
terms of effort involved.  
The research project, ‘Motivating Jenny’ at the Open University (Section 2.2.6) has 
created lightweight interventions, but there is no evidence as yet into their effectiveness.  
We are aware of no other academic literature investigating lightweight approaches to 
encourage teams of developers to adopt successful security practices. Based on the 
previous discussions such an approach would need to: 
• Be cost-effective, and not require security professionals; 
• Support developers in determining wider security needs; 
• Encourage developers to investigate security code analysis tools, especially just-
in-time solutions; and  
• Analyse and address the resulting Blockers and Motivators impacting on the 
teams.  
This thesis offers one such approach.  
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3 Methods Used 
This chapter explores the methodology of the research projects. It introduces the 
philosophical stance of the author, and introduces the methods for each separate project, 
specifically: 
• Grounded Theory, 
• Online Survey,  
• Canonical Action Research and 
• Design-Based Research 
This chapter discusses only the methodological aspects of each project—aspects that 
would be relevant to other implementations; details specific to the specific 
implementation, such as numbers and details of recruits, are covered in the specific 
chapters describing each project.  
3.1 Philosophical Approach 
An important starting point is to define the philosophical approach we have as 
researchers. Goldkuhl [75] identifies three common philosophical stances depending on 
the aims and requirements of an Information Systems research project, as follows: 
Positivist research looks for a single objective truth;  
Relativist (or interpretivist) research rejects the idea that a single objective truth exists, 
and looks instead for a more local truth; and 
Pragmatic research seeks specific social or business benefits as a result. 
In this research, ultimately, we are looking to find ways to make a large number of teams 
more effective at software security. Our overall philosophical viewpoint, therefore, is 
Pragmatic.  
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3.2 Choice of Research Methods 
The research question: 
RQ 1 What is needed to make a cost-effective and widely applicable intervention to 
help UK software development teams achieve better software security? 
identifies the research topic as one in Empirical Software Engineering (ESE). Empirical 
Software Engineering is the research area concerned with the study of how software 
creation happens in practice. The terms ‘cost-effective’, ‘widely-applicable’, 
‘intervention’ and ‘achieve’ all mean that the question is about what happens in 
practice, and the emphasis on software development makes it an ESE question. We can 
identify five generally used research methods for this field [49]:  
1. Controlled Experiments (including Quasi-Experiments);  
2. Case Studies (both exploratory and confirmatory);  
3. Survey Research; 
4. Ethnographies;  
5. Action Research. 
Most have been used in Developer Centred Security research. For example, Acar et al. 
[3] used Controlled Experiments with individual software developers to evaluate learning 
about security, and Yskout et al. used A-B Controlled Experiments with students to 
evaluate the use of security patterns [205]; Ge et al. [69] wrote up a secure web project 
as a Case Study; Balebako & Cranor [19] used a Survey to evaluate app developers’ 
attitudes to privacy; and Poller et al. [134] used an Ethnographic study to study the effect 
of an intervention by security professionals. Variants of Action Research have been 
widely used in Empirical Software Engineering [147], though as far as we know, it was 
not used not prior to this project in Developer Centred Security research. 
Since we want a wide impact for the intervention, we need it to work with teams of 
professional software engineers. Though Controlled Experiments are possible on 
individual software professionals [3], we knew of no professional development teams 
who might cooperate with such experiments, and we rejected this approach. 
Further, since the aim was to study new means to change the behaviour of software 
engineers, we rejected Case Studies as an approach.  
Instead, therefore, we used Survey Research for the initial steps to provide knowledge 
and theory to support the creation of an intervention. This took two forms: a qualitative 
interview survey of professional security experts, and a quantitative online survey of 
software engineers.  
For the qualitative survey, the choice of methodology was important, since taking 
recordings of unstructured responses to qualitative interviews and deriving academically 
sound knowledge from them is a difficult challenge. Two competing methodologies both 
address that problem: 
• Grounded Theory [74] concentrates on deriving a single overarching ‘theory’. 
• Thematic Analysis [35] concentrates on deriving multiple themes.  
Both use similar techniques in practice, though Grounded Theory’s ‘Everything is Data’ 
principle tends to apply it to a wider range of data. The main distinction is in the aim of 
each methodology. Grounded Theory (GT) looks for a single ‘theory’, an overarching 
conceptual framework that can help a researcher or practitioner understand and perhaps 
change a complex situation [74]. Thematic Analysis looks for multiple ‘themes’, usually 
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within the context of an existing ‘theory’ or conceptual framework [35]. Grounded 
Theory doesn’t ‘prove’ the theory it generates, nor even claim that two different sets of 
researchers given the same data will generate the same theory, but its methods allow GT 
practitioners convincingly to claim a measure of dependability in the process: that the 
correct use of GT is likely to generate a theory consistent with the data [33]. This research 
takes a pragmatic approach (Section 3.1): the resulting theory can later be accepted if it 
helps understand a complex situation, if deductions made using it are all confirmed, and 
if using it to plan research or interventions leads to desired outcomes; it can be rejected if 
not. 
In the qualitative survey, the author was faced with large amounts of transcribed text 
representing a wide variety of ‘expert opinion’. To take action based on this expert 
opinion, a simplifying ‘theory’ was needed; none existed beforehand. This pointed to a 
need for Grounded Theory rather than Thematic Analysis. GT is widely accepted by the 
software research academic community [162], and was adopted on this basis. Section 3.3 
describes the use of GT in detail.  
For the online survey, by contrast, the choice of analysis method was straightforward; it 
used statistical methods, as described in Section 3.4.  
The next research stage required the creation of an intervention as a proof of concept and 
exemplar to support learning more about the subject. The findings of the surveys provided 
outline requirements for the intervention, and ruled out, surprisingly, the conventional 
approaches to improving software security discussed in Sections 1.4 and 2.2.4.  The 
experience of the author as a software consultant and team leader provided a range of 
facilitation and game techniques to use. The author therefore combined a game idea from 
the work of colleagues with ideation techniques to create the format of workshops for 
teams of developers: the Developer Security Essentials intervention. Chapter 6 provides 
more detail. 
 
Trialling this intervention with professional developers required the direct involvement 
of the researchers as facilitators. This ruled out an Ethnographic approach, since 
Ethnography requires the researchers to remain relatively uninvolved. Instead we used 
Action Research [196], an accepted methodology used in many forms of academic social 
research including software engineering [47,147,153]. Specifically, we used the methods 
and approach prescribed for Canonical Action Research, using the entire project as a 
single ‘action research cycle’. Section 3.5 describes Canonical Action Research in detail. 
Based on the findings from the first trials, the author modified the Developer Security 
Essentials package and embarked on a further set of trials with professional teams of 
developers. Constraints in the pure Canonical Action Research methodology led to the 
adoption of a different overall methodology, Design-Based Research (DBR). Section 3.6 
describes Design-Based Research.  
All four research projects were approved in advance by the Lancaster University Faculty 
of Science and Technology Research Ethics committee. 
3.3 Grounded Theory 
This section explores our use of Grounded Theory. Our Grounded Theory methods were 
identical to those used in the author’s previous project, and much of the content of this 
section is based on the author’s earlier Masters by Research thesis [183].  
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3.3.1 Introduction to Grounded Theory  
Grounded Theory (GT) is a systematic methodology to construct theory through the 
analysis of data. It originally developed in the US medical field, where the direct value of 
discoveries about human social behaviour is high. Glaser’s early works, ‘The Discovery 
of Grounded Theory’ and ‘Theoretical Sensitivity’ [73,74] contain a good deal of 
discussion of the social benefits of the process, and a polemical style against alternatives.   
Within 10 years Glaser and Strauss/Corbin [163] were competing for ‘ownership’ of the 
technique and the two resulting ‘flavours’ of GT still remain distinct. Both approaches 
are positivist in essence, though Glaser’s aim is to `discover' a single overarching theory, 
while Strauss is more interested in causes and effects [120]. 
Later still, as the technique was adopted by European researchers, Charmaz [33] tailored 
it to support the relativist philosophy [125]. The resulting variant is now known as 
Constructivist GT, an approach that emphasises the researcher’s impact and the restricted 
applicability of any results. The approach used in this research is Constructivist GT. 
Glaser and Strauss/Corbin’s works are strong on justifications and in some cases team 
approaches, but less so on practical instructions how to go about making detailed choices 
in following the method [66]. However, software engineering researchers now have 
access to a range of work filling this gap. A good starting point is Hoda et al.’s set of 
patterns instructing a novice how to set about a GT research project [87]. Other work in 
this area extends basic GT with detailed advice, such as Adolph's ‘Lessons Learned’ [7] 
and Allan's ‘Critique of Using Grounded Theory’ [8]. Finally Stol et al.’s ‘Grounded 
Theory in Software Engineering Research’ [162] provides a detailed and very explicit set 
of instructions on how to achieve academic rigour. 
3.3.2 A Brief Overview of Grounded Theory  
Traditional science assumes that theories are generated as hypotheses by the researcher, 
which are then repeatedly tested against reality [133]. The concept is that random theories 
are winnowed by the scientific process to leave only those which match observable and 
testable fact. Grounded Theory attempts to make theory generation into a more 
dependable process, based on textual analysis. Rigorous testing of the theories generated 
is expected to happen via other approaches.  
The textual analysis is of everything relevant that is available to the researcher. Thus, it 
might include interview transcripts, survey comments, relevant research literature, field 
notes from observation and anything else that can be reduced to text form. This is summed 
up in the GT principle all is data. 
The process is iterative, with analysis of initial findings from interviews or similar 
typically leading to changes in the research thrust and direction, and with every code 
written being matched against all the others, a technique called the constant comparative 
method.  
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3.3.3 Grounded Theory Step-by-Step  
Figure 5 shows the techniques used in the Grounded Theory process. As can be seen, the 
process is highly iterative, with the practitioners moving from technique to technique in 
response to discoveries, new data, and observations concerning the data. 
Table 2 describes each technique in more detail. 
Table 2: Steps in Grounded Theory 
Technique	 Description	
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3.3.4 The Use of Literature Surveys 
Hoda et al. [87] recommend using existing literature in a different way from other forms 
of research.  Since the aim of Grounded Theory is to generate new theory, there is a natural 
concern not to be biased by existing thinking. So GT’s original recommendation was to 
leave any literature survey until after the main bulk of coding and ideas generation [7]. 
Hoda et al. disagree with this, pointing out that literature surveys are often needed due to 
academic pressures and the need for the researcher to be up to speed with the subject 
terminology. They therefore recommend a short literature survey to begin with, and a 
longer one once the majority of data has been coded. The longer survey may itself 
contribute to the coding and memo generation. However, we have not seen a suggestion 
that academic papers should be coded with the same level of detail that is given to other 
research data.  
Others suggest a similar approach: Allan [8] used a literature survey in advance of GT 
work to identify if there were compelling theories already in existence.  
We have therefore taken the approach of an initial literature survey to learn nomenclature 
and avoid ‘reinventing the wheel’. A final, post-research survey (Section 2.2) added 
further detail in the context of the discoveries from our interviews.  
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3.3.5 Incorporating Appreciative Inquiry 
A further important question is how to structure the interviews to get the most helpful 
results. Our major concern in discussing security with experts was the danger of a litany 
of complaints and major problems they had seen. Much of the security literature 
concentrates on vulnerabilities, and we perceived a tendency among security experts to 
concentrate on the negative. We wanted instead to avoid the details of problems, and to 
focus on what had actually worked well for our interviewees.  
This led us to look at Appreciative Inquiry. This method is primarily used as an Action 
Learning method, with its purpose to change the participants’ behaviour for the better as 
they reflect on their answers to questions. In this research we did not need to change the 
participants (the security experts). Instead we want to find the means to help achieve the 
results being achieved by the interviewees, but in other contexts, and so the Appreciative 
Inquiry method offers a valuable contribution. 
The full Appreciative Inquiry method [41] involves a cycle of four processes as shown in 
Figure 6. The Discovery Phase typically concentrates on the positive aspects of the 
current situation, encouraging participants to visualise what has worked, and what is now 
working – hence the name ‘Appreciative’. The Dream Phase also stresses the positive, 
with participants working to establish a shared vision of the future. The Design and 
Destiny phases then continue to produce a plan for future change that has buy-in from the 
participants. 
 
Figure 6: The Processes of Appreciative Inquiry 
Discovery
Identification











Chapter 3: Methods Used 
44  Charles Weir - October 2020 
Underpinning this cyclical process is a set of five principles, which we may summarise 
simply as shown in Table 3.  
So, when using Appreciative Inquiry, a community will work together 
(Constructionalist), starting with the Discovery of the current situation (Simultaneity), 
then generating a (Poetic) Dream of how they would like things to be. They then Design 
(Anticipatory) steps to take them there, creating a Destiny, which then becomes the 
baseline for the next cycle. To generate and sustain the energy required for such change, 
Appreciative Inquiry replaces the conventional trouble-shooter focus on problems, 
complaints and issues with a Positive focus, especially in the Dream activity. 
Appreciative Inquiry has been effective in creating organisational change in a large 
variety of different organisations [40].  To use it as a research tool requires some changes 
that are explored in detail by Reed [140]. In our interviews of security specialists, 
however, we were neither working with a community nor did we have the opportunity to 
work with the specialists over the timescale involved in a cycle; so we used only the two 
elements that could work effectively in a single interview: each interview concentrated 
on AI’s Discovery: “What do you do and have you done in the past that was successful” 
and Dream: “What would you like to see in an ideal world?” In terms of principles, the 
interviews strongly adopted Appreciative Inquiry’s Positive principle; and gathered 
Poetic stories to characterise the effective techniques discussed by the participants. 
3.4 Online Survey 
This section discusses the methodology behind the creation of an online survey. Such 
surveys are valuable to find objective, quantitative, data about the current situation, and 
indeed in this research we used a survey to find background information about the secure 
development habits of a community of professional developers. 
Chapter 5 covers the practical elements of the specific survey we did, such as choice of 
participants, scope of questions, and the additional artefact analysis carried out.  
The important methodological aspects can be summarised as: 
• Ethical issues  
• Questionnaire design 
• Questionnaire implementation 
• Analysis design 
• Review and piloting 
• Sample sizing and marketing 
• Survey follow-up 
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The following sections discuss each in turn, describing each in terms of the activities we 
carried out and the reasons involved.  
3.4.1 Ethical Issues 
Probably the biggest ethical issue is the privacy of the participants, since the responses 
contain personally identifiable information. Addressing this requires: 
• Keeping all responses secure. Universities provide guidelines for securing 
personally-identifiable data [101]. 
• Ensuring that publications do not permit the identification of any individuals. This 
applies particularly to the publication of the research data set, and includes 
ensuring that no combination of data in a response might permit the identification 
of a particular respondent. 
A second ethical issue is when it is appropriate to ‘spam’ the members of a mailing list. 
This is a complex issue, governed partly by legal constraints such as GDPR. 
Another concern concerns the use of rewards to the participants. Some surveys offer a 
lottery, offering benefits such as cash payments. There are practical issues with 
implementing this, and possible selection biases it might instigate, such as encouraging 
less well-off participants. Where, as in this survey, the rewards are altruistic benefits from 
the research and a report sent to participants who request it, the ethical requirement is to 
ensure that the analysis is properly carried out and that the report is indeed sent. In 
particular, we interpret the commitment to provide research benefits as a requirement to 
make the data set available for future researchers.  
A particular concern is the effective use of participants’ time. By sending out large 
numbers of survey requests we have an ethical responsibility to ensure that the time that 
participants spend is not wasted, by ensuring that the questionnaire is as effective as 
possible. This requires effective review and piloting (see section 3.4.5). 
Finally, there is the issue of the accountability of the researchers involved, providing 
publicly available details of the study purpose and contact details for the researchers and 
their superiors with the survey invitations.  
3.4.2 Questionnaire Design 
The first decisions were whom to survey, and what to learn about them. Whom to survey 
is partly a pragmatic decision, depending on what datasets of contacts are available; an 
online survey requires a large list of the email addresses of potential contacts. The 
questions to ask derive from the research questions. 
Before trialling questions on target participants or offering it for external review, it is 
important to challenge it based on several criteria: 
Survey completion time: Longer surveys tend to get a high dropout rate. Naturally the 
acceptable time depends on the nature of the participants, but expert sources cite 
maximum recommended times between eight minutes (SurveyMonkey) and 10 minutes 
(Qualtrics). A practical rule of thumb allows us to calculate objectively how long 
participants will take for a given set of questions: allow a point for each simple question, 
a point for each row in a grid question, a point for each two responses in a multiple select 
question, and two points for each mental calculation required; then multiply by 7.5 
seconds per point [178].  
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Practical implementation: The practical limitations of creating questions on a web-
based survey platform may require changing the phrasing or the nature of questions. 
Statistical relevance: it is important to take account of the analysis planned on the Survey 
results, to phrase and to target the questions in such a way as to get an effective result (see 
section 3.4.4). 
3.4.3 Questionnaire Implementation 
It is essential to use an online platform, and the better platforms improve both 
implementation and results. In practice we used Qualtrics, one of the market leading 
platforms. Several points are important in implementing the survey on such a platform: 
Linking results with invitations: where there is metadata about the invitees: for 
example, their location and product name, this much be matched to the corresponding 
survey results. 
Ease of statistical analysis: the survey platform codes most multiple-choice answers as 
integer numbers. For analysis it is helpful if these numbers correspond to useful values 
for statistical input. For example, Likert-type scales such as ‘Not knowledgeable at all …. 
Very knowledgeable’ might use increasing integer values, such as 1 to 5. 
Multiple platforms: participants are likely to be responding on anything from a PC to a 
mobile phone. Grid-style questions, where a set of questions each has the same range of 
answers, are more difficult to answer on a mobile device, and are worth avoiding.  
Encouragement: We want each participant to finish the survey if possible. So, it is 
important to keep encouraging them to carry on. A good solution we used in this project 
is to add a progress bar to show users how close they were to completion. 
Irrelevant questions: some questions are only meaningful in certain circumstances. For 
example, if the participant answered “No” to the question “Are you in a team?” then it 
would be meaningless to ask the team size. The survey software handles these using 
constructs called ‘conditions’ and ‘blocks’; it is important to implement these carefully 
and test them in the initial face-to-face trials. 
Randomisation: the order of the questions and of the answers within questions is 
important. To prevent this having a statistical effect, it is worth using randomisation 
where possible. Randomising the order of all of the questions would create problems 
around the ‘irrelevant questions’ discussed above. Instead one can randomise the order of 
questions within grids, and the ordering of answers where these have no logical built-in 
ordering. 
Standard answers: Where possible, one can build on the experience of other researchers 
by reusing tried-and-tested answer sets provided by the platform. For example, for 
knowledgeability Qualtrics provides a Likert-type scale from ‘Very knowledgeable’ to 
‘Not knowledgeable at all’. 
Optional answering: some questionnaire systems force the participant to answer every 
question, by not allowing progress until an answer is present. This can be irritating and 
deter participants from completing the rest of the survey. However, it is important to avoid 
participants accidentally missing out questions; a compromise is to use a dialogue “… 
Are you sure?”. 
Coding answers: in some cases, we did not know what set of answers to expect. For 
example, the question “What development environment do you use?” might have some 
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obvious answers but might also have a range of possible answers we were not expecting. 
So, we created the survey with an initial fixed set of multiple-choice options, and an 
additional “Other” option with a corresponding free text field. Following the pilot study, 
we manually ‘coded’ the answers for that text field, then incorporated the most common 
‘codes’ as further multiple-choice options. We retained the ‘Other’ option in these cases, 
but in practice none of the text answers proved of value in reporting the survey results. 
Low-value responses: Questionnaires, especially in psychology, sometimes include 
‘attention questions’, where the same question is asked in two different ways: typically 
negated the second time. Researchers can then either reject responses with inconsistent 
answers, or do statistical analysis [166] determine whether responses are sufficiently 
internally consistent. However, in questionnaires about facts rather than opinions this 
approach can appear contrived and irritating to the participants. An alternative to reject 
low-value responses is to analyse the time taken to complete the survey, rejecting those 
completed so fast that it was unlikely that the respondents were responding accurately. 
3.4.4 Analysis Design 
In parallel with the survey there needs to be an analysis plan. This fed back to the question 
design and implementation.  
Our initial inclination was to gather the survey results first and then decide on statistical 
analysis according to what we found. This approach works fine for purely descriptive 
statistical analysis, such as graphical representations of the results of questions and simple 
calculations from those numbers. However, for statistical hypothesis testing—
specifically any statistical analysis that returns a p-value—this approach is unsatisfactory. 
The reason lies in the problem of ‘data dredging’. When we run a test of statistical 
significance we are always implicitly or explicitly comparing two hypotheses; one that 
the data tested shows a particular feature, and the other, ‘null hypothesis’, that it doesn’t. 
A ‘p-value’ is the probability that the data analysed could have shown that feature even 
if the null hypothesis was true, just by random chance. The arbitrarily accepted p-value 
threshold for statistical significance, 0.05, is likely to be achieved by random chance 
every now and again, even if the feature is not present. In fact, if we do as few as 14 
analyses on different samples of data that doesn’t have some feature, we still have a more 
than 50% chance that one will show that feature with a ‘significant’ p-value of less than 
0.0513. 
This means that if we take a dataset and run enough statistical tests on it, we will find 
‘statistically significant’ results purely by chance. Doing this is called ‘data dredging’ and 
is poor research practice; in particular it leads to conclusions that are unlikely to be 
replicable [89]. 
The main ways to avoid this are twofold: 
First, we define, before data collection, what statistics analysis we are going to do, what 
the tests will be, and what are the hypotheses and null hypotheses. Indeed, many journals 
now accept papers that define the research process and analysis prior to the data 
collection, with a guarantee of publication regardless of the subsequent results, because 
this leads to more replicable, and therefore higher value, research results. Research best 
practice guides also require this approach [38,39]. 
 
13Pr(𝑛𝑜	𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡	𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠	𝑖𝑛	14	𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑠) = (1 − 0.05)!" 	= 0.49  
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Second, when the planned and statistics do require several tests on the same data, we use 
corrections and techniques to ensure that the criteria for statistical significance are 
modified accordingly. For example, the Bonferroni correction divides the threshold for 
statistical significance by the number of tests made [144]. 
In deciding statistical techniques, we need to both identify the techniques required, and 
find ways to ensure that correct preconditions hold for each. For example, many statistical 
calculations assume some form of Normal distribution in the data; to use one, for those 
we would need to ensure that the dataset satisfies this precondition. 
In the statistical analysis for this project we had two forms of question: 
1. In the survey results, a proportion satisfied some criteria (e.g., ‘works with 
security professionals’); what can we deduce about the wider population? 
2. We have two sets of ‘factors’, measured numeric values (e.g. rating of importance 
of security, frequency of use of security techniques); do they show a mathematical 
relationship? 
For 1, ignoring concerns about sample validity, we can express the answer in terms of the 
95% confidence limits on the proportion in the wider population. This is a simple formula, 
calculated from the sample proportion and the sample size [99], and requires only that the 
sample has the same variance as the wider population—i.e. that the sample is 
representative. 
For 2, the usual relationship to look for is a linear one. If there is no need to use the result 
to make predictions, linear regression is unnecessary; instead we used the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient (‘Pearson R’) calculation [44] to establish whether pairs of values 
had a linear relationship. Note that in representing the relationship graphically it helps to 
show a line on the graph; to calculate this line the graph plotting software used Simple 
Linear Regression [44].  
The preconditions for the Pearson Correlation Coefficient test are that the data tested are 
continuous (i.e. numeric, with equal intervals between adjacent units); come in matched 
pairs (x,y values); have no outliers (values far from the majority); and have linearity and 
homoscedasticity (criteria that amount to ‘look vaguely linear on a scatterplot’). We tested 
these by plotting a scatterplot or similar to show the data. 
Following normal statistical practice, we coded Likert-style responses [106] on a range 
of 1 through 5 to create effectively continuous data [91]. It is accepted practice to use 
Pearson R tests on such coded scores [96,124]. 
Some of the data (such as the number of errors found by analysis in an application) forms 
a Poisson distribution14. To permit linear analysis on this data we use a transformation, 
log(𝑥! + 	k) , where k is chosen to minimise skewness [30]; in practice we trialled 
different values of k, finding no difference to the results, so used the conventional 
research practice of k=1. 
One form of analysis is to look for correlation between a matrix of ‘factors’, where each 
factor is represented as a numeric score. For example, we might have had A, B, and C as 
input (‘independent’) factors—things that we might think of as causes—and X, Y, Z as 
output (‘dependent’) factors—things we might think of as effects. In that case we would 
 
14 The Poisson distribution may be thought of as the ‘bus waiting times’ distribution; if buses arrive 
randomly, then the distribution of waiting times obeys the Poisson distribution: Pr	(𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒	 > 𝑡) ∝
𝑒#$% 
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have tested X’s correlation with each of A, B, and C; Y’s correlation with each of A, B 
and C; and Z’s correlation with each of A, B, C. Since this constituted several tests on the 
same data, we applied the Bonferroni correction [144], reducing the threshold for 
‘significance’ accordingly. 
To investigate the sample validity, we used one further statistical technique. We 
investigated whether results from a subset of the data (e.g. developers of apps with less 
than 1000 downloads) differ materially from the remainder. Since the two samples—
subset and remainder—are independent and we have no knowledge of the distribution of 
the values, we used the Mann Whitney rank sum test [144] to compare the sample 
medians. The other preconditions for this test—that the two populations have the same 
distribution and variance—are reasonable for this situation. We used the same test to 
compare the survey results with those from the corresponding larger populations. 
3.4.5 Review and Piloting 
There are a variety of approaches to help ensure the survey is effective [64].  
Expert Reviewing: This is a method that supports identifying questions that require 
clarification and uncovering problems with question ordering or potential biases [136]. It 
involves asking an experienced usable security and privacy researcher with survey 
expertise, who is not part of the research team, to review our survey questionnaire and 
evaluate question wording, ordering, and bias. 
Face-to-face Testing: Next, is face-to-face pilot surveys with a few candidate 
participants who were not previously involved in the research project. This supports 
revising the survey questions based on realistic feedback.  
Pilot Survey: Before conducting the full survey, one can send invitations piecemeal until 
a few dozen replies are received: enough for simple analysis and feedback but minimising 
the effort ‘wasted’ by participants whose responses would not appear in the final survey. 
The goal is to test the survey questionnaire under realistic conditions and with participants 
drawn from the same pool as we used for the full survey. The pilot results are not 
incorporated into the main survey.  
The pilot gives an indication how many responses to expect from a given number of 
invitations. It can also check that the number of dropouts during the survey was 
acceptable. A further benefit is the opportunity to manually code the responses of some 
of the text-based questions, taking the most frequent codes to create new coding answers 
(see section 3.4.3).  
3.4.6 Sample Size and Marketing 
There are several ways of identifying a sample size [64]. Some researchers use analysis 
of the data collected to decide on a cut-off point (such as when the Cronbach Alpha 
between a pair of attention questions is sufficiently high). This is justifiable but has a 
tension with the principle of defining the statistical analysis in advance.  
This project used Fowler’s guidance [64], We identified the smallest subgroups for which 
we wanted data, and used the pilot data to estimate the proportion of these in the 
population. We then calculated a sample size large enough to get significant data from 
these groups, based on the calculation for the Confidence Interval for a Population 
Proportion [44]. 
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To maximise the effectiveness of the survey, and to avoid wasting the limited resource of 
invitee details, we wanted a good response rate. In particular we wanted to encourage 
participation by making it completely clear that this was a bone fide university research 
project. There were several aspects to achieving this, as follows. 
Email distribution: Mass distribution of emails is fraught with problems. Most email 
services have complex arrangements to detect incoming spam and prevent it from 
reaching their uses. And universities discourage individual users from sending mass 
emails. To address this Qualtrics provides a mass mailer system that can be set up to send 
emails legitimately associated with a university address; other systems may have other 
solutions. 
Invitation wording: The invitation must make it clear that the senders are legitimate 
researchers, acting with the approval of, and subject to the constraints of, their 
universities. It is also useful to personalise the emails as much as possible.  
Project description: ethics standards require a full explanation, with contact details and 
constraints on the researchers, to every participant in advance. Best, to make it look as 
legitimate as possible, is to host it as a webpage on the university domain. 
3.4.7 Survey Follow-up 
To publish the data for future researchers requires a version of the results that preserves 
the privacy of the responders. This requires deleting any personally identifiable data 
including: 
• Names, emails and application names and identifiers, and 
• Locations (Qualtrics provides precise locations). 
3.5 Canonical Action Research 
This section introduces Action Research generally, and the Canonical Action Research 
method in particular. 
3.5.1 Action Research Methods 
Action Research is an approach to research in communities that emphasises participation 
and action; Action Research aims at understanding a situation in a practical context and 
aims at improving it by changing the situation. It has its roots in research in the 1940s by 
Kurt Lewin, a relativist sociologist, whose work on community social issues led him to 
conclude that “mere diagnosis… does not suffice,” and therefore that the role of the 
researcher was to add “experimental comparative studies of the effectiveness of various 
techniques of change”. This ‘action-research’, or “research to help the practitioner”, 
needs therefore to involve the practitioners, and to occur in cycles of planning, execution 
and evaluation [104].  
This approach has clear advantages in software engineering, where development team 
leaders tend to see ‘time not spent on development’ as an expensive luxury, and therefore 
many will not engage with researchers unless there are probable benefits from doing so. 
Action Research offers such benefits and is now widely used in mainstream research. One 
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taxonomy identifies four main approaches [102], all used in Empirical Software 
Engineering research [147], and each with many variants: 
Action 
Learning 
Uses group reflection techniques (Action Learning Sets), which may be 
facilitated, to help teams address and learn from complex problems. 
Action 
Science 
Addresses organisational change; and particularly concentrates on 
participants’ own thinking and habitual behaviour as the source of the 




Addresses a specific problem with researchers working with teams in an 





Has its basis in working in communities; it extends Canonical Action 
Research by emphasising the equal involvement of participants, 
including in the generation of theory. 
Other taxonomies identify many more variants [23]. Note that the name ‘Action 
Research’ refers both to the generic form of research and to a specific variant; in this 
thesis we use the term ‘Canonical Action Research’ for the variant to avoid confusion. 
3.5.2 Canonical Action Research 
Canonical Action Research follows a cyclical model, as shown in Figure 7. It is 
characterised by five principles: researcher-client agreement, cyclical process model, 
theory use, change through action and learning through reflection [43]. These are 
summarised below.  
Researcher-client agreement: The researcher and client must agree that CAR suits the 
situation and that the research goals are appropriate. 
Cyclical process model: The work follows one or more cycles of diagnosis, planning, 
intervention, evaluation and reflection, as shown in Figure 7. Each cycle builds on the 
previous. The remaining principles refer to the stages in this cycle. 
Theory use: The work may start based on a specific theory; if not, the researchers will 
derive one through the reflection process, typically using an approach akin to Grounded 
Theory (Section 3.3). Focussing on a theory ensures that the research remains relevant to 
the research community and supports sense-making from the large amount of data 
collected.  
 
Figure 7: Canonical Action Research Activities (Davison et al. 2014 [43]) 
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The Principle of the Cyclical Process Model (CPM)
 
When an initial RCA has been established, it is appropriate for the action researcher to com-
mence work on the project. His or her activities will typically be informed by and designed to
follow a CPM. Susman & Evered (1978) originally proposed a model with the following five
stages: diagnosis, planning, intervention, evaluation and reflection. Subsequently, Kemmis &
McTaggart (1988) suggested that the model should take the form of  a spiral, not a cycle, with
the intervention moving ever closer to the core of  the organizational problem with each itera-
tion. More recently, McKay & Marshall (2001) outline a model that includes two cycles running
in tandem: one addresses the client’s problem solving interest while the other addresses the
researcher’s scholarly interest. The CPM presented in Figure 1 builds upon these various per-
spectives. The extent to which the Principle of  the CPM is reflected in a project can be
described by the adherence to seven criteria (see Table 2).
Progressing through the CPM in a sequential fashion will help to ensure that a CAR project
is conducted with systematic rigor, a defining characteristic of  CAR. Sometimes it is possible
to complete a project satisfactorily in a single cycle, but very often additional cycling through
the stages is appropriate. The cyclical nature of  the CPM suggests a unidirectional flow, with
diagnosis followed by planning, intervention, and so forth. While this is desirable, our experi-
ence suggests that some iteration between stages may be needed. For example, supplemen-
tary planning may be necessary if  an intervention cannot be completed as intended. Therefore,
the first criterion (2a) suggests that variations from a unidirectional flow through each of  the five



















Criteria for the CPM
2a Did the project follow t e CPM or justify any deviation from it?
2b Did the researcher conduct an independent diagnosis of  the organizational situation?
2c Were the planned actions based explicitly on the results of  the diagnosis?
2d Were the planned actions implemented and evaluated?
2e Did the researcher reflect on the outcomes of  the intervention?
2f Was this reflection followed by an explicit decision on whether or not to proceed through an additional process cycle?
2g Were both the exit of  the researcher and the conclusion of  the project due to either the project objectives being met 
or some other clearly articulated justification?
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Change through action: “The essence of CAR is to take actions in order to change the 
current situation and its unsatisfactory conditions”. Both researcher and ‘client’ are 
motivated to improve the situation, with an intervention appropriate to the diagnosed 
problem, based on a clear understanding of the problem and its context and causes. A 
thorough analysis of the outcomes then informs both general knowledge and future 
interventions. 
Learning through reflection: The researcher reports back to both clients and to the 
research community. This involves both keeping the client informed of progress; and 
reporting via publications to the research community, concentrating on what has been 
learned, especially where related to the theory. 
3.5.3 Practical Canonical Action Research  
The practical aspects of carrying out CAR are less well documented than the theory. The 
following is the approach we adopted. 
First, we interviewed a selection of the future participants to establish a baseline in terms 
of their current understanding, practice and plans. Each interviewee completed and signed 
a consent form, and a representative of each team signed a different one for the 
organisation, before either interviews or workshops.  
We then carried out a series of workshops with members of the development teams, led 
by the intervener. Then, a suitable time after the final workshop, we carried out ‘Exit 
Interviews’ with the same participants as before. Both Entry and Exit Interviews were 
semi-structured using open questions. Later, we attempted ‘One Year Interviews’ with 
the leaders of each team, to find out to what extent the security effects of the package 
were long-lasting, using the same questions as the earlier exit interviews.  
We recorded the audio of all the interviews and all the workshops. Given the importance 
of the recorded interviews, we used two recorders of different makes for all recordings, 
to reduce the risks from error, battery failure or recorder failure. Ethical considerations 
and university guidelines [101] required us to keep all such data only on encrypted 
storage; since encrypting recorders are both expensive and cumbersome to use we used 
standard recorders, moving the recordings onto an encrypted laptop and erasing the 
recorders’ memory immediately after each session.  
The recordings of the interviews and workshops were transcribed and qualitatively 
analysed. In an iterative process, the author and a colleague coded all transcripts. Initially 
both coders used open coding [74] on the first two hours of material, then agreed on a 
coding scheme based on that and the research question. Then both coders independently 
coded all the remaining material to this coding scheme and compared the results. 
Differences in coding were discussed and resolved between us, which often led to the 
creation of new codes or redefinition of existing ones. Following the one-year interviews, 
we both again independently coded the transcribed interviews and compared the results.  
We used the industry-leading tool NVivo [137] for coding. The teamwork and merging 
facilities of the Windows version 15  make remote working straightforward, and its 
analytical functions [71] allow sophisticated analysis of both text and coding. 
 
15 The Mac version of NVivo lacks many of the features and uses a different file format; the author ran the 
Windows version on a Mac using the Parallels VM software. 
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To analyse change caused by the process improvement, we coded the initial interviews to 
provide evidence of a baseline before the start of the process.  
Using a dedicated text analysis tool such as NVivo permits sophisticated analysis in terms 
of ‘queries’ on the coding [71]. To support this, we used automated features of the 
software to ‘auto-code’ each interview transcript to distinguish speakers: using 
anonymous codes to identify the interviewer, and each interviewee, and to assign 
interviewees to company codes; and we categorised all transcripts as ‘before’, ‘during’ or 
‘after’ the workshops. This allows queries such as “Mentions of Feature X identified 
before the intervention, categorised by company.” Using such queries in conjunction with 
spreadsheets to analyse numeric data further allowed us to create several forms of visual 
representation of the data (see).  
3.6 Design-Based Research 
The projects were focussed on the intervention more than on the specific improvements 
achieved in each of the organisations involved. A methodology designed for this situation 
is Design-Based Research. The motivation for using it in the Magid 2 project is discussed 
in Section 8.1. This section explores its salient features. 
3.6.1 Introduction to Design-Based Research 
Design-Based Research (DBR) has its roots, and is used most, in education research. Its 
foundation lies in the ‘Design Experiments’ of Brown [31], and Collins [36] prior to 1992: 
a specific method that worked with teachers as co-experimenters and emphasised the 
development of design theory in parallel with the creation of teaching innovations. 
Though it does not derive directly from Action Research, DBR shares the principle that 
the researcher may themself be part of the research project [22].  
By 2003 the approach was widely adopted in education research, and researchers from 
ten different institutions agreed to term the approach ‘Design-Based Research’, to avoid 
confusion with other forms of research [86]. Initially used predominantly to support the 
design of ‘Technology Enhanced Learning Environments’, DBR is now an accepted 
research paradigm, used to develop improvements ranging from tools to curricula [86]. 
with online tutorials [174] and a recent comprehensive guide book for practitioners [18]. 
The characteristics of Design-Based Research are that it is pragmatic, grounded, 
interactive, iterative and flexible, integrative and contextual [181]. The next sections 
explore these attributes in turn. 
Pragmatic: DBR aims to solve current real-world problems, by creating and trialling 
interventions in parallel with the creation of theory and design principles. Promoters 
contrasted it to the ‘Controlled Experiments’ used previously in education research, in 
that the purpose was not primarily to test theory, but to create interventions or 
improvements in (educational) practice.  
Grounded: The research is grounded in both in the creation and development of theory; 
and in the practicalities of real-world trials in the ‘buzzing, blooming confusion of real-
life settings’ [22] 
Interactive, iterative and flexible: To create real-world changes requires interaction 
between researchers and practitioners, since typically it is only through practitioners that 
change can take place. It also requires an iterative process, usually over a long time, with 
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multiple trials and experiments taking place as the theory develops. This iteration permits 
flexibility, allowing changes in process as well as theory between iterations.  
Integrative: DBR practitioners may integrate multiple methods, and vary these over 
time, to support the credibility of findings [181]. 
Contextual: The results depend both on the design process and intervention created, and 
on the context of the real-world trials. 
There are several types of theory that DBR research may generate [50]: 
Domain Theories:  General theories about the situation and interactions between 
participants.  
Design Frameworks: Prescriptive guidelines to design a particular type of 
intervention or product.  
Design Methodologies: Prescriptive guidelines for an approach to design a range of 
interventions or products. 
The classic illustration of the processes that make up DBR is shown in Ejersbo et al.’s 
Figure 8 [53]. It shows the two cycles of research: creating theory and creating the 
artefact. The researchers are involved in both, generating academic output from the theory 
cycle and practical impact from the artefact cycle. The creators of that illustration, 
however, are careful to stress that this virtually never happens, and that in practice 
particular projects use variations, swapping emphasis across parts of each cycle.  
3.6.2 Practical Design-Based Research 
Elegant though that illustration is, it does not capture the interaction between the two 
cycles, which seems to be limited to a shared Problem; nor is it clear how a Hypothesis 
might generate Data. We offer instead Figure 9, which shows the source of the Data, and 
also re-labels the Intervention-Artifact sequence as the creation of an Artefact followed 
by a Trial. In this model the Hypothesis also feeds into the Design process, and the Trial 
generates the Data that supports or denies the Hypothesis (shown with a dotted arrow), 
generating Theory. The result is that the ‘Design Theory’ cycle does not exist as a separate 
entity, but instead depends crucially on the practical Trial. Although this representation 
is less elegant, we suggest that this offers a more practical view of Design-Based 
Research, at least in the context of this research.  
 
















Figure 1’Osmotic Mode’: Our current understanding of how to balance artifact and theory generation 
within a design research paradigm. The left circle mimics the traditional way of doing educational 
research, where the main “customers” are the peers. The right circle mimics a normal production cycle, 
but with a much stronger involvement f user feedback. Ideally, a d sign research project moves in 
synchronous circular movements, starting from the center and going in both directions. However this 
synchronicity rarely happens in practice.  
 
In order to explain this very idealized and macroscopic model for conducting research, we break 
the model down into four steps or phases: a) from problem to design and from problem to 
hypothesis; b) from design to intervention and from hypothesis to data; c) from intervention to 
artifact and from data to theories; and d) from artifact to markets and from theories to peers. 
a) from problem to design and from problem to hypothesis 
Going from a problem at hand to a hypothesis/design entails making a move from the empirical 
level into the heuristic level - probably the most exciting but also most difficult part of doing 
research. A pre-requisite is that the researcher has a fairly good knowledge of existing theories 
about the theme. It also helps to have a sound scientific intuition when making a new hypothesis 
(a proto-theory) about how the particular problem could be confronted and possibly solved. In 
order to make this move, a researcher should be able to induce a solution, for example a change 
of practice. This requires a working knowledg  of existing th ories, existing artifacts, and design 
intuition.  
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Curiously, there is little discussion in the literature about the practical aspects of carrying 
out Design-Based Research. Even Bakker’s ‘Practical Guide’ book [18] describes how to 
frame a question, keep the project manageable, write up DBR papers, and the philosophy 
of DBR; but does not describe how to carry out the major part of the work: creating and 
assessing a product or intervention.  
We conclude that the reason for this is captured in the ‘Integrative’ nature of DBR: both 
design and assessment techniques must come from other research methodologies. Such 
research methodologies may be based on Action Research, Ethnography, and even on 
occasion Surveys, Case Studies and Controlled Experiments [49]. Thus, the techniques 
of the Canonical Action Research method—though not that method’s overriding 
paradigm—provide an acceptable basis for data gathering.  
3.6.3 Practical Implementation 
Since DBR concentrates on the intervention, it works well with a large number of trials 
in different situations. To have many trials is highly desirable but requires a change to the 
CAR techniques described in the previous section; this section describes how we made 
that change. 
The problem is that manual transcription of all the sessions becomes prohibitively 
expensive. As a solution, only the entry and exit interviews—the most valuable and data-
rich content—were transcribed manually; we coded all the workshops and training 
sessions from audio. 
Coding from audio alone is difficult; and also makes it hard to make sense of summaries, 
such as a summary of all the statements assigned to a particular code. However, shortly 
before the start of the project Google had made their speech-to-text services available as 
paid APIs. Several online services have appeared using these services to provide 
automated transcription at small cost; after some experimentation, we concluded that, 
while far from perfect, the transcription quality was sufficient to support coding in NVivo: 
it makes it clear at a glance what the speakers are discussing, even though the actual 
transcriptions can be nonsensical or hilarious. Even automated transcription of group 
discussions, though not recommended by the service suppliers, was helpful. The 
automated transcriptions made the audio faster to code, and easier to analyse, than using 
NVivo’s ‘audio-only’ coding feature.  
We used the Sonix automated transcription service and created a simple script to change 
the format of the transcripts to that supported by NVivo. In view of the privacy concerns 
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of using such a service, we discussed it in advance with the leaders of each of the teams 
(all agreed to its use) and amended the participant and organisation consent forms 
accordingly.  
3.6.4 DBR Data Analysis for an Intervention 
Design-Based Research includes the evaluation of an artefact. When the artefact is 
influencing behaviour, we need a way to establish what changes have occurred. Here is 
the approach we used.  
The author and fellow coder agreed a coding scheme in advance. Specifically, we decided 
to code the extent to which several different aspects of the participants’ behaviour had 
changed. We therefore identified a list of aspects, and a grading scheme to identify what 
level the participants had achieved for that aspect.  
We wanted to compare levels for each aspect ‘Before’ and ‘After’ the use of the artefact. 
Rather than have many separate codes (such as ‘Level 2 for Aspect A’, ‘Level 4 for 
Aspect C’, etc.), we used ‘code pairs’: coding each mention twice, once for the aspect and 
once for level. We used ‘auto-coding’ to assign codes Before and After to the different 
participants and companies. That allowed us to use NVivo queries similar to the 
following: 
“Text coded to ‘Before’ and ‘Company E’, cross-tabulated by Aspect and 
Level”  
Which produces a ‘cross-tabulated’ matrix16. Table 4 shows an example for a specific 
company, from the interviews Before the intervention. It shows the Aspects in rows, and 
the Levels as columns; the value in each cell is the number of code pairs that showed that 
Level of for that Aspect.  
From that table, it is then simple to calculate the highest Level coded for each Aspect, 
representing it as an integer from 0 (not coded) through to 4 (Established). So, for 
example, in Table 4 for that particular company and time, we see that Aspect A scored 0; 
Aspect B scored 1; and Aspect C scored 4. 
We repeated this for every company for both Before and After the intervention, and 
copied the resulting tables into an Excel spreadsheet.  
On occasion a statement made by an interviewee in an exit interview or a workshop might 
provide information about plans or engagement prior to the interventions. We handled 
this by adding the code Before to the corresponding statements (thus the statements are 
coded both Before and After). So, the NVivo queries above will include the appropriate 
 
16 In practice, NVivo queries are less sophisticated. We achieve the search above by starting with a query 
like ‘Coded to Before and Company E’, saving the result as a ‘result set’, then using that ‘result set’ as the 
scope for the cross-tabulated query. NVivo also lacks any automation, so repeating this for different 
parameters is a long manual process. 
Table 4: Example NVivo Report Showing Aspects and Levels 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
1 : Aspect A 0 0 0 0 
2 : Aspect B 3 3 3 3 
3 : Aspect C 3 3 10 5 
4 : … etc. 0 0 0 0 
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text about engagement before the interventions, even when the corresponding statements 
were made afterwards. 
As is normal practice, both coders coded independently, then met up to discuss, and each 
then independently modified their coding according to the discussion.  
3.6.5 Validation of Analysis 
For this project, we wanted to be able to cite a statistical rating of the accuracy of our 
coding analysis.  
The accepted approach to this is to use ‘Inter-Rater Reliability’ (IRR) [78]. This calculates 
a number between 0 and 1 that can be interpreted as shown in Table 5 by Viera and Garett 
[179] 
The main decision in using IRR is the selection of what ratings to compare: possible 
ratings include the extent to which each rater assigned the same codes to each character 
in the text (as NVivo does in its default IRR analysis); or the extent to which each rater 
assigned the same codes to each paragraph in the text; or the extent to which the final 
results derived from each rater’s codings  agree with each other.  
Since we were using coding to establish the extent to which the participants had changed 
in each aspect as discussed in the previous section, the relevant ratings to compare with 
IRR analysis were these final results figures as calculated for each coder.  
Another consideration is how to handle aspects that are ‘No mention’ for both raters, 
representing aspects that had not been discussed in the interviews, such as Aspect A in 
Table 4. Whilst this was certainly ‘agreement’ between the raters, arguably it was not 
agreement that was interesting in the context of Inter-Rater Reliability. Accordingly, we 
calculated a version of the IRR calculations based only on cases where at least one rater 
had assigned a value (‘Active rating subset’ [78]). 
There are several possible calculations: Cohen’s Kappa, Krippendorff’s Alpha and others 
for different numbers of coders and situations [78]. We did the calculations for both 
Cohen’s Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha, finding the results reassuringly identical to 
two significant figures, so in this report we quote the numbers as Krippendorff’s Alpha. 
NVivo supports queries specific to each separate coder, and so we could create queries 
similar to: 
“Text coded to ‘Before’ and ‘Company E’,  
cross-tabulated by Aspect as coded by Coder 1,  
and Level as coded by Coder 1”  
Table 5: Interpretation of Cohen’s Kappa (Viera and Garett [179]) 
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tion of the variance of kappa and deriving a z statistic,
which are beyond the scope f this article. A confidence
interval for kappa, which may be even more informa-
t ve, can also be calculated. Fortunately, computer pro-
grams are able to calculate kappa as well as the P value
or confidence interval of kappa at the stroke of a few
keys. Remember, though, the P value in this case tests
whether the estimated kappa is n t due to chance. It
does not test the strength of agreement. Also, P values
and confidence intervals are sensitive to sample size,
an  with a large enoug  sample size, any kappa above
0 will become statistically significant.
Weighted Kappa
Sometimes, we are more interested in the agreement
across major categories in which there is meaningful
difference. For example, let’s suppose we had five cat-
egories of “helpfulness of noon lectures:” “very help-
ful,” “somewhat helpful,” “neutral,” “somewhat a
waste,” and “complete waste.” In this case, we may
not care whether one resident categorizes as “very help-
ful” while another categorizes as “somewhat helpful,”
but we might care if one resident categorizes as “very
helpful” while another categorizes as “complete waste.”
Using a clinical example, we may not care whether one
radiologist categorizes a mammogram finding as nor-
mal and another categorizes it as benign, but we do
care if one categorizes it as normal and the other as
cancer.
A weighted kappa, which assigns less weight to
agreement as categories are further apart, would be re-
ported in such instances.4 In our previous example, a
disagreement of normal versus benign would still be
credited with partial agreement, but a disagreement of
normal versus cancer would be counted as no agree-
ment. The determination of weights for a weighted
kappa is a subjective issue on which even experts might
disagree in a particular setting.
A Paradox
Returning to our original example on chest findings
in pneumonia, the agreement on the presence of tactile
fremitus was high (85%), but the kappa of 0.01 would
seem to indicate that this agreement is really very poor.
The reason for the discrepancy between the unadjusted
level of agreement and kappa is that tactile fremitus is
such a rare finding, illustrating that kappa may not be
reliable for rare observations. Kappa is affected by
prevalence of the finding under consideration much like
predictive values are affected by the prevalence of the
disease under consideration.5 For rare findings, very
low values of kappa may not necessarily reflect low
rates of overall agreement.
Returning for a moment to our hypothetical study of
the usefulness of noon lectures, let us imagine that the
prevalence of a truly helpful noon lecture is very low,
but the residents know it when they experience it. Like-
wise, they know (and will say) that most others are not
helpful. The data layout might look like Table 3. The
observed agreement is high at 85%. However, the kappa
(calculation shown in Table 3) is low at .04, suggesting
only poor to slight agreement when accounting for
chance. One method to account for this paradox, put
simply, is to distinguish between agreement on the two
levels of the finding (eg, agreement on positive ratings
compared to agreement on negative ratings). Feinstein
and Cicchetti have published detailed papers on this
paradox and methods to resolve it.5,6 For now, under-
standing of kappa and recognizing this important limi-




             Poor     Slight     Fair     Moderate     Substantial     Almost perfect
Kappa 0.0 .20 .40 .60 .80 1.0
Kappa Agreement
< 0 Less than chance agreement
0.01–0.20 Slight agreement
0.21– 0.40 Fair agreement
0.41–0.60 Moderate agreement
0.61–0.80 Substantial agreement
0.81–0.99 Almost perfect agreement
Table 3
Usefulness of Noon Lectures, With Low
Prevalence of Helpful Lectures
                                                                 Resident 1—
                                                            Lectures Helpful?
Yes No Total
       Resident 2— Yes 1 6 7
       Lectures No 9 84 93
       Helpful? Total 10 90 100
Calcul tions:
Observed agreement, po = 1+84 = 0.85
        100
Expected agreement, pe =[(7/100) * (10/100)] + [(93/100) * (90/100)] =
0.007 + .837 = 0.844
Calculating kappa:
K = (po - pe) = 0.85–0.844 = 0.04
         (1–pe)        1–0.844
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As before, we exported the resulting tables into an Excel spreadsheet: we calculated the 
maximum Level for each Aspect, for Before and After, for each company, repeated for 
each coder. We then compared those figures for each coder using the IRR calculations17.  
To give a meaningful indication of the IRR values, we did calculations of Krippendorff’s 
Alpha for both the full set of ratings, and the ‘Active rating subset’; and both after the 
first, independent, coding activity, then after the discussion and modification. 
3.7 Visualisation of Results 
Finally, an important aspect of the research method is the presentation of the findings. 
Though calculated figures are sufficient as a basis for evidence claims, visualisations can 
be much more effective at conveying the meaning of figures. Both Excel, and Python in 
Jupyter Notebooks, are widely used to create visualisations, and both are used to create 
figures in this thesis.  
Excel proved the most flexible tool, since it supports ‘manual’ changes in the manner of 
a drawing package. There are a variety of possible Excel techniques, as follows: 
Standard Excel Charts: For these one creates cell ranges containing the data to plot in 
the number or text format required and uses the ‘create chart’ functionality; then uses 
mouse and menu commands to edit the colours, sizes, axes, legends and other features. 
Advanced Excel Charts: Excel supports more sophisticated charts, allowing one to have 
multiple series types (bars and lines, for example) and to manipulate these; or to change 
the representation of individual points in a series. 
Compositions of Charts Figures and Shapes: By removing the axis, title and key 
displays from, for example, a ring pie chart or single stacked bar chart, one achieves a 
structured shape that one can then position on a two-dimensional ‘composite diagram’ to 
convey several dimensions of information. Excel also supports the drawing shapes, text, 
lines and arrows familiar to users of PowerPoint, and one can position those as axes and 
other shapes on the composite diagram. One can also use, for example, white shapes on 
a white background to blank out unwanted aspects of any of the charts. Figure 10 shows 
a detail from a visualisation created in this way. 
Excel Visual Basic for Applications: Excel has VBA scripting, and supports functions 
that can take data from ranges of spreadsheet cells. Each shape and chart on an Excel 
diagram has a text name. These names have defaults (such as ‘Chart 2’) but can be edited 
to be meaningful (‘Company I’), and the corresponding ‘objects’ can be manipulated from 
VBA. One can therefore program a VBA function to set the sizes, positions, colours or 
other attributes of shapes on a diagram according to spreadsheet data; then use additional 
mouse and menu manipulation to achieve the correct data representation. 
So, for example, Figure 10 shows a visualisation created using these techniques. It is a 
simplification of Figure 42 in Section 8.2.1. Each of the shapes in the diagram is an Excel 
chart (hollow pie charts and stacked bar charts), based on spreadsheet data and with 
colours assigned consistently from a standard palette. These had all text removed, and 
VBA scripting was used to set their sizes based on further spreadsheet data. They were 
then positioned manually and annotated manually with identification letters.  
 
17 We used a Python implementation [121], using a Jupyter Notebook [97] to read data directly from that 
Excel spreadsheet. 
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4 Expert Survey 
4.1 Introduction 
As a first step, the author wanted to understand industry best practice with regard to 
interventions.  
In prior work [183], the author had carried out a Constructivist Grounded Theory [33] 
study, involving face-to-face interviews with a dozen experts in security related to mobile 
app development, whose cumulative experience totalled well over 100 years of security 
work. The early analysis of the interviews [191] found a wide range of difference between 
interviewees, and concluded that there was little consensus in the industry. Deeper 
analysis of the same interviews [192] then identified that the most important and 
successful secure development techniques share a quality called ‘dialectic,’ meaning 
learning by friendly challenging. Based on this observation, the analysis then highlighted 
a range of ‘assurance techniques’ used within industry to find security issues using 
dialectic.  
The next step was to find ways to introduce such techniques to development teams who 
were not yet using them. None of the techniques, nor the dialectic concept, appeared 
specific to mobile app development. Indeed, though the previous study’s interviewees 
had been chosen for their experience with app security, in discussing the questions most 
had cited experience with a far wider range of software domains. The author therefore 
conducted a second interview survey to find ways to induce teams to adopt assurance 
techniques, extending the scope to cover professional software development in general. 
The research question for this next step, therefore, was: 
RQ 2 What interventions can change the environment for members of the development 
team to achieve good security, considering cost-efficiency, motivational factors, 
choice of tools, supporting processes, culture, awareness, training and skills? 
The author accordingly interviewed sixteen experts in secure software development, 
asking them about these topics. These specialists ranged from senior experts in the major 
multinational online service providers to solo consultants.  
The analysis of those interviews identified a consistent perception of the developer as an 
active agent in their own right, whose decisions could be influenced by security experts 
but not controlled by them. More specifically, it identified six assurance techniques 
recommended by the experts, and a further two techniques used by the experts to help 
introduce them to development teams.  





Chapter 4: Expert Survey 
Charles Weir - October 2020   61 
4.2 Approach 
Section 3.2 explains the choice of analysis method: Grounded Theory. The method is 
described in detail in Section 3.3. 
4.2.1 Research Sub-questions 
The wide scope of the question  
RQ 2 What interventions can change the environment for members of the development 
team to achieve good security, considering cost-efficiency, motivational factors, 
choice of tools, supporting processes, culture, awareness, training and skills? 
led to a need for a more specific focus. Accordingly, in the analysis the author focussed 
on two further questions, one addressing the approach to creating and introducing 
interventions: 
RQ 2.1 What approach to interaction with software development teams leads to the best 
results in encouraging secure development? 
And one addressing the practical aspects: 
RQ 2.2 What specific intervention techniques do specialists consider most cost-effective 
in helping developers improve security and privacy in their code? 
4.2.2 Research Participants 
Interviewees were chosen opportunistically; the author’s personal connections in industry 
provided introductions to a number of successful, and mostly senior, practitioners with 
considerable experience of helping teams achieve software security. Table 6 shows the 
interviewees, with an indication of organisation size: Solo for consultants working with 
a variety of organisations, Medium for organisations between 10 and 1000 people, and 
Large for larger and government ones; also, a description of the interviewee’s main day-
to-day role. Each interview was with a different organisation, other than P14/P15; and 
P12/P16 who were interviewed together. Most are based in the UK other than P10, P13 
based in Germany, and P5 in the USA. 
Each expert worked with a different set of software development teams. The table also 
gives a subjective indication of the ‘secure software capability maturity’ [90] of those 
teams, based on the author’s observations during the workshops: an indication of how 
expert we might regard the teams involved at delivering secure software, and therefore at 
what level the expert was normally working: 
Low Teams had little or no awareness or activity related to software security 
Medium Teams were aware of and addressing security issues, typically including 
some developers with good security knowledge. 
High Teams are expert at software security, within an organisational culture that 
assigns it a high priority. 
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Figure 11 visualises the same data, illustrating the range of participants. The horizontal 
axis indicates their organisation size; the vertical axis the ‘secure software capability 
maturity’.  
To show further the range of participants involved, Figure 12 summarises the recruitment 
process. Various people were approached; the horizontal axis indicates how long the 
author had known the people approached. Some were interviewed directly, and these are 
shown closest to the axis. Professional and personal contacts are shown above the axis, 
and contacts encountered via academia—mostly encountered at industry-academic 
workshops—below. In other cases, the contacts approached referred others, and the 
resulting interviewees are shown further from the axis. 
Table 6: Experts Interviewed 
ID	 Org.	size	 Organisation	type	 Est	SCMM	 Main	Role	
P1	 Medium	 Outsourced	software	developer	and	consultant	 High	 CEO	
P2	 Solo	 Security	consultant	 Low–Med		 Consultant	
P3	 Large	 Security	and	military	supplier	 High	 Team	leader	
P4	 Large	 Research	organisation	 Medium	 Research	and	support	
P5	 Large	 Operating	system	supplier	 High	 Security	team	leader	
P6	 Large	 Security	and	military	supplier	 High	 Security	expert	
P7	 Medium	 Software	security	tool	supplier	 Medium	 CEO	
P8	 Large	 Telecommunications	provider	 Medium	 Security	expert	
P9	 Solo	 Security	consultant	 High	 Consultant	
P10	 Large	 Software	package	supplier	 High	 Security	expert	




P16		 Medium	 Telecoms	service	provider	 High	
Security	expert,	
Team	lead	
P13	 Large	 Research	organisation	 Low-High	 Research	and	consultant	
P14	 Medium	 Outsourced	software	developer	 High	
Principal	
engineer	
P15	 Medium	 Outsourced	software	developer	 High	 Security	expert	
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Those chosen were experts in secure software development; many were therefore 
predominantly developers first and security experts second. As Table 6 shows, only ten 
of the fifteen had roles or company missions specifically related to security. Their 
qualification as experts was based on their reputations, either directly from the 
researchers’ knowledge; or as validated by the people who referred them.  
4.2.3 Interview Questions  
We consulted the interviewees as experts, rather than analysed them as subjects. Our 
questions aimed to draw out what they themselves had found most effective, and what 
they had seen to be most effective in other teams. Figure 13 shows the main questions we 
used. These were generated with an initial ideation session, adding further open questions 
based on the Appreciative Inquiry (Section 3.3.5), and detailed sub-questions based on 
findings in the author’s earlier interviews of App Security Software Specialists [183].  
In the following sections, quotations from the interviewees are in italics. Quotations are 
edited to protect confidentiality and indicate context: square brackets show additions and 
replacements; ellipses show removals. 
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Figure 13: Expert Survey Questions 
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4.3 Results: Active Developer Model 
Section 3.3 describes the analysis approach. The audio of all the interviews was recorded 
transcribed, and coded by the author using the NVivo tool [137].  
The 12 interviews generated 15 hours of audio. The final code book had 14 top-level 
categories and a total of 409 codes and categories, applied to 2977 references in total. 
In line with the tenets of Grounded Theory, the researchers’ primary aim was to find a 
‘Core Category’, a concept that covered the widest possible scope of the points raised by 
the interviewees. This Core Category then formed a basis from which to construct theory 
and to view the practical findings from the research. 
In the analysis, the common Core Category found was what we termed the ‘Active 
Developer’ model, where developers themselves are the agents driving security adoption. 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 illustrate the difference between the Active Developer model and 
the model implied by traditional security literature. In traditional literature, the role of the 
intervener is to tell the developers what to do, and to provide the techniques and tools that 
the developers are required to use. In the Active Developer model, the role of the 
intervener is to sensitise the developers to the implications of their security needs; they 
then choose for themselves which tools and techniques best work for their situation.  
4.3.1 Description of the Active Developer Model 
One interviewee described the difference between the Active Developer Model and the 
model implied in previous security literature as follows: 
It’s not just about educating the developers, well, I guess it was, but we had 
to get the developers on side, the developers had to understand why we were 
doing this, as well as what it was that we needed them to do, so it was a kind 
of two pronged thing. (P2) 
Others simply talked in terms of security motivation as a fundamental requirement. 
People need to be motivated. As a unit you are motivated; as an individual 
you are motivated. (P4) 
They were clear that even those with significant power in the organisation still have to 
work by persuasion, not coercion. For example, even though P8 is a Head of Security for 
a large multinational company, he said: 
So, working with Dev Teams, I think the important thing, is to get them to 
buy into the approach and to understand the value of what you are asking 
them to deliver. ...  You can’t go in and say, ‘you must do it this way’, it 
would never work, they would just say p*** off, who’s this idiot, to come in 
and tell us how to do our work. What you have got to do is go in there, and 
you have to convince them that it is to their advantage to do it that way. So, 
you have got to sell the benefits of any particular approach and persuade 
the lot of them to follow the same common approach. (P8) 
Some organisations have incorporated this change in thinking into the way they approach 
software development altogether, giving their developers the power to arrange their own 
processes to incorporate security in the ways they think best: 
We have really changed in the last couple of years, in redesigning our 
[Software Development Lifecycle] processes, based on how product groups 
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work. Rather than in the year 2000 when we launched the SDL: “this is the 
process – everyone’s ‘thou shalt do’ irrelevant of how you work”, now we 
say “here are the characteristics we want you to employ; how you build that 
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However, not all of the interviewees felt that motivation was the primary problem; one 
felt that skills were more important. 
I don’t think the main problem is lack of motivation, I think it is lack of 
skills. And I think most people want to do a good job, and want to write 
secure code. (P1) 
But all agreed that motivation to do security was essential. 
It is part of the motivation to be aware that real actual harms can follow, 
when people don’t get this stuff right. (P1) 
All of the interviewees, in one way or another, phrased their discussion and interventions 
in terms of the developer as the agent making decisions, and the intervener as persuader.  
You need to have the good arguments to convince people to work on 
[security] ... – the motivation aspect. (P10) 
They therefore evaluate their interventions’ success in the extent to which the developers 
themselves changed. 
The rest they did all themselves, I would call that a triumph. (P10) 
4.3.2 Active Developer Model and Interventions 
The Active Developer model helps to explain which interventions will be most effective. 
The most helpful interventions are not those that identify the most security defects, but 
rather, those that have most impact in persuading developers of the need to deal with 
security issues and the possibility of their doing so.  
For example, in talking about automated code review tools, their primary importance is 
their effect in motivating developers. 
Because, in the end, this code scanning tool is not fixing any bugs on its 
own. It is, hopefully, motivating the developer to fix them. But if that 
motivation is not working, then the tool is also not effective. (P13) 
Moreover, usually the intervener gets only one initial shot at this persuasion, and therefore 
the choice of interventions is vital; most valuable are interventions like Threat Modelling 
that establish a positive relationship for future work. 
Yes, I mentioned beforehand, if you want to motivate people in a cross-
development team environment, you cannot come by two or three times for 
the same topic to try to elaborate on that, to describe it to them. ...  We were 
talking about threat modelling as one concept, the Microsoft conception, of 
which I am a big fan of, which not only this kind of check mark, or checklist 
that you have to go through, but it allows you a more interactive base, and 
by that, having a better relationship with the development team. (P10) 
It follows that an important attribute for successful interventions is: 
Sensitisation: Helps sensitise developers to security concerns 
A second implication of the Active Developer model is that developers have the choice 
to accept or reject interventions individually or as a team, and the default will be to reject: 
The technical inertia is such that doing anything new or radical is seen as 
risky... And therefore the default choice in those organisations is do the 
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same as last time, because that won’t get me fired, if I’m the project 
manager or technical authority. (P15) 
Therefore, the developers must see the interventions as worthwhile in themselves to 
achieve the goal of security: the interventions must be sufficiently easy to introduce, yet 
deliver significant impact in terms or teaching or helping with security.  
Unless you have a way of getting people to use the Thing, and make it the 
easiest thing for them to use, and then wherever they are going to deploy is 
already pretty set up, you need to have all of those steps, you can’t say ‘ this 
one thing, solves that one problem’. (P9) 
This can by represented as: 
Support: Helps a developer efficiently to achieve the goal of security. 
Finally, each intervention needs to be acceptable to the organisation. While there may be 
other considerations, the primary consideration will be cost: financial cost and time cost 
in development and management time. 
There is always pressure on delivery, delivery, delivery, get that product 
shipped on time, to a price. So, quite often, security will impact that delivery 
timeline, and impact that delivery cost. (P8) 
For every team, there is always a trade-off between cost and benefit for each intervention. 
This is a strange tension here for our team, because we work for ... a FTSE 
100 company, and vendors of static analysis tools might reasonably expect 
that we have an infinite budget, but we are broken down into teams and 
teams, and they are not selling us a site wide corporate enterprise license, 
so when they come to me with a quote for 10 users for £30,000 a year – that 
sounds quite a lot... because it is always a business case. (P3) 
Thus, a third important consideration for the adoption of an intervention is: 
Affordability: Has an acceptable cost in terms of effort and financial 
impact. 
4.4 Results: Techniques Used 
Next, the Grounded Theory analysis of the interviews identified six software assurance 
techniques as the most effective. These are as follows: 
Threat Assessment  Identifying and ranking the threats to computer software, a 
component, or an IT system. 
Stakeholder 
Negotiation 
Discussion and negotiation with stakeholders, such as product 
managers, on security choices 
Configuration Review A review of the way a system or its software has been 
configured to see if this leads to known vulnerabilities, using 




The process of using an automated scanner on a web 
application or network to identify vulnerabilities. 
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Source Code Review  The manual examination of source code to discover faults that 
were introduced during the software development process. 
Penetration Testing A simulated attack on a component or system, carried out by 
a security expert using similar techniques to that of a real- 
world malicious attacker. 
For consistency with other literature, the definitions above are taken from Such et al. 
[164], except for Stakeholder Negotiation, which was not discussed in that paper; and 
Automatic Static Analysis, since Such’s name for the technique, ‘Vulnerability Scan’, 
proved confusing. Note that the author was not aware of that paper at the time of coding, 
and the assurance technique names derived from the Grounded Theory analysis were 
different. This set of effective interventions is considerably smaller than the full range of 
industry assurance techniques, which include also Self-Assessment Forms, Architectural 
Review, Automated Static Analysis, Formal Verification and seven others [164].  
The contribution of the Grounded Theory analysis was not the identification of the 
assurance techniques—they were already well known—but the identification of a 
practical subset of the techniques suitable for cost-effective use in development teams, 
and the justification of that subset in terms of the Active Developer model.  
The Grounded Theory analysis also identified a further two techniques that the experts 
used when intervening with development teams. These are to support the developers 
themselves, and are as follows: 
Incentivisation 
Session 
A presentation, discussion or workshop to help motivate 
those involved for the need for security. 
On-the-job Training  Mentoring or informal workshops, used regularly with the 
development team. 
4.4.1 Technique Names Used in this Thesis 
A complication in discussing Developer Centred Security is that there is no standard 
taxonomy of Assurance Techniques. As far as possible this thesis uses the names defined 
from Such et al. [164], but those were taken from the Security Expert domain. They are 
not consistently used there, nor are they necessarily the ones that software development 
teams would use; indeed, the author found the need to use different names in talking to 
different groups. 
Appendix C shows a table of all 14 different Assurance Techniques mentioned in this 
thesis, along with the names for and references to each in the different phases of the 
research. So, for example, from the Grounded Theory Analysis of the expert surveys 
discussed in the previous section, we identified a technique the experts called ‘Plugin 
reviews’; we identified that it was the same as Such et al.’s ‘Configuration Review’, and 
used that name in this chapter. The table also shows the names used in the research in 
later chapters.  
In some cases (Red Teaming for example) we identified that a technique was 
insufficiently important to the developer community to justify being separate and we 
described it along with another technique (Penetration Testing, in this case).  
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4.4.2 Expert Discussion of the Techniques 
Table 7 shows the participants’ discussion of these techniques. The numbers indicate the 
percentage of the words by each participant that were coded to each assurance technique: 
the share of the discussion devoted to that technique within that interview. Cells are 
highlighted based on their values. The most discussed techniques are on the left; less 
discussed ones towards the right.  
Sections 4.5 to 4.10 explore each assurance technique in detail, discussing the 
implications for each. Each section discusses the context of the problem, and outlines 
how the technique solves it, exploring how the interviewees use the technique, evidencing 
the discussion with quotations from interview participants 
4.5 Technique: Threat Assessment 
Threat Assessment is the activity of identifying and ranking the threats to computer 
software, a software component, or an IT system as a whole [164]. 
4.5.1 Context 
Any system can be broken with sufficient determination, ingenuity, and resources.  
You can’t defend against an attacker who has unlimited resources, you 
can’t do it. Not for long. (P8) 
As a result, secure development is not a matter of making a completely secure system. 
Instead, it becomes a question of which defences to implement: where one should spend 
the time and effort defending the system to deter the largest and most damaging potential 
exploits. Making those choices requires an understanding of the potential attackers: 
But, from the vulnerability side, it is all about assessing how we are. (P16) 
You need developers to …  understand how the attackers brain works, what 
is the methodology, the way I know how to do that is to make them do the 
steps, make them ask the questions (P11).  
4.5.2 Solution 
To address this, security experts use ‘Threat Modelling’ techniques: identifying the 
causes or motives and possible scenarios for a full range of threats to the systems in 
question. 
Your answer to any kind of security question anywhere should almost 
always start with a threat model. (P9) 
Several interviewees indicated that developers must drive the threat modelling process: 
You need developers to do threat models, but you need developers to 
understand how the attackers brain works, what is the methodology, the way 
I know how to do that is to make them do the steps, make them ask the 
questions. (P11) 
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4.5.3 Execution and Counterparties 
The counterparties discussed for Threat Assessment included other developers: 
Threat modelling: what I see as the big benefit here is, is that it is not that 
you are coming up with a list of issues that product of the team has, it is 
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more putting the team into the perspective, to think about the functionality 
from a different aspect, from a different point of view, that that brings up a 
list of issues, no doubt  about that, but it also fosters the understanding to 
see the coding from a different side, to also to think about it when you 
create code: what else can there be? (P10)  
Some experts emphasised the importance of including more senior stakeholders: 
If [the developers] don’t know what a threat model is, then tell them what a 
threat model is, and the simplest explanation in the world is ‘who is going to 
attack you, and where is the gold?’  ‘Where’s the gold’ answers need to 
come from managers, and company owners. Not from developers because 
their answers will be totally wrong. And actually that is a big learning that 
you can give to any company when you go in. Whatever the CEO’s threat 
model is, explain it to all of the devs and go ‘if you don’t know what the 
worst nightmare is for your CEO, then how can you be expected not to make 
that cock up’ (P9) 
For developers more experienced in secure development, threat modelling can become 
part of normal requirements gathering, and no longer be considered an explicit separate 
process.  
We did requirements engineering based upon the work of Michael Jackson's 
Problem Frames model, and as part of that you sit there and you do your 
security engineering, you look at assets and threats and risks, and all of 
that. And you decide what you are trying to protect, and how much we need 
to spend to protect it (P15) 
4.6 Technique: Stakeholder Negotiation 
Stakeholder Negotiation is the activity of discussion and negotiation with stakeholders, 
such as product managers, on security choices. 
4.6.1 Context 
Merely identifying the possible attackers and exploits does not itself deliver software 
security. The need is to prevent them from causing damage to users, stakeholders or 
others.  
Given the Threat Assessment, a development team can take the list of possible attacks 
and work out possible mitigations for each. These mitigations will each have costs in 
development time, commitment, finance, and sometimes usability. The team can estimate 
financial and other costs for each. How, though, do they make the decision which to 
implement? 
The decision of what aspects of security to implement is a commercial one. Implied in 
every decision about software security is a trade-off of the cost of the security against the 
benefit received. Every security enhancement needs to be weighed against other uses of 
the investment—financial, time, usability—required.  
4.6.2 Solution 
The solution is for development teams and security experts to express risk and costs to 
stakeholders (project managers, senior management, customers) in terms they can 
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understand and use to question about security concerns against other organisation and 
project needs. 
[If] it looked like there were some problems …, then they would mark it like 
an orange, and say to the customer :'what is your risk appetite?(P9) 
4.6.3 Execution  
The primary stakeholders are those who prioritise development tasks, such as product 
managers. Evaluating and expressing the threat in business terms requires discussion and 
experience, so other Team Members and Security Experts are also important: 
The teams take a risk management approach, full stop. For every risk, we 
try and weight it on two axis – one is the severity, if it happens. So, ignore 
the likelihood, how bad is it if it happens? And the other is the likelihood, 
how likely is it to happen… so the project teams will plan their work, and 
come up with an end date, and the project manager will make sure that they 
add enough capacity to the project for the weighted risks to happen.  (P14) 
Many of our interviewees made the point that ‘security is not an absolute,’ but that 
security is what the users and stakeholders need for a particular situation at a particular 
time. There are techniques available to give objective assessment of security risks, such 
as work by ben Othmane et al. [127].  
The stakeholders will be making cost benefit trade-offs comparing various business risks. 
Given that each mitigation now has a cost and benefit, the decision on whether to do it 
becomes part of standard project management process. It is outside the scope of this 
technique – and indeed of the topic of software security – to explore how to make these 
decisions in general; the balancing of risk cost and reward is a well-understood aspect of 
business life. 
And that's what managers do all the time, they make common sense 
decisions – they refer to it as common sense, but they make risk decisions: 
that is the way security look at it. The way managers look at it, they make 
common sense decisions all the time … and that is their job, and they 
manage time, and they manage resources, and they know there is a trade off 
with all of these things. (P9)  
4.7 Technique: Configuration Review 
Configuration Review is a review of the way a system or its software has been configured 
to see if this leads to known vulnerabilities, using manual checking software versions or 
automated build review scanners [164]. 
4.7.1 Context 
Most software development reuses code developed by others, whether purchased or 
obtained ‘open source’. In this section, such reused code is called ‘components’, and 
includes frameworks and toolchains. 
Chapter 4: Expert Survey 
74  Charles Weir - October 2020 
Using an insecure component automatically makes a developed system insecure, 
regardless of the quality of the code developed by the team:  
WordPress plug-ins are an enormous liability. Anyone can write one, most 
of them are rubbish. Anyone can get them put up on the plug-in directly, 
which gives them this air of authenticity, and quality that they don’t deserve, 
frankly. (P1) 
So, a ‘low hanging fruit’ for development is to use only components  that are well written 
and securely implemented. This is non-trivial, given the wide range of components 
available.  
4.7.2 Solution 
Configuration Review is the activity of reviewing the codebase to evaluate the 
components used for security: using public repositories of security vulnerabilities to 
assess well-known components; avoiding little-known components where possible; and 
using Source Code Review and Penetration Testing to evaluate such components if they 
must be used.  
4.7.3 Execution and Counterparties 
For some development systems there are corresponding web sites with security reviews 
of plug-ins; cross referencing with these sites is a powerful security technique. This may 
use automated analysis tools:  
[Our tool chain] also queries Wpvulndb for the plug-in that you are 
expecting and tells you if there have been any published vulnerabilities in it. 
(P1) 
Where such sites are unavailable, or for new plug-ins, there is value to Source Code 
Review (Section 4.8) to establish the likely security attributes of a given plug-in. This 
does however have a significant cost to development teams since it takes effort, however 
much automation may be involved, and restricts the plug-ins that developers can use. 
And so that is one of the things you end up sitting down with developers 
going “I’m sorry, but I know this is actually going to slow you down”. And 
we are desperately normally trying to avoid that, I’m trying to make your 
lives as easy as possible. … But you have to say “well, no, you can’t just 
add [components] – you have to review them. You don’t have to do the most 
detailed review in the world, but if you think it looks worrying, then … don’t 
put it in your code”. (P9) 
A second issue is that, since plug-ins are widely shared, any weakness in a plug-in 
becomes known to attackers, and therefore it is important to keep plug-ins upgraded to 
the latest versions in which defects have been corrected. 
We keep track of all the patches and everything for all our systems. (P7) 
Since Penetration Testing tests a whole system, it will also find vulnerabilities in 
components, so testing is another way to assess components: 
[When Penetration Testing] you’ll find the OWASP Top 10 in one 
[component] alone! (P9) 
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4.8 Technique: Source Code Review 
Source Code Review is the manual examination of source code to discover faults that 
may have been introduced during the software development process [164]. Note that 
throughout this Thesis we use the term ‘Source Code Review’ to refer to review for 
security and privacy issues, rather than more general code review. 
4.8.1 Context 
It is notoriously difficult to spot one’s own errors. This is especially true when the errors 
are faults in complex reasoning or are due to misunderstandings. Thus, a programmer 
working solo is likely to create avoidable security problems, just because they can 
naturally have only one point of view. 
So, it is very easy when you are trying to deliver something yourself, as a 
developer, to pass over the bit that you are not doing [188] 
This problem extends to programming teams. A team will always suffer to some extent 
from ‘groupthink;’ the need to generate a shared understanding brings with it the danger 
that that understanding may include misunderstandings and blind spots. This is 
particularly important with software security, since such blind spots often lead to 
vulnerabilities in the developed software. 
4.8.2 Solution 
In Source Code Review, development teams provide a counterpart who reviews the 
security and privacy aspect of assumptions, decisions, and code. Several interviewees 
stressed the importance of this questioning process for security reviews: 
What is our most successful technique for secure software? In terms of what 
I have seen, certainly talking amongst the developers, the code reviews have 
been very useful. (P16) 
I would say, without a doubt, [our most effective technique for getting teams 
more secure] is code review. This affects everything we do, and our newest 
grads understand this from the very first day they join our team. (P3) 
4.8.3 Execution and Counterparties 
The reviewer is typically another developer from the same team.  
And that is something that is a process within the team, and the way that we 
encourage that – first of all, all the teams I have worked with, do some sort 
of at least cursory code reviews. So somebody will look at the code. (P11) 
If a Security Expert is available, however, they can often provide more security-relevant 
questioning than development team members: 
[We have] ‘software pen testing,’ where you have some Subject Matter 
Experts who take a piece of code and review that in detail, and work with 
the developers in tandem, looking at the code and saying, “we think this is 
really high risk, we really want to look at this.”  And then somebody goes 
through that code with the mindset of “how do I exploit the code” (P5)  
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Other approaches to Source Code Review include providing dialectic questioning to a 
developer via pair programming, where the code is written by two developers sharing one 
computer: 
We have [security reviewed] a couple of companies that already use 
concepts like pair programming and so on. (P13) 
And enforcing an informal check of code before it is released: 
Code review can [just] mean that every bit of code that is committed is 
looked at by somebody else (P11). 
The heavyweight approach is a formal review process, with separate review meetings 
delivering lists of defects for a developer to fix.  
It is in the culture. We do reviews; we always have to do reviews. We set 
things up – and it is not regarded as a second class. (P6) 
4.9 Technique: Automated Static Analysis 
Automated Static Analysis is the process of using an automated scanner on an application 
or network to identify vulnerabilities [164].  
4.9.1 Context 
It is a poor use of expensive resources to find problems that are cheap to find in other 
ways. Source Code Review, Configuration Review and Penetration Testing are all 
expensive in financial or human effort:  
[A pen test] is quite expensive. We don't do cheap ones. [My company’s] 
pen test will be upwards of £8 grand or so. (P1) 
In particular in small teams, … you can’t spend the additional effort in 
doing reviews. (P13) 
Indeed Such et al.’s survey of Assurance Technique costs—cheap, moderate or 
expensive—for these three techniques, taking the modal choice, are that Source Code 
Review and Penetration Testing are expensive; Configuration Review is moderate [164].  
4.9.2 Solution 
Automated Static Analysis uses automated tools to look for possible security flaws in the 
written code. Tools to do this are sometimes called ‘lint’ checkers, after a UNIX tool that 
does extra checking for C code: 
There are many tools that are for looking at things that could be helpful in 
[checking code]. There are Linters, there are all sorts of things (P1) 
Such et al.’s results suggest that Automated Static Analysis is cheap [164]. Indeed, 
automated tools can be used as an extension to the compilation process of the code, and 
many interviewees saw them as valuable in automating the removal of certain classes of 
security bugs: 
We use excellent tooling from the Alassian stack, the Crucible Tool … We 
do a lot of static analysis. We review for security, we certainly do, but the 
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point is, is that we will try to automate the removal of whole classes of 
problem from that. (P3) 
4.9.3 Execution  
There are now many such tools, some produced by commercial companies, supporting 
different languages and purposes. They work similarly to compilers, and generally use 
analysis techniques developed for compilers. Since codebases vary enormously in their 
style, requirements, and ways of using code, such tools often require significant work to 
configure or rebuild:  
Certain tools are very good with custom rules, they are very easy to tweak 
to try the custom rules. If someone is doing something different from a web 
application, I contend that they need to find a static analysis tool where they 
can write the rules easily, because they are not going to have cross site 
scripting, they are not going to have the standard thing that the tool looks 
for. (P11)  
Such tools typically generate large numbers of ‘false positive’ warnings. So, developers 
need to use them as questions (‘is this piece of code OK’) rather than as notifications of 
changes to be made. This is particularly relevant when examining components (see 
Section 4.7): 
We have a tool that we wrote … for checking … plug-ins, which is intended 
to make code reviews of plug-ins more focused. It looks for things that are 
indications of badness and you go and review that list of things, rather than 
sitting down and reviewing the entire plug-in.(P1) 
The benefit of using such tools is that they can reduce the time to find vulnerabilities: 
I like them because I think there is no value – this is almost a philosophical 
thing – there is no value in a human being finding a vulnerability, if that 
vulnerability can be found automatically in a second by a vulnerability tool. 
(P11) 
Some interviewees, however, had found the time cost of analysing the responses to be too 
great: 
If you mean static analysis type tools, the answer is no [we do not use 
them]. Two teams I have worked with have used them. One gave up entirely, 
because they looked at the amount of time that they were spending on it, 
versus the reward that they were getting, and then looked at what happened 
in the first pen test that they had, where they just got completely pwned. 
(P9) 
4.10 Technique: Penetration Testing 
A Penetration Test is a simulated attack on a component or system, carried out by a 
security expert using similar techniques to that of a real-world malicious attacker [164]. 
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4.10.1 Context 
All the assurance techniques discussed so far (Sections 4.5 to 4.9) need access to the 
development team or source code. Yet the delivered system is what the attackers see and 
where the privacy issues occur: 
I like to do [external reviews to authorise projects to go live] on a White 
Box basis (P8) 
So, there are situations where none of the other assurance techniques will help.  
4.10.2 Solution 
In Penetration Testing an external ‘white hat’ security team simulates what an attacker 
would do to attempt to gain access or disable the service. The team then feeds back any 
‘successful’ exploits they have found to the development and operations teams: 
[The most successful intervention technique we have found] comes down to 
using security experts. We … have Penetration tests. (P5) 
If the team have developed something new… and it is a significant change, 
we might get it externally pen tested, if we think that we can’t test it 
ourselves. (P12) 
Many security specialists offer external Penetration Testing as an explicit service: 
You sit down and ask what their worst nightmare is, their second worst 
nightmare, and you deliver that in as many ways as possible, and anything 
else you think is interesting, that you can do in the time period, and then the 
really important bit is the non-sexy end of that, which is a big long detailed 
report… The two sections that people care about is the executive summary 
which is one page and a non -technical person can read the entire executive 
summary, it does not contain anything technical, ‘I can do the following 
things’  It doesn't say how I’ve done it. (P9) 
4.10.3 Execution  
Essential for this assurance technique is a Penetration Test Expert. Few developers have 
more than basic skills at Penetration Testing, so it would be unusual for a development 
team member to take the role. Instead, the role of developers is to take the results of the 
Penetration Test and use them to plan future security enhancements: 
Normally the way the report would be dealt with, we would sit down in a 
sprint planning meeting and we would go through the report: us, the client, 
sometimes the tester, … and we would discuss the findings and produce 
work that would be added to the next sprint to address what had been found. 
(P1) 
Some interviewees have success extending the Penetration Testing to involve direct 
discussion with the developers:  
So, the idea is the penetration tester is testing the web application, and the 
developer is sitting with the penetration tester. That is very effective. … I do 
not claim to be able to find all the vulnerabilities in an application … but if 
you are sitting with a developer they are part of the process and they tell 
you ‘ah, you know that request you have just intercepted in Burp: I’ll 
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change it to that!’ And you find out that you have completely broken the 
authentication and you wouldn’t have found that on your own, because you 
really need to have the knowledge that the developer has about the 
application. … I would say it is also much quicker to do a pen test with a 
developer who spends the whole time with you. (P11) 
4.11 Technique: Incentivisation Session 
Lastly, we turn to the two further techniques used by the experts interviewed in their 
intervention work. First, an Incentivisation Session, which is a presentation, discussion 
or workshop to help motivate those involved for the need for security. 
4.11.1 Context 
Given that a large number of developers have no current interest in security [200], it is 
vital that at least one intervention generates such interest. The Active Developer Model 
makes it clear that without such interest, developers will avoid security-improving 
activities. 
4.11.2 Solution 
Thus, most of the interviewees discussed a form of presentation or workshop to help 
motivate those involved for the need for security: 
Everyone who joins [this company] gets a security talk, when they are a 
developer that security talk is longer. And it includes examples of things that 
have gone wrong and why, and how badly these things can go wrong, and 
how easy it is to screw it up, and some pointers on things to read about, to 
learn about. (P1) 
Some provide it as a scheduled training course for new employees: 
I get an email every week, and it tells me how many new starters there are, 
so I know, okay, yeah, there is about 4 or 5, I’ll do an induction. (P12) 
Others make it a one-to-one between the intervener and each developer: 
The conversation can take anywhere between 40 mins to several hours 
depending on who the person is, and you won’t know until you’ve had the 
conversation. And the conversation is: you explain how to break into, how 
an attacker would attack the systems, and what the various things you need 
to be aware of, are. (P9) 
Bigger companies may offer a security sensitisation course over several days for every 
programmer: 
So we run a very large scale education program …  where we …  tell 
developers exactly what happens in the real world, how TalkTalk was 
hacked, how Sony was hacked. And then we go in detail how we have been 
attacked, and whether they were successful and how they were detected. 
Then we also show them all the stuff that our red teams do – our internal 
hackers – which really scares them! (P5) 
Sometime the Incentivisation Session is based on a penetration test of the live systems; 
the intervener carries out the penetration test, identifies a list of vulnerabilities in the 
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software, and uses those to convince the developers of the importance of improving their 
security. From the point of view of an external security specialist this may also be an 
opportunity to establish their credibility: 
What is often a door-opener for us is, with these companies, we would do an 
initial project where, for example, we pen test one of their existing products, 
and show them “this is how you designed this product, and this is how you 
went through this process, and this is what we found”. And ideally, we try to 
then point out to them “this is where you might have detected it earlier, but 
this is why it failed, why you failed to detect it”. And this is often an eye 
opener for them, because then they see that a better process might be more 
worthwhile. (P13)  
4.11.3 Execution 
However it may be carried out, the aim of the Incentivisation session is to motivate the 
developers themselves to understand and prevent security problems. So many such 
sessions include stories and warnings about the consequences of security failures: 
I talk to my engineers about this, about look at what is happening in the 
courts – look at the class actions, look at these things. It is a hard thing to 
say, but you guys do not get away with saying “it’s nothing to do with me” 
(P6) 
Many covered a variety of different kinds of security problem, not limited to purely 
technical ones. So, for example, some include discussions about how aspects of team 
working may cause security problems: 
So we give them that kind of perspective, it really brings it home: if you do 
X, this is the result. If don’t work together as a team – if you don’t work with 
your dependencies, this is what happens to you. (P5) 
Conventional software security wisdom used to be to ‘scare developers into security’. We 
wondered if this was actually the best approach, and asked our interviewees directly if 
they did this. The consensus from our interviews was definitely not to leave them scared: 
I must admit, we had [high-profile expert] to visit and he goes off on one of 
his rants and scares the shit out of people, and they think “oh there is no 
point then!” (P5) 
Instead it is essential to leave developers knowing that the problem is solvable, and so 
each session needs to show that solutions do exist for the problems they are introducing. 
The Incentivisation Session works by highlighting problems and leaving possible 
actionable solutions: 
It needs to be positive. That is why the day is balanced. For every one of 
these problems we show you in the commercial world and internally, we 
absolutely have a way of mitigating it. And even if we know we can’t stop it, 
we can certainly detect it, contain it and then exfiltrate those people. (P5) 
Overall, the interviewees designed their sessions to convey a positive aspect to software 
security: that it is an interesting and exciting topic, a valuable skill to learn, and that secure 
implementations give value to their organisation and end users: 
I try to emphasise the positive aspects: “This is exciting, this is interesting.”  
Fear is probably the wrong word, but awareness is the right word. … The 
Chapter 4: Expert Survey 
Charles Weir - October 2020   81 
awareness that someone can attack your application is definitely scary – 
especially from the perspective of someone who owns the business – there is 
nothing wrong with that, you shouldn’t try to scare them; you try to share 
solutions to empower them. (P11) 
All of the experts who discussed an Incentivisation Session emphasised this in one way 
or another.  
4.12 Technique: On-the-Job Training  
Finally, the experts interviewed also made considerable use of different forms of On-the-
Job Training: mentoring or informal workshops, used regularly with the development 
team. 
4.12.1 Context 
We had expected a good deal of formal training in the techniques required to provide 
secure code; however only one interviewee (P11) provided this. More than formal 
knowledge, developer need practical, contextual, reminders of the importance of security 
issues and the ways of addressing them in their own work. 
4.12.2 Solution 
The experts used two approaches to On-the-Job Training: informal workshops and 
mentoring.  
The informal workshops are usually based on security learning from recent project work 
or from external research, and take the form of presentations by one of the team or an 
external expert: 
[Our security specialist] will take the most interesting or most relevant 
findings for the team out, and those go into a slide deck that we keep, and 
that deck is used as part of a show and tell. That happens… a few times a 
year. (P1) 
A different and widely used form of intervention is mentoring of various kinds. This is 
particularly valuable in that it supports a security-aware team culture: 
I think it is an issue of team culture, where teams are usually led or 
mentored by our more senior people who try and set the standard. And 
teams will say ‘we are just not going to have any [security] bugs in this 
system’. A team culture emerges. And that is always the right way to do it. 
(P15) 
4.12.3 Execution 
Some organisations teach penetration and attacking techniques to developers: sometimes 
as formal taught courses; sometimes through online resources. The emphasis is to show 
the developers what kinds of weakness might be present, and also how to prevent such 
weaknesses: 
And, today, I was teaching software developers how to basically pen test an 
application and exploit an authorisation issue. ... They know the technology 
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and they now understand it. They went back to their application and they 
started to apply it: “maybe I can do this here”. (P11) 
A few had used formal training in the past, and now use online resources instead, thereby 
reducing cost and making the training easier to arrange: 
I think training is obviously very effective, and we sometimes do specialised 
training. ... So we had pen testers coming in, and I have got it so that we can 
now do it ourselves, where we have got a VMWare image with all the 
hacking tools on it, and vulnerable webpages, so they can play and see how 
easy it is – and what issues they need to look for. (P12) 
The Grounded Theory analysis identified three approaches to this. First is mentoring by 
security experts, who are not themselves developers, but who work with the developers 
to sensitise them to security issues and address those issues in practice: 
So there is that side, and then there is a SME, Subject Matter Experts, side, 
which we call our advisors. And these are people we actually plug into 
different parts of the service teams, the engineering teams, and they work as 
a security SME. And they are highly skilled security people. They are people 
who couldn’t write a product, but they certainly know everything about 
[specific security features], and how would you do that at scale, how would 
you do the threat modelling. And they work as a team. (P5) 
A second approach is to send a developer experienced in security to work with a less 
experienced team. The experienced developer acts as a consultant to the team, and as a 
team member helps to create ways of working that promote security: 
We send people on site, and we embed them into other teams. The normal 
outcome, and I can’t think of a situation where this hasn’t happened, is for 
them to export our processes like it was the obvious thing to do – and I think 
it is! And for that then to be taken up by customer [developer] teams. (P3) 
Finally, where neither of the first two approaches is appropriate—or in addition to them—
there is the option of encouraging a ‘security champion’ from amongst the developers within 
a team. This developer learns as much as possible about the subject, and then provides support 
to others in the team on security matters: 
One thing that we find works with software development teams is … Security 
Champions – the idea is that one person in the team is more interested in 
security – not responsible – but who is the ‘go to’ person in the team if there is 
an issue in the team before they go to an external consultant. ... You need that 
person in a team, you actually do. (P11) 
4.13 Discussion 
In response to:  
RQ 2.1 What approach to interaction with software development teams leads to the best 
results in encouraging secure development? 
the Expert Survey established the ‘Active Developer Model’ theory, that developers must 
drive the introduction of security improvements.  
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Encouragingly, we note that the ‘Motivating Jenny’ project (Section 2.2.6) came to a 
similar conclusion of the need to raise developers’ security awareness, from their later 
ethnographic work.  
In response to: 
RQ 2.2 What specific intervention techniques do specialists consider most cost-effective 
in helping developers improve security and privacy in their code? 
the Expert Survey established six key Assurance Techniques as the most recommended 
by the experts for adoption by developers: Threat Assessment, Stakeholder Negotiation, 
Configuration Review, Source Code Review, Automated Static Analysis, and Penetration 
Testing. Plus, it established two further techniques used by the experts to encourage 
developers to drive security: Incentivisation Session and On-the-Job Training. 
4.13.1 Choosing Assurance Techniques  
Table 8 summarises the Assurance Techniques discussed in Sections 4.5 to 4.10. It 
highlights the ‘dialectic’ nature of each of the techniques (see Section 4.1), by showing 
‘friendly counterparties’ involved with each one; such a counterparty may be a tool. 
Interestingly, end users and operations staff were not mentioned in the context of any of 
the Assurance Techniques.  
We observe that this list of key Assurance Techniques is nevertheless a small subset of 
the 20 techniques identified by Such et al. [164]: the explicit focus that the surveyed 
experts placed on them is therefore important. 
Based on Table 8 and the expert cost estimates from Such et al., we can further 
characterise the assurance techniques in terms of two important practical considerations: 
their cost and their need for security expertise. Figure 16 shows this characterisation, 
using Such et al.’s modal estimate of cost for each technique, and assigning ‘cheap’ to 
Product Negotiation, since it is incorporated into activities already carried out by a 
development team. In this and the following figures, the Assurance Techniques are 
coloured according to their type: blue for process techniques; orange for vulnerability 
finding techniques. 
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Based on this, we deduce that the most promising Assurance Techniques are Threat 
Assessment, Product Negotiation, Configuration Review and Automated Static Analysis; 
and that teams with greater resources will benefit from adding Source Code Review and 
Penetration Testing.  
Interestingly, the choice of which tools to use for Configuration Review and Automatic 
Static Analysis, and indeed for the other techniques, was rarely discussed by the experts. 
We conclude that developers are already highly skilled at choosing between competing 
tools and methods, and do not need explicit support for choosing security assurance tools. 
4.13.2 Incorporating the Assurance Techniques into the Development 
Cycle 
The ordering of the assurance techniques in Section 4.4 is roughly chronological within 
a development cycle. Figure 17 illustrates how they might be incorporated into an 
iterative cycle. Threat Assessment and Product Negotiation affect what functionality is 
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produced, so apply to the planning element; Configuration Review and Automated Static 
Analysis can be automated into a product build; Source Code Review needs a candidate 
complete implementation, so is typically done at the release stage; and Penetration 
Testing applies to an installed system, so comes in the test phase.  
4.13.3 Sensitisation, Support and Affordability 
The Active Developer model implies that for an intervention to be effective the 
development team must actively accept it, and therefore it must qualify in terms of 
Sensitisation, Support and Affordability (Section 4.3.2). Figure 18 shows how each of the 
identified Assurance Techniques qualifies, showing their effectiveness in providing 
Sensitisation or Support on the horizontal axis, and their Affordability on the vertical one.  
4.13.4 Research Validity  
What measure of certainty can we offer for the theory, the Active Developer Model, and 
for the assertion that the six Assurance Techniques and two further techniques highlighted 
in the research do represent best practice in Developer Centred Security interventions? 
Considering first Conclusion Validity, do the research data justify the conclusions? 
Grounded Theory’s rigorous process of line-by-line coding, categorisation, and sorting 
generates a theory that does reflect the interview data. The use of extensive quotations 
ensures that this can be at least partially checked. 
In terms of Construct Validity, does the Active Developer theory represent real-world 
practice? Grounded Theory handles this primarily in terms of ‘theoretical saturation’, 
reached when new interviews do not add substantially to the theory (Section 3.3.3). A 
dozen interviews are often sufficient [77]. We believe we have reached saturation as 
regards the Active Developer concept and the list of Assurance Techniques, in that further 
interviews would be unlikely to modify the concept, or the list; obviously they would 
produce more detail for the descriptions. There is also a risk of bias in the choice of 
interviewees, and of questions. Examples might include selecting participants using only 
one form or intervention or one interaction approach; or asking only about certain aspects 
of their interventions. We addressed this bias with interviewees from a wide range of 
industry roles, and completely open questions. 
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In terms of External Validity, can the results be generalised to a wider scope? Grounded 
Theory’s conclusions are always limited to the scope studied [33]. Specifically, the scope 
in this case covered commercial companies, predominantly in the UK (Section 4.2), and 
was limited to the views of security experts rather than software developers. 
4.14 Conclusions 
Combining the answers to the two research sub-questions discussed in section 4.13, leads 
to an answer to the original research question: 
RQ 2 What interventions can change the environment for members of the development 
team to achieve good security, considering cost-efficiency, motivational factors, 
choice of tools, supporting processes, culture, awareness, training and skills? 
The Grounded Theory analysis in this chapter selected eight such interventions to achieve 
good security. The primary motivating factor identified was the Active Developer Model: 
that developers must drive the security improvements themselves (Section 4.3). The 
training role of an intervener, therefore, must be to generate awareness with the 
Incentivisation Session (Section 4.11), and to promote it within the team culture using 
On-the-Job Training (Section 4.12).  
Figure 17 shows how a supporting process fits Assurance Techniques into the 
development cycle. The six Assurance Techniques were chosen for their cost-efficiency; 
as Figure 16 shows the most cost efficient were Threat Assessment, Configuration Review 
and Automatic Static Analysis, plus a new ‘Assurance Technique’, Stakeholder 
Negotiation; with Code Review and Penetration Testing were more expensive (Section 
4.13.1). The choice of tools is of relatively little importance compared with the decision 
to use them. Similarly, the skills required are accessible if required, and achievable if the 
motivation and culture are right (also Section 4.13.1).  
4.14.1 Improvements on Existing Practice 
Current practice in interventions is often based on challenges by the intervener based on 
Penetration Testing (Section 2.2.4). Aside from the high cost [164], this approach proves 
ineffective in the longer term (also Section 2.2.4). The findings of this chapter suggest a 
quite different approach: sensitising developers to the importance of security so that they 
drive the security improvements, then providing cost-effective tools to support them. 
The specific techniques suggest a practical model for future interveners. An intervener 
might carry out an Incentivisation Session to motivate security improvement, then carry 
out a Threat Modelling session. This identifies the risks and benefits to the organisation 
from security issues. This then justifies Product Negotiation, plus use of Configuration 
Review and Automated Static Analysis, and in some cases the more expensive Code 
Review and Penetration Testing. Meanwhile, the intervener uses On-the-Job Training to 
keep the team actively considering software security. Figure 19 on page 87 illustrates this 
model: the training items (in grey) are provided by the interveners; the process items (in 
blue) and vulnerability finding items (in amber) are typically driven by the developers. 
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4.14.2 Next Steps 
The findings in this chapter provide a basis for the creation of an intervention package to 
help developers improve security. Specifically, we deduce that an intervention must: 
• Motivate Active Developers to drive their own security improvements; 
• Provide an Incentivisation Session to help do so; 
• Encourage developers to adopt Threat Assessment, Stakeholder Negotiation, 
Configuration Review, Source Code Review, Automated Static Analysis and 
Penetration Testing; and 
• Deliver continued On-the-Job Training.  
Chapter 6 describes the creation of such a package. 
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5 Developer Survey 
To provide proof of need and a baseline of existing security practice in commercial 
development teams required an online survey. To do this, the author collaborated with 
researchers in the Ruhr University of Bochum, Leibnitz University of Hannover and 
Paderborn University18.  
We chose a specific set of software developers to investigate: Android application 
developers. Our reasons for choosing these were twofold: 
1. The research team has considerable experience in Android development security 
research [3,126] 
2. The Android ecosystem provides access to both developers and the software 
developed, along with an indication of application usage. 
The research question for the survey was the following19: 
RQ 3 To what extent, and how, does a perceived need for security and privacy lead to 
security-enhancing activities and interactions in an Android development team 
and result in better software security? 
Accordingly, we carried out an online survey of professional Android developers, asking 
for details of their security practices and interactions. From statistical analysis of the 330 
completed and accepted surveys we deduced, with 95% confidence20, that: 
• No more than 22% of the developers of successful, maintained, Android apps have 
regular access to security professionals; 
• Although more than 71% have used at least one of the basic assurance techniques; 
less than 49% use any regularly; and security updates for apps generally happen less 
 
18 Specifically, as stated in the Declaration at the start of this thesis, Sascha Fahl instigated and mentored 
the survey project, suggested Figure 20  and wrote the initial version of Section 5.1.2; Ben Hermann created 
and ran the application analysis software package and wrote the initial version of Section 5.2.1; Christian 
Stransky generated the lists of invitation email addresses, obtained the corresponding application binaries 
and wrote the initial version of Section 5.1.5; Dominik Wermke created the initial Python Jupyter Notebook 
analysis plus Figure 25, Figure 27, Figure 29, Figure 31, and Figure 35 in Sections 5.3.2 to 5.3.4.. 
19 RQ 3 was modified to include ‘how’ and ‘perceived’ following feedback on a submitted paper. 
20Assuming the sample is representative of the wider population. See Section 5.3.1. 
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than once a year. Among the roughly 40% who work in teams, up to 64% may use at 
least one assurance technique regularly.  
• Less than 15% of them have made more than cosmetic changes as a result of the new 
GDPR legislation. 
We also found that: 
• Android app developers’ use of assurance techniques is positively correlated with the 
perceived need for security, the involvement of security experts or champions, and 
the security expertise of the developers;  
• The reported frequency of app security updates is positively correlated with the 
perceived need for security, the security expertise of the developers, and the 
developers’ use of assurance techniques. 
A second phase investigated how these aspects of the development process were reflected 
in objective app security outcomes. The research question for this phase was: 
RQ 3.1: To what extent do the perceived need for security, the involvement of specialist 
roles, and the use of assurance techniques in a development team lead to fewer security 
defects? 
We analysed the Android applications created by each developer and matched the 
findings to the questionnaire results, concluding that: 
• There was no correlation found between the perceived need for app security, nor the 
use of assurance techniques, and the defect count of the resulting app; and 
• Surprisingly, the involvement of security professionals and ‘security champions’ is 
correlated with higher cryptographic API defect counts. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 describes the survey design, participant 
recruitment approach, analysis plan, survey trials and limitations; Section 5.2 describes 
the same for the app binary analysis; Section 5.3 explores both the survey and app analysis 
results; Section 5.4 explores the implications of these results; and Section 5.5 summarises 
the main learning points and conclusions. 
5.1 Survey Methodology 
We conducted an online survey of Google Play Android developers in May 2019, 
receiving 345 complete responses. Section 3.4 provides a detailed overview of the 
methodology used. Figure 20 summarises the study procedure, the stages of which will 
be unpacked in the following sections. 
5.1.1 Ethics  
We addressed the ethical issues discussed in Section 3.4.1 as follows. All the institutions’ 
Institutional Review Boards approved this study, including the use of publicly available 
contact details for the survey invitations. With the invitation, we provided all participants 
with a link to a web page that informed them about the study purpose, the data we 
collected and stored, and an email address and phone number to contact the principal 
investigators in case they had questions or concerns. 
The use of data from non-participants (the Android applications created by the 
developers) can also raise ethical issues; the approach in this survey was also approved 
by the Institutional Review Boards. 
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5.1.2 Survey Questionnaire Structure 
We asked our respondents to answer questions about their Android application 
development behaviour and context relevant for application security and privacy, and a 
set of demographic questions. Although this might have led to self-reporting bias and 
social desirability bias, we considered this approach the best practical approach to address 
the research. We implemented the questionnaire in Qualtrics [138], and developed it using 
an iterative process.  
Appendix I contains the full list of questions. In summary, we asked respondents: 
• Whether they worked in a team, and if so their role and the team size; 
• The Android development environments they used; 
• The number of recent releases for their most frequently updated app, and the 
proportions of updates addressing new features, addressing library updates, and 
addressing security or privacy issues; 
• Their attitude to security and of privacy, both implicitly and for sales; 
• Whether they receive support from security professionals or internal security 
champions, and if so, the nature of that support; 
• What events had led to recent changes in security;  
• Which secure development practices they used, and to what extent; 
• How long they had been programming, both generally and with Android;  
• How many apps they had developed, and whether it was their primary job; and 
• Demographic information about gender, language, and country of residence. 
Definitions: In the questions, ‘recent’ was defined as the previous two years, and 
‘security champion’ to be a non-expert who takes a particular interest in security [26]. 
We asked developers with more than one app to provide answers for the most frequently 
updated one. 
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Secure Development Practices: The questions about secure development practices 
asked specifically about five of the most frequently-used assurance techniques identified 
in the Expert Survey (Section 4.4) as follows: 
Threat  
Assessment 
Working as a team to identify actors and potential threats; following 
this up with risk assessment and mitigation decisions. 
Configuration 
Review 
Keeping components up to date using component security analysis 
tools to the toolchain. 
Automated Static  
Analysis 








Having external specialist security testers identify flaws. 
Question Wording: All the questions about security processes were worded as questions 
of fact, rather than of future intentions as in some security surveys [51], to reduce the 
impact of desirability biases. 
Omissions: We considered asking about code analysis tools, since these are of particular 
interest to researchers. However, static analysis is only one of the five assurance 
techniques considered, so to be consistent we would need to investigate tools for the other 
four techniques as well, which would have made the questionnaire unacceptably long 
without contributing to answers for the research questions.  
5.1.3 Survey Pretesting 
Section 3.4.5 describes the pretesting done. The specific results from the two pre-tests 
were as follows. 
Face-to-face Testing: From the face-to-face testing, we modified the wording of two 
questions and added one, to improve clarity. We also noted that responses from those who 
had produced little-used apps were not interesting from a security viewpoint. 
Accordingly, we modified our criteria for invitations to only invite developers of 
‘successful’ and ‘maintained’ apps: ones that had received more than 100 downloads and 
at least one update. 
Pilot Survey: In the pilot surveys, 5000 were invited using the email in Appendix H, 
producing 30 completed entries. The number of dropouts found in the pilot responses was 
acceptable; since of those who completed the first page of questions, only 21% dropped 
out later in the survey. We manually coded the changes respondents had made as a result 
of GDPR, and provided the most frequent answers as ‘tick boxes’ in the final survey. 
In addition, the pilot survey identified the following additional research questions to help 
scope the problem of supporting developers: 
RQ 3.2 What proportion of Android developers have access to security experts, and  
RQ 3.3 To what extent do Android developers use assurance techniques? 
Given that RQ 1 relates specifically to UK development teams, we specifically want also 
to investigate the figures for developers in teams and for UK developers. 
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5.1.4 Required Sample Size 
Using Fowler’s method described in Section 3.4.6, we chose the sample size to get 
between 50 and 100 in each group, which would give typical sampling errors on data 
based on each subgroup between 4% and 15%: a sample size of 310. From the pilot survey 
response rate, we calculated that this required us to send 55,000 invitations. 
5.1.5 Recruitment 
Only registered Google Play developers were invited. From January to February 2019 the 
team crawled the details’ pages of 3,608,673 (2,087,829 free and 1,520,844 paid) Android 
applications from those published in Google Play. For all apps, we stored their last update 
time, name, developer data and download counts. 
Overall, we identified 312,369 developer accounts that match the 100+ downloads and 
update requirements in Google Play. The number of apps published by a single developer 
account in that sample ranged from 1 to 3,302 with a median of 2. From these 312,369 
developer accounts, we selected a random sample of 55,000, and the author used Qualtrics 
to send a single invitation email to each to ask each to kindly to support the research 
(Appendix H). Of the invited 55,000 participants, 605 started and 345 completed the 
survey. Ten of the invited developers reached out via email. None complained about being 
contacted; three asked to be removed from the mailing list; the remainder provided 
various reasons for not completing the survey, including two who noted the security 
questions and stated that their apps had no security aspects. 240 took the opportunity to 
leave their email address in the survey questionnaire for us to send them the results of this 
work. 
5.1.6 Filtering Invalid Results 
In psychological surveys, a common stratagem is to ask a question twice, once negated. 
One can then filter out meaningless responses (or use them to calculate a “self-
consistency” score for the survey). Since the survey was asking facts rather than attitudes, 
we concluded that this would be contrived and irritating to the respondents. Instead the 
author looked at response times, experimented to find a minimum time that a participant 
might be expected to take to complete the survey: 3 minutes. We then filtered out the few 
(10) surveys that had taken less than that minimum time to complete.  
5.1.7 Survey Statistical Analysis Plan 
Four forms of statistical analysis were used: 
1. Population analysis, to explore how well our sample corresponds to the larger 
population; 
2. Graphical analysis, to show the nature of the data; 
3. Confidence limits for proportions in the wider population based on proportions in the 
sample; and 
4. Correlation analysis, to identify relationships between different data items.  
The statistics scores and outline analysis methods were defined before the main survey 
data collection, as required for research best practice (see Section 3.4.4). The analysis 
used Python statistical packages, including Pandas, Statsmodels, and Seaborn, in Jupyter 
Notebooks [97]. 
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Linear Analysis for RQ 3: Addressing RQ 3 required scores based on each respondent’s 
survey answers: some scores captured the “need for security and privacy” (the 
independent, input, variables); others the “security-enhancing activities and interactions 
in the development team” (the dependent, output, variables).  
Figure 21 shows the processing to create these scores. The aim in each case was to create 
an ordinal score that approximated to linear across the range of raw data, so a higher score 
corresponds to more security (or more drivers towards security) and each increment 
represents a similar semantic increase. As shown, the Requirements Score reflects the 
security need as the arithmetic sum of the three Likert-style responses encoded as 
integers; similarly, to explore the why, there are Developer Knowledge and Expertise 
Support scores. The Security Update Frequency estimate was the product of the answers 
to two questions; this had an exponential (Poisson) distribution, so to make it linear [10] 
we used a transformation: log(𝑥! + 1) to create the Security Update Frequency Score. 
See Appendix J for details. 
The calculation of the Expertise Support Score is based on an assumption that direct 
expert involvement is more effective than ‘security champions’; the Requirements Score 
assumes that, for example, occasionally using two techniques is as effective as regularly 
using one; and the Assurance Technique Score assumes that, say, considering four 
techniques is as effective as consistently using one. Though reasonable as an approach, 
none of these scores are linear or even provably ordinal [161]; we anticipated that 
inconsistencies in the scoring would add to the statistical variance but not obscure overall 
trends. See Section 5.3.6 for a post-hoc justification. 
In statistics, the usual relationship to look for is a linear one. In line with previous research 
in the field [51] we used the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (‘Pearson R’) calculation 
[44] to establish whether pairs of values had a significant linear relationship; this test is 
acceptable for Likert-style data [96,124].  
 
Figure 21: Developer Survey Security Scores 
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In this analysis we treated the Security Update Frequency score as a dependent variable 
(output); and the Requirements, Expertise Support, and Developer Knowledge scores as 
independent variables (inputs)21. The use of Assurance Techniques is likely to be affected 
by the latter three variables but may itself in turn affect the Security Update Frequency 
and other security outcomes; in the analysis, therefore, we treated the Assurance 
Technique score as an independent and as a dependent variable in different tests.  
As discussed in Section 3.4.4, since the analysis constituted multiple tests on the same 
data, we applied the Bonferroni correction [144], reducing the threshold for ‘significance’ 
accordingly to (5%)/5 = 1%. To validate the preconditions for the Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient test [44], we then constructed x-y plots of all the pairs of variables that showed 
significant correlation. 
5.2 Application Analysis Methodology 
In the second phase of the project, we downloaded and analysed the apps corresponding 
to the survey responses. For analysis, we used a selection of state-of-the-art vulnerability 
scanners. Each one focuses on a different problem category and produces a relatively low 
number of false positives. We chose mature tools that are openly accessible to Android 
developers.  
5.2.1 Description of Analysis Tools 
The tools covered three key areas: SSL Security, Cryptographic API Misuse, and Privacy 
Leaks. We selected these areas because these cover a representative range from the 
possible security and privacy vulnerabilities faced by application developers [128].  
SSL Security: A key concern in the secure treatment of information is the correct use of 
secure transport mechanisms (SSL, TLS) when connecting to remote systems. To capture 
this aspect, we used two techniques. First, we used MalloDroid [56] to inspect the correct 
use of certificate validation in the apps code. Second, we extracted any HTTPS URLs 
from the constant pools of the classes contained in the app using the OPAL 
framework [52] and checked the corresponding server configurations and certificates 
using the command-line tools curl and openssl.  
Cryptographic API Misuse: Many apps use cryptographic measures to improve data 
security and privacy, and a key concern in the secure treatment of information is the 
handling of cryptographic primitives (e.g., for persistence). We run CogniCrypt [100] to 
capture this aspect. CogniCrypt uses static inter-procedural static program analysis to 
detect misuses of the Java Cryptography API. The detected problems range from 
improper configuration of algorithms (e.g., use of AES with ECB) to incorrect order of 
calls to the API. As it is formulated as a static program analysis, CogniCrypt makes 
conservative assumptions (over-approximations) on the control flow of the program, 
which may produce false positive reports. 
Privacy Leaks: To find possibly harmful data flow that can lead to privacy leaks, we 
used FlowDroid [11]. This tool is designed to find information flow in Android apps 
between defined information sources and information sinks. For example, the location 
APIs are considered as sources of private information, and the text message sending APIs 
as sinks. FlowDroid uses static inter-procedural data flow analysis to find evidence of 
 
21Pearson’s R does not distinguish dependent and independent variables, so this affects only our choice of 
scores to correlate with each other. 
Chapter 5: Developer Survey 
Charles Weir - October 2020   95 
directed information flow between these methods. We configured the tool with the default 
sources and sink for Android provided by the tool authors, which had been constructed 
by manual inspection of common vulnerabilities in Android apps. FlowDroid is not able 
to determine if the found information flow is to be considered an actual leak as it might 
also be intended to use the information in the particular context (e.g. for location-based 
services). 
Practical Approach: We downloaded the application binaries for at least one application 
by each of the survey respondents, wherever possible; we ran the full set of scanning tools 
on each and counted the issues (reports of possible vulnerabilities) generated. Table 9 
lists the versions of the tools we used. In some cases, the tools failed (see Figure 20); 
where this happened the corresponding app and developer data were omitted from the 
analysis. 
5.2.2 Application Statistical Analysis  
As in the survey statistical analysis (Section 5.1.7), we used graphical tools to explore the 
data, and linear analysis to explore relationships between the data. 
To investigate RQ 3.1, we defined further scores to represent the outcome “fewer security 
defects” in each app analysed. Figure 22 shows the processing involved. We anticipated 
that the issue counts would have a Poisson distribution; to permit linear analysis we used 
a log transformation22. As with the scores for developer behaviour, we wanted scores that 
increase with increasing app security and privacy, and we therefore negated the log value. 
 
22 Specifically, log(𝑥& + 	k), where k is chosen to minimize skewness [10]; in practice we trialled different 
values of k, finding no difference to the results, so used the conventional research practice of k=1. 
Table 9: App Binary Analysis Tool Versions 
MalloDroid  Version Dec 30, 2013  
OPAL framework  Version 1.0.0  
curl Version 7.64.0  
openssl Version 1.1.1b 
FlowDroid  Version 2.7.1 
LibScout  Version 2.3.2 
CogniCrypt Version 1.0.0 
 
 
Figure 22: App Analysis Security Scores 








- Log (count + 1)FlowDroid Issue Count Privacy Leak Score
Server SSL Issue 
Count - Log (total + 1) SSL Security Score
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We used the same method as previously (Section 5.1.7) to look for relationship between 
these scores and the scores from Figure 21 covering the “need for security, involvement 
of specialist roles, and use of assurance techniques in a development team” in RQ 3.1. 
5.2.3 Survey Limitations 
As with most studies of this type, our work has limitations. 
The response rate for our online developer survey was low, as might be expected from 
sending unsolicited emails to prospective participants. However, our recruitment 
approach was also used by relevant previous work [2,3,195]. The low response rate may 
show some self-selection bias, but since the invitations made no mention of security, we 
have no reason to believe a priori that those who responded differ meaningfully in terms 
of security or privacy behaviour from those who did not. 
All the survey data—except download count and last app update date—is self-reported. 
Though we addressed this by keeping questions as fact oriented as possible, this is an 
important limitation. 
In terms of the population, the survey reached app owners rather than all app developers; 
so, data about the respondents’ own experience is not representative of all Android 
developers, nor of software developers in general. 
5.2.4 App Analysis Limitations 
The static analysis tools we chose each consider specific categories of vulnerabilities. 
This may disregard other categories of issues which may also be security critical. Indeed, 
many vulnerabilities—especially privacy ones—will tend to be in the intended app 
functionality rather than in the detailed implementation, and we have no way to estimate 
these. However, we used detectors for a range of implementation issues which may be 
found through other methods, and which developers who consider security or privacy 
important would be expected to address.  
Static program analysis tools often report false positives, and the tools we used are no 
exception. Our approach for this survey, however, was to assume that the reported issue 
counts will correlate with the numbers of true vulnerabilities, and therefore that such 
counts can be used as a proxy for aspects of app security in statistical analysis. 
We were able only to analyse ‘free’ and ‘freemium’ apps, not ones where Google Play 
Store charges for download; this may introduce a bias. In cases where respondents have 
more than one app, the app we downloaded may not be one requiring the security 
practices and priorities described in the survey. 
We considered improving the app analysis by ranking vulnerabilities based on severity. 
However, the analysis did not identify vulnerabilities; it reported counts of ‘issues’ 
detected, where an ‘issue’ is a potential vulnerability. To determine whether an issue 
represents a vulnerability would require detailed analysis of the source code; this source 
code was not available to the researchers, and decompilation was infeasible due to the 
widespread use of obfuscation tools. 
We also considered distinguishing issues in the source code from issues in libraries, or 
using vulnerability ratings for libraries. However, although there have been several 
worthwhile tools developed to analyse the libraries used by Android apps, including 
LibScout [16] and LibDetect [72], with the current state of the art they are not 
sophisticated enough to detect library versions reliably, nor are they integrated with other 
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binary analysis tools to allow differentiation of issues in libraries from issues in the main 
code.  
5.3 Results 
This section describes our results, both from the survey and from the app analysis.  
5.3.1 Sample Validity 
Comparing the box plots for invitees with those for participants in Figure 23, we see that 
the average user rating and number of downloads for apps produced by the 345 developers 
who completed surveys are very similar to those for the 55,000 invited. 
One survey question asked the respondent’s years of experience in software development. 
Figure 24 compares the results with answers to a similar question addressed to the 21,000 
Android developers out of the 89,000 developers who answered the 2019 Stack Overflow 
developer survey [158]. As will be seen, our respondents are generally more experienced 
than the corresponding general population (our median 12 years; Stack Overflow 
population median of 8 years; Mann Whitney 𝑝 = 10"#$). 
One concern was whether our app selection criterion (over 100 downloads and one 
update) was too lenient, since little-used apps may well have poor security. To test this, 
 
Invitees are light blue; respondents dark blue 
Figure 23: Comparing Participants’ App Success with Invitees’ 
 
Figure 24: Participants’ Experience Compared with Developer Population 
Using Workshops to Improve Security in Software Development Teams 
98  Charles Weir - October 2020 
we used the Mann Whitney test comparing developers of apps with less than 1000 
downloads against the rest23 (see Section 3.4.4). We did this for all of the scores (Sections 
5.1.7 and 5.2.2) and for all the numerically analysable survey questions to see if the 
distribution was different for low-download apps. In the survey results and scores we 
found small p-values (𝑝 < 0.003) only for questions whose answers we expected to 
correlate with download counts: ‘How many apps have you developed’, ‘How many 
Android apps have your developed’ and ‘Is developing apps your primary job’, and we 
concluded that the populations were essentially the same. Doing the same Mann Whitney 
test on the App Analysis scores, we found low p-values only for the Cryptographic API 
Misuse and Privacy Leak scores (𝑝	~	0.016 for each). Though suggestive, these values 
are not significant after statistical correction. We concluded that there was no justification 
for changing our app selection criteria. 
Finally, to check the accuracy of respondents’ replies, we compared the respondent-stated 
app update interval with objective evidence. App update histories are not generally 
available from Google Play, but we did collect the last update date for each app we 
considered. We correlated the time since that last update with the participant-stated update 
interval using log scales: Pearson R=0.38, P=1e-9 (n=242). The tiny P value corroborates 
the assumption that the stated update frequencies reflect reality; the moderate R value 
reflects that respondents were asked the about updates to ‘their most frequently updated 
app’ and not the app we considered, plus the randomness of where each app was in the 
release cycle. 
5.3.2 Geographical Location of Participants 
Figure 25  provides an overview of the physical location of the participants. As 
highlighted, they are predominantly European.  
Figure 26 shows the main countries involved. As will be seen, this top eight countries 
accounts for less than half the total participants; a total of 65 countries were represented. 
 
23 We specified this analysis after data gathering; accordingly, significance in any of the correlations should 
be considered suspect. However, a lack of significance in a wide range of correlation calculations is a valid 
finding. 
 
Figure 25: Geographical Location of Participants 
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5.3.3 Findings on Self-Reported Developer Behaviour 
The next sections describe the survey results for individual survey questions, without 
considering associations between answers24.  
Importance of Security and Privacy: Figure 27 shows respondents’ ratings of the 
importance of security and privacy in their apps. For comparison, we also asked and show 
the importance of other functional and non-functional requirements. We were surprised 
how many developers considered security and privacy important. Over 40% of 
respondents considered each of security and privacy to be ‘extremely important’: ratings 
comparable with multi-platform support and higher than support for many features. 
Team Structure: Only 42% of respondents were working in teams (95% confidence 
interval 36% − 46%), the remainder being solo developers. Of those working in teams, 
Figure 28 shows the distribution of team sizes; more than half had 4 or fewer members. 
Figure 29 shows how many teams included particular roles (other than the respondent). 
Notably only half had tester roles, and only a third project managers. 
 
24 The number of answers varies to each question or set of questions, giving different values for ‘n’ in each 
chart. 
 
Figure 26: Countries of Participants  
 
Figure 27: Importance of Different Requirements 
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Security Expert Support: Only 17% of respondents reported receiving support from 
professional security experts. So, for RQ 3.2 we calculate the ninety-five percent 
confidence interval for the proportion working with security experts in the Android app 
developer population as a whole as: 
Lower bound = 14%, Upper bound = 22% 
Of these few professional security experts discussed by respondents, 33% were part of 
the development team and the remainder external. Their most common function was 
Penetration Testing (44%), but they also provided Design Reviews (39%), Audits (33%) 
and Training (27%).  
Some teams (18%) had a ‘security champion’, a non-expert providing security input to 
the rest of the team. Only 7% had both professional experts and champions. 
Developer Security Knowledge: Figure 30 shows how survey participants rated their 
security expertise. Interestingly, very few considered themselves to have no knowledge; 
this is as we would expect given the level of development experience of participants 
(Section 5.3.1). 
Use of Assurance Techniques: Figure 31 shows the reported use of assurance 
techniques. Unsurprisingly, Threat Assessment for every build is rare; possibly those 
respondents consider the list of threats every day. Penetration Testing for each build is 
 
Figure 28: Distribution of Participants’ Team Sizes 
 
Figure 29: Other Roles in Participants’ Teams 
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also rare; possibly they meant automated penetration testing. But otherwise the 
proportions using each are fairly consistent across all the techniques, with just under half 
not having considered each technique, and only a small percentage using it for every 
build. 
Combinations of Assurance Techniques: We investigated the extent to which teams 
used combinations of assurance techniques. Figure 32 summarises how many and how 
often the techniques are used. It shows the cumulative proportion of respondents using 
each number of techniques, separated out to show how often they used them. Thus for 
example, the middle bottom dark blue rectangle shows that 4% used all five techniques 
every release or more often; the middle column shows that nearly 45% used at least one 
technique every release or more often; the left hand column shows that 76% had trialled 
at least one technique but only 17% had used all five.  
So, for RQ 3.3, the 95% confidence intervals for the proportion regularly using one or 
more of the given assurance techniques in the wider Android developer population [99] 
are: 
Lower bound = 38%, Upper bound = 49% 
The figure for those who have at least tried one assurance technique is much higher: 
Lower bound = 71%, Upper bound = 80% 
We analysed which combinations of techniques were popular amongst the 15% (50) of 
respondents who only used two or three regularly.  
 
Figure 30: How Knowledgeable about Security 
 
Figure 31: Use of Assurance Techniques  
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The most popular were as follows: 
Combination:  Proportion 
Automatic Static Analysis Configuration Review 38% 
Automatic Static Analysis Code Review 32% 
Code Review Configuration Review 22% 
Threat Assessment Code Review 16% 
 
Security Updates: Figure 33 shows the frequency of security updates, calculated as the 
product of the reported update frequency, and the reported proportion of security updates.  
The 95% confidence interval for the proportion with less than one update a year is 
59%	 − 	70%. 
5.3.4 Recent Changes in Team or Development Security 
Given how fast moving the field of software security has become, it is also important to 
know what might have caused changes in the developers’ perceptions or actions around 
security. Two questions in the survey addressed this: one listing possible reasons for 
security and privacy improvements and asking the user to select all that had affected app 
security; and for those who mentioned an impact from the recent European GDPR 
legislation [55], a further question asking what changes they had made as a result. Since 
the GDPR legislation affects any apps collecting data in Europe, it impacts developers 
worldwide. 
 
Figure 32: Percentage Using Each Number of Assurance Techniques 
 
Figure 33: Cumulative Security Update Frequency  
Chapter 5: Developer Survey 
Charles Weir - October 2020   103 
Figure 34 shows the answers. Interestingly, the developers’ perception is that, even more 
than GDPR, the main security driver has been the developers themselves. Encouragingly 
very few (3%) reported security improvements as a consequence of actual security issues 
affecting themselves, suggesting that this is still rare; a few more (7%) reported ‘horror 
stories’—something bad happening to a competitor. 
Of the 45% of participants (n=133) who reported changes as a result of GDPR, Figure 35 
summarises the changes they made as a result. We observe that the majority of these 
changes were cosmetic as far as solving or mitigating security problems was concerned: 
changing privacy policies or adding pop-up dialogs. Only 33 made substantive changes 
to improve user security or privacy (giving 95% confidence limits of 8% to 15% for the 
wider Android developer population [99]).  
5.3.5 Team-Based and UK-Based Assurance Technique Use 
Since this thesis is primarily concerned with development teams, it is of value to see what 
we can deduce for this group of developers.  
Figure 36 shows the use of assurance techniques by 139 respondents who described 
themselves as working in teams. Unsurprisingly, comparing this with Figure 31 we see 
that in teams a decidedly larger proportion are doing Code Review.  
Specifically, answering RQ 3.3 for team-based Android developers, 56% reported using 
one or more assurance techniques regularly, making the 95% confidence intervals for the 
proportion in the wider population: 
Lower bound = 48%, Upper bound = 64% 
 
Figure 34: Top Five Reasons for Security Changes 
 
Figure 35: Changes Made Due to GDPR 
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Turning to the figures for the United Kingdom, Figure 26 on page 99 showed the countries 
of the respondents. Unfortunately, the sample size from the United Kingdom is too small 
(n=22) for meaningful statistical analysis25. 
Instead, we observed that there was no a priori reason to believe United Kingdom 
developers are different from those in the rest of the world in development behaviour. We 
validated this using the Mann Whitney test to compare the UK sample with the full sample 
population (as Section 5.3.1). We found significant differences only in Q25, “For how 
many years have you been programming in general (not just for Android)”, which we 
ascribe to the difference in developer populations.  
Accordingly, we have no reason to believe that the results relating to developer behaviour 
would have been materially different in a UK-only survey.  
5.3.6 Linear Analysis of Developer Survey Scores 
Table 10 shows the results of the analysis described in Section 5.1.7. It correlates each of 
the two dependent scores representing “security-enhancing activities and interactions in 
the development team” against four independent “need and mechanisms for security and 
privacy” scores. Each cell in the table shows, for the corresponding test:  
The R-Value, between -1 and 1, indicating how much of the variation in one 
measurement corresponds to the variation in the other.  
The P-Value, indicating the likelihood that the result could have been observed by 
chance. 
 
25 It would have been possible to select just ‘.uk’ email addresses for the invitations; however, this would 
both have introduced bias (since many UK email addresses do not conform to this pattern), and lacked 
interest to the non-UK co-researchers. 
 
Figure 36: Use of Assurance Techniques by Developers in Teams 
 
Table 10: Pearson R Results for Developer Survey Security Scores 














0.56, 3.9e-25 0.37, 1.5e-11 0.27, 8.6e-07  
Security Update 
Frequency 
0.16, 0.0085 0.25, 2e-05 0.03, 0.61 0.41, 5.7e-13 
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Non-italic figures highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant result (𝑝 <
0.01): results where we can be reasonably sure that higher values in one score are 
associated with higher values in the other. 
Figure 37 shows x-y plots of these significant results. Dots and vertical bars show the 
mean and its 95% confidence interval for the y-readings corresponding to each x-value. 
The plots also show a simple linear regression line and its confidence limits. The graphs 
validate the preconditions for the use of Pearson R [130]: particularly homoscedascity 





Figure 37: Cross-plots of the Scores with Significant Correlations 
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We observe that the first two plots also justify our choice of the calculation for the 
Requirements Score and Expertise Support Score since the use of assurance techniques 
shows a strong linear relationship to both scores. 
5.3.7 Findings on Application Security  
In the Application Security analysis (see Section 5.2.2), of the tools used, CogniCrypt 
reported no issues for 32% of apps; FlowDroid for 35% and the Bad SSL/MalloDroid 
combination for 70%. Only 20% of apps analysed showed no issues from any of the tools. 
Table 11 shows the results of the analysis described in Section 5.2.2. It correlates each of 
three dependent scores representing “fewer security defects” against the four independent 
“need and mechanisms for security and privacy” scores. Non-italic figures highlighted in 
yellow indicate a statistically significant result (𝑝 < 0.01). 
Only one result achieves significance and bizarrely that result suggests a negative 
correlation: the involvement of security professionals and champions is associated with 
worse Cryptographic API misuse outcomes. 
Figure 38 explores this odd finding. It shows that the effect is not large, and that both 
experts and champions seem to be associated with the negative correlation, though experts 
more so. We note, as well, that the p-value is only just significant given the Bonferroni 
correction (Threshold for significance 0.05/3	 = 	0.017).  
Disappointingly, in response to RQ 3.1, use of assurance techniques was not associated 
with better security outcomes, nor was developer security knowledge, nor was a user 
requirement for good security. 
Table 11: Pearson R Results for App Security vs. Developer Security  














-0.17, 0.016 -0.06, 0.37 -0.09, 0.17 -0.13, 0.047 
Privacy Leak -0.09, 0.20 -0.01, 0.85 0.02, 0.81 0.02, 0.81 
SSL Security -0.14, 0.049 0.01, 0.93 -0.02, 0.76 -0.08, 0.20 
 
 
Figure 38: Worse Cryptosecurity with Expert Involvement? 
Chapter 5: Developer Survey 
Charles Weir - October 2020   107 
5.4 Discussion 
At first sight, the findings in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.7 give a depressing view of app 
security. From Section 5.3.7 we see that over 80% of apps had reported defects from our 
analysis tools. From Figure 33 we see that the majority of apps get security updates less 
than once a year. From the analysis of the app security measurements, Table 11 shows 
that security outcomes seem to have little correlation with an app’s perceived need for 
security and privacy.  
And Figure 35 shows that GDPR’s new compliance rules for apps have had little positive 
impact. Certainly, in many cases cosmetic changes may have been all that was needed; 
but the finding suggests that GDPR has not been a strong force to improve app security 
and privacy.  
5.4.1 Adoption of Security Techniques by Developers 
However, there are positive aspects too. Considering the findings in Section 5.3.2, Figure 
30 shows us that the vast majority of the respondents consider themselves to have at least 
some security knowledge, and thus are likely to be aware of security as a possible issue 
in their software development. Indeed, Figure 27 shows that more than 60% of the 
respondents consider security to be very or extremely important to their users, and even 
more put the same value on privacy.  
Section 5.3.2’s combinations of assurance techniques used are particularly interesting in 
suggesting how security improvement is happening. Though the analysis only covers a 
small fraction of the survey participants, those respondents it considers are the ones using 
only a proportion of the Assurance Techniques and it therefore offers an insight into 
which techniques are adopted first. One would expect teams whose security is driven by 
external experts to adopt the Threat Assessment/Penetration Testing combination, since 
both of these activities can be carried out by the experts themselves; actually, rather more 
teams adopt tool-only techniques (Automated Static Analysis and Configuration Review), 
or code-review based techniques (Automated Static Analysis and Code Review), perhaps 
because few have access to security experts (Section 5.3.2). 
This suggests that the adoption of assurance techniques is being driven by the developers 
themselves, rather than by external security experts, and so what we are seeing is 
developer-led security. This tallies with the reasons given for app security changes in 
Figure 34, where the most common reason for changes was developer initiative. It also 
corresponds to the views of security experts, who emphasise the importance of developer 
initiative in improving software security [193]. 
5.4.2 Appropriate Use of Security Techniques 
Using security assurance techniques usually has a cost, both in time and in financial terms 
[164], and therefore it is poor economics to adopt them in cases where they are not 
required. From Section 5.3.6 we see that this is correctly reflected in the Android 
ecosystem: the use of Assurance Techniques increases in line with the importance of 
security for the app. We suggest that the correlation with the involvement of security 
professionals/champions and with developer knowledge of security may be an effect 
(expert developers and security professionals will tend to work on products that need 
security) as much as a cause (their involvement causes increased assurance technique 
use). 
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Updating apps also has a considerable cost, and again we would anticipate having more 
security updates in cases where security is important for the app. Again Table 10 confirms 
this behaviour, and shows that, justifiably, there is no correlation between the security 
update frequency and the security experience of the developer.  
5.4.3 Impact on App Security 
It was disappointing that the use of assurance techniques did not appear to be a major 
factor leading to better security outcomes when we analysed the apps themselves. Even 
though the analysis tools can only detect a limited range of code level security issues, we 
expected more security-experienced developers and those using assurance techniques—
especially Static Code Analysis—to generate fewer such issues.  
We conclude that other factors must drown out this effect. We observe, for example, that 
most app binary code will consist of libraries, and even up-to-date libraries will differ 
enormously in the number of such issues they may have. We hypothesise that the scores 
generated by the tools we used depend more on the nature of the libraries needed to 
implement the app functionality than on any attributes of the non-library code created by 
the developers; current tools cannot verify this effect (Section 5.2.4).  
More surprising is the finding that the involvement of professionals and champions seems 
to be associated with increased numbers of Cryptographic API issues. It seems unlikely 
that this is because they create the issues. Instead, we observe that our tools will not detect 
a failure to use cryptography in apps where it is required, whereas experts or champions 
will do so. We suggest that teams involving experts or champions will therefore tend to 
use cryptography more frequently, leading to more such issues26. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter describes the creation and deployment of a survey to Android app 
developers, in which we asked them a range of questions related to their approach to 
security and privacy in app development; and a second phase in which we compared the 
answers with the outcomes of running security analysis tools on one of their apps. The 
research addressed the following question: 
RQ 3 To what extent, and how, does a perceived need for security and privacy lead to 
security-enhancing activities and interactions in an Android development team 
and result in better software security? 
From the 335 survey responses analysed, we found a high level of reported security 
importance for the app development, but low use of practical security assurance 
techniques (Section 5.3.2). Where such techniques were used, this was in proportion to 
the perceived importance, as was the involvement of professionals and security 
champions. The frequency of app security updates followed a similar pattern (Section 
5.3.6).  
Considering the “how” of RQ 3: in the perception of respondents to the survey, app 
security improvements have been predominantly driven by developers themselves 
(Section 5.4.1); this is supported by the observation that the assurance techniques first 
 
26 We might speculate also that security professionals may tend to push teams to use extra cryptography 
without providing guidance on how. 
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adopted are those most easily available to developers. GDPR has also had an impact, 
though the resulting changes for GDPR have been mainly cosmetic (Section 5.3.4). 
RQ 3.1: To what extent do the perceived need for security, the involvement of specialist 
roles, and the use of assurance techniques in a development team lead to fewer 
security defects? 
The results of the app analysis showed little relationship with the reported security drivers 
and development process from the survey; we believe this reflects the inability of the 
current generation of binary analysis tools to analyse libraries effectively and separately 
from the main app code. We did however find the involvement of security specialists or 
champions to be associated with more Cryptographic API issues, probably since they 
correctly enforce much more Cryptography use (Sections 5.3.7, 5.4.3) 
RQ 3.2 What proportion of Android developers have access to security experts? 
Section 5.3.2 concludes that between 14% and 22% of developers work with security 
experts. 
RQ 3.3 To what extent do Android developers use assurance techniques? 
Only between 38% and 49% regularly use assurance techniques (Section 5.3.3). For the 
third to a half of the population who were working in teams, the proportion was higher: 
between 71 and 80% (Section 5.3.5). 
Contrasting the high need for security with the low use of assurance techniques and low 
availability of security professionals, this suggests that there is an urgent need for means 
to support app developers in adopting security assurance techniques in the absence of 
security professionals. The following chapters explore one such means. 
The author has released a privacy-preserving set of the survey raw results, along with the 
full questions and data description [186]. 
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6 Intervention Package 
Creation 
The purpose of this PhD project was to answer:  
RQ 1 What is needed to make a cost-effective and widely applicable intervention to 
help UK software development teams achieve better software security? 
Following the literature review in Chapter 2, the Expert Survey in Chapter 4 and the 
Developer Survey in Chapter 5, the next step was to investigate creating such an 
intervention.  
6.1 Requirements for the Intervention 
In section 4.14.2, we deduced from the Expert Survey that a cost-effective intervention 
would best: 
• Motivate Active Developers to drive their own security improvements; 
• Provide an Incentivisation Session to help do so; 
• Encourage developers to adopt six key intervention techniques; and 
• Deliver continued On-the-Job Training.  
Stack Overflow’s 2016 Developer Survey [157] suggests that a majority of developers 
work in teams, so we conclude an effective intervention should: 
• Support developers working in teams 
And the Developer Survey suggests that to have a wide appeal an intervention must: 
• Not require security specialists, since few teams have access to them (Section 5.5) 
• Support developers currently using few or no Assurance Techniques, since few 
are doing so (Section 5.5) 
The six key intervention techniques were as follows (Section 4.4): 
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Threat Assessment  Identifying and ranking the threats to computer software, a 
component, or an IT system. 
Stakeholder 
Negotiation 
Discussion and negotiation with stakeholders, such as product 
managers, on security choices 
Configuration Review A review of the way a system or its software 
has been configured to see if this leads to 
known vulnerabilities, using manual checking 




The process of using an automated scanner on a web 
application or network to identify vulnerabilities. 
Source Code Review  The manual examination of source code to discover faults that 
were introduced during the software development process. 
Penetration Testing A simulated attack on a component or system, carried out by a 
security expert using similar techniques to that of a real- world 
malicious attacker. 
6.2 Constructing the Intervention 
The next step, therefore, was to construct such an intervention. The author had expected 
it to take the form of a website, a book or video [190]; or possibly a code analysis tool 
(Section 2.1.3), or training-based intervention (Section 2.2.4) 
In practice, excellent implementations already exist of such interventions (Section 2.2), 
but the need for improved security remains. We observed that there were no interventions 
that both provided the incentivisation session required above and encouraged developers 
to drive the security improvement process.  
6.2.1 The Consultancy Model 
As a former consultant and trainer, the author had experience of interventions to support 
developer-driven changes: specifically, the adoption of the object-oriented paradigm, and 
later of the agile paradigm, for software development. This experience provided a tried-
and-tested model for such interventions. The essence of this ‘consultancy model’ is as 
follows: 
• A single external consultant facilitator engages on site with the team, leading 
training sessions, workshops or individual sessions, as required. 
• All the work is focussed around the specific project being undertaken by the 
group. 
• Involvement is not full-time, but over a period of weeks or months. 
• Confidentiality is necessary, usually requiring Non-Disclosure Agreements or 
contracts. 
• The consultant is paid based on their professional time spent. 
Since this consultancy model is familiar to the managers and technical leads of software 
development teams who have the power to engage with the research team, it seemed a 
good one on which to base a new form of intervention. To ensure academic credibility, 
and because of the importance of the trials, no payment was involved. The other four 
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aspects were retained; on-site facilitator, specific project, several-month involvement, and 
confidentiality. 
Given the need for a practical and lightweight process, the target was for the intervention 
itself to require less than a day’s on-site involvement. In practice, that meant the 
researcher spending most of a day on-site with the teams involved at the start of the 
intervention; then continuing over several months using teleconferencing or 
videoconferencing. For research purposes, where possible, the researcher also returned 
for the final session. 
Returning to the requirements in Section 6.1, given the need to motivate ‘Active 
Developers’, we determined that facilitated workshops with the teams would be the best 
approach. We observed that two of the Assurance Techniques are suitable for such 
workshop sessions: 
• Incentivisation Session, and 
• Threat Assessment 
Indeed, Section 6.1 already identifies the Incentivisation Session as an essential 
component of any intervention. The next sections explain their implementation as cost-
effective team workshops not needing security specialists. 
6.2.2 Implementing the Incentivisation Session 
In the ‘traditional’ security specialist approach to inspiring developers, the Incentivisation 
Session involves an expert or trainer explaining all the bad things that may happen, and 
using the developers’ fear of those events as a motivator (Section 4.11). Unfortunately, 
fear is only effective short-term as a motivator [98]. Frederick Herzberg in the Harvard 
Business Review [84] put it like this: 
KITA [Kick in the ‘Rear’] ... has been demonstrated to be a total failure…. 
A negative KITA does not lead to motivation, but to movement  
Indeed, researchers who tried this approach found it ineffective in the longer term (see 
Section 2.2.4). 
Accordingly, as an alternative approach to fear-based motivation, we wanted an 
Incentivisation Session that would help developers engage with security better and lose 
their fear of it. Devising such an Incentivisation Session was perhaps the biggest 
challenge of the project.  
Fortuitously, while considering this challenge the author received an enquiry from a 
colleague working as a consultant ‘Agile Coach’. He wanted to use a game, the ‘Agile 
Security Game’ [184], invented by the author as a fun workshop session for the 
AgileNorth 2016 conference.  
This game was based on the ‘Mumba’ role-playing game invented by Frey et al. [65], to 
help elicit participants’ prior experience of real-life security attacks. The ‘Agile Security 
Game’ variant, however, was designed simply to educate developers about security. In it, 
participants act as product managers, selecting security-enhancing product improvements 
with varying costs and learning whether their choices deter attacks.  
The colleague wanted to use the game in Company A (see Section 7.2.1) to help motivate 
development teams towards security. The author realised it was being requested as an 
Incentivisation Session, and proposed delivering the full planned intervention in that 
company—a proposal that was accepted.  
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6.2.3 The Agile Security Game 










story	 cards	 to	each	 table.	The	players	 then	select	 the	 stories	 for	 ‘their	product	
developers’	to	implement,	subject	to	a	budget	for	each	sprint	expressed	in	story	







Following	 the	 last	 sprint	 there’s	a	 facilitated	discussion,	where	 the	 teams	state	
what	they	learned;	the	facilitator	may	also	explain	some	of	the	game	workings,	
including	some	‘security	stories’	that	are	not	recommended	practice.	
6.2.4 Implementing Threat Assessment 
The Threat Assessment workshop was also challenging to implement. Much of the 
literature [114,154] describes a heavyweight process taking a while to set up and requiring 
considerable knowledge of possible technical threats, preferably with support from a 
professional with a detailed understanding of both the industry sector and current cyber 
threats to it. But such a process would be expensive in time and commitment, and the 
required professional knowledge was not available. 
However, in this case the researchers’ own experience was valuable. As technical lead 
for a major mobile money project, the author had faced this problem in a commercial 
project. With the help of Alec Muffett [208], a consultant security expert, he had 
developed a lightweight brainstorming process to identify threats and potential attackers 
[189]. While this may have lacked the rigor of the threat modelling approaches used by 
some large companies, it had served to deliver a product which the security analyst at 
their customer T-Mobile described as ‘the most secure app they had seen that year’. 
Accordingly, the author used the same approach here.  
6.2.5 Threat Assessment Description 
The following inset describes the Threat Assessment workshop as we implemented it in 
Developers Security Essentials. 
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As	ways	 of	 generating	 ideas,	 participants	 also	 consider	 also	who	might	 be	 the	
attackers	–	what	would	they	want	and	how	would	they	go	about	getting	it.	That	
may	 generate	 a	 different	 set	 of	 possible	 threats.	 Similarly	 looking	 at	 the	

















And	 then,	 taking	the	 threats	 with	 high	 impact	 or	 likelihood	 first,	 the	 team	
identifies	possible	mitigations	–	possible	things	to	do	to	deal	with	the	threat.	Some	
mitigations	may	be	in	code,	or	changes	to	functionality;	others	might	be	processes,	






6.2.6 Implementing On-the-job Training 
Finally, Section 6.1 required On-the-Job Training (Section 4.12). Specifically, we wanted 
a regular ‘nudge’ [168] to the team as a reminder to take action on what they had 
determined in the initial workshops and on what they had discovered since then. For this 
we used a monthly follow-up meeting, usually by video conference. The facilitator asked 
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open questions with the team about their progress over the previous month, and discussed 
issues that came up.  
6.2.7 Intervention Schedule 
Figure 39 shows a typical schedule for the interventions. The work with each company 
spanned 3-4 months, with only two days on site at the start and end. The involvement 
time was limited to four months in order to get the feedback from the exit interviews 
reasonably quickly.  
6.3 Facilitation Approach 
Given the Active Developer model, we wanted to use language and approaches consistent 
with developers as the instigators of activity rather than the language and approaches of 
commands and formal processes (Section 4.3).  
Therefore, at no point did the facilitator interact with the development teams using terms 
like “you must” or “it’s essential that”. Also, throughout the workshops and game, the 
researchers allowed the developers themselves to drive the solutions; as facilitators they 
provided only guidance. 
Furthermore, the researchers were aware that Source Code Review and Penetration 
Testing are relatively expensive for a team to adopt (Section 4.13.1) and therefore seldom 
within a team’s power to achieve themselves. So, the decision was taken not to promote 
them explicitly. Instead the Intervener concentrated on promoting, when opportunity 
arose, the other main techniques identified in Chapter 4: Configuration Review, 
Automated Static Analysis and Stakeholder Negotiation.  
An online book, video, and materials [182] supported the package.  
 
Figure 39: Typical Schedule for the Interventions 
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7 Package Trials (Magid) 
This project investigated having a consultant lead the Developer Security Essentials 
intervention in three different organisations.  
We called the project ‘Magid’ after some troubled superhuman interveners in a novel by 
Diana Winn Jones [93]. 
Our research question for this project was straightforward: 
RQ 4 What security outcomes did the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ package have, 
and what aspects contributed most to those outcomes?  
This is an ‘overview question’, and difficult to answer with precision. Accordingly, we 
unpacked it to create several sub-questions. First, we wanted to know the short-term 
outcome from using the intervention: 
RQ 4.1 What security improvements and changes were made in the development teams’ 
ways of working and developed products in the short term due to the 
intervention? 
Next, given that some previous interventions described in the literature had failed to have 
a long-term impact (Section 2.2.4), we wanted to know whether this was true for this 
intervention:  
RQ 4.2 To what extent did the changes made in the development teams’ ways of working 
persist over a one-year timeframe? 
And finally, we wanted an insight into what was happening, to support modifying the 
intervention in future: 
RQ 4.3 What aspects of software development as practiced by the teams supported or 
hindered adoption of the various security techniques? 
7.1 Research Method 
Section 3.2 justifies the choice of Action Research in this project. The choice of variant 
of Action Research was dictated by the situation. The interventions took relatively little 
time and did not involve discussion of individual problems, nor did they overtly 
emphasise organisational learning; that ruled out Action Learning and Action Science. 
The subjects did not influence the intervention design, nor participate in theory 
generation, making Participatory Action Research unsuitable. So, the method adopted 
was Canonical Action Research (CAR, see Section 3.5), with the author working as 
‘intervener’, directly with the participants (‘client’). 
We addressed the principles of CAR (Section 3.5.2) in the project as follows: 
Researcher-client agreement: The lead researcher agreed the form of the intervention, 
the nature of the workshops, and the specific approaches and choices of participants with 
the team leaders in each case.  
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Cyclical process model: This was the hardest principle to address; indeed many Action 
Research projects in software engineering have had only a single cycle [147]. In practice 
all of our participating development teams were using forms of Agile processes, and in 
each case the three-month duration of the intervention covered several agile development 
iterations, so the monthly follow-up intervention session allowed retrospection and 
improvements. However, the full intervention was used only once, not in each monthly 
session, so the monthly sessions could not be considered cycles in the Action Research 
sense. In planning the project, we anticipated a later Action Research cycle with the same 
teams. 
Theory use: The interventions were based on theory derived from the earlier projects; 
the research process itself also generated further theory for later use: specifically, in the 
Magid 2 project.  
Change through action: In each case, the participating developers decided on possible 
changes and prioritised them themselves; the normal development prioritisation 
techniques (Kanban boards or task lists) ensured that a record was kept and that the 
timings of the changes was known. 
Learning through reflection: This happened mainly though the final interviews and the 
discussions around them. Later reflection by the researchers was captured and fed back 
though the research papers and discussion with participants. 
7.1.1 Practical Approach 
On arrival, the researcher met with the main contact, and arranged the signing of the 
organisation consent form. He then, in a meeting room, interviewed in sequence four or 
five of the team members, each signing the individual consent form at the start of the 
interview. The interview protocol is given in Appendix F. The interviews typically took 
20 minutes each.  
The researcher then met back with the organiser, and together they set up the room for 
the first workshop, the Agile App Security Game, as given in Appendix D. The teams 
then arrived and, after a brief introduction by the team lead and the researcher, they played 
the game as in Appendix D. 
After the game, and following a half hour break, they did the Threat Assessment session 
(Section 6.2.5). This used a simple brainstorming approach [61]. The researcher used a 
flipchart or whiteboard to capture suggestions from the group, encouraging as wide a 
scope as possible and discouraging criticism or selectiveness.  
The facilitator and team leaders then selected the five or six of the most likely and 
damaging threats identified and discussed them in more detail, identifying possible ways 
to mitigate them. The teams also kept the flip chart sheets (or screenshots) and transcribed 
the full list of threats for reference afterwards.  
During the discussion of the mitigation for each threat the researcher introduced 
suggestions of possible approaches where these were not forthcoming from the 
participants, mainly from the list of key assurance techniques (Section 6.1). The 
suggestions usually took the form of short War Stories (Section 7.3.6).  
The monthly follow-up sessions were mostly by videoconference between the researcher 
and the team lead and a selection of the rest of the participants. The exit interviews were 
mostly in person, of the same people as the entry interviews, and took about 20 minutes 
each.  
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One point of importance related to: 
RQ 4.2 To what extent did the changes made in the development teams’ ways of working 
persist over a one-year timeframe? 
was whether participants understood the aim of the intervention, so that they themselves 
might use Assurance Techniques later in future projects; accordingly, the exit interviews 
included an open question to elicit whether the participants appreciated the need for 
Threat Assessment and perhaps other interventions. The exit interview protocol is given 
in Appendix G. 
7.1.2 Research Analysis 
The focus of this research project was the improvements achieved by the subjects through 
their own efforts, as focussed by the intervention. Accordingly, in our evaluations of the 
results we concentrated on practical, objective, improvements in security as a result of 
the interventions; feedback on the interventions themselves and the way they worked was 
treated as a secondary outcome27.  
A main research sub-question for this project was: 
RQ 4.1 What security improvements and changes were made in the development teams’ 
ways of working and developed products in the short term due to the 
intervention? 
To measure the intervention’s security effects, we needed a baseline with no intervention. 
A-B testing, requiring a different team working in parallel, was not practical. Instead, we 
used a longitudinal approach, deducing a baseline (‘no intervention situation’) from the 
initial situation plus a knowledge of the original plans by the team leaders to improve 
security over the same timescale.  
The author28 then carried out the pre- and post- interviews and the Developer Security 
Essentials intervention with the development teams and transcribed and analysed the 
workshops and interviews as described in Section 3.5.3. 
In this coding we looked for aspects of security improvement—including in learning and 
attitude—implied by statements from the speakers. To justify improvement, we coded the 
initial interviews to provide evidence of a baseline security activities and awareness 
before the start of the interventions.  
We analysed the kinds of interaction involved in the workshops and looked for 
‘Motivators and Blockers’ : aspects that helped and hindered such security improvements 
[14]. We coded signs of new knowledge in the team, new activities related to security, 
and evidence of improvements in the security of developed software.  
Given that the teams were prepared to work with us, we knew that at least some of them 
had some prior interest in security. In the interviews and our analysis, therefore, we were 
careful to distinguish new security activities and enhancements attributable to the 
 
27  Note that in the later, ‘Magid 2’ project we changed focus, and we altered our research method 
accordingly. See Section 3.6. 
28 All the work and analysis were done by the author of this thesis; Ingolf Becker acted as second coder for 
the dual coding.  
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interventions from those that had been planned or contemplated before the trials and those 
due to other external factors such as customer demand or other security specialists.  
7.1.3 Research Numbers 
Three companies participated, generating a total of 19 hours of audio.  
The final code book consisted of 5 families of codes, making a total of 41 codes, applied 
to 1405 quotations in total. 
7.2 Participating Companies 
This section introduces the three companies, with the projects and development teams 
involved. To preserve confidentiality, we have changed all names and the exact 
functionality of the products involved. 
7.2.1 Company A 
Company A is a small-to-medium company employing around 50 people in the UK. Set 
up about 10 years ago, it has a single product which is sold both web-based as ‘software 
as a service’, and as an installable system for clients’ own sites. This product manages 
sensitive data, and is used by large multinational organisations, including several that are 
household names. 
The product is a web application and is shipped or installed as a single codebase 
implemented mainly in Java. The ‘software as a service’ implementation is hosted on 
systems at a leading hosting provider; clients with their own installations manage them 
themselves, which means that the developers must provide support for older software 
versions. The nature of the app means there are complex rules and permissions as to which 
users may see what. These are typically implemented for each new customer installation 
by a separate team of configuration specialists. 
7.2.1.1 A’s Developers 
Participating in Company A’s workshops were developers from two teams. The teams 
worked on separate tasks on a shared code base, and each team had a technical lead, the 
‘architect’.  
The company development teams show some of the enthusiasm and characteristics of a 
start-up. We observed a culture of technological improvement, and a willingness to 
embrace change. Both teams use an agile approach to development based on Scrum, with 
sprints, stories and a prioritisation process. 
7.2.2 Company B 
Company B is a tiny non-profit start-up, run on a part-time basis by two professionals: an 
educationalist and a software project manager. Other staff also assist on a part-time basis. 
The company purpose is to provide work experience for promising young people who 
would otherwise be unable to get initial jobs in IT. They undertake pro-bono software 
development projects for charities. During the interventions we worked on two projects: 
first a marketing website for Company B itself, and later a project for an art installation 
involving voice recognition and public interaction. 
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7.2.2.1 B’s Developers 
The development team constituted the educationalist (B1), a project manager (initially 
B2), and two student developers with very limited experience (B3, B4). Typical 
interactions were dominated by B1, but with contributions from the others. 
7.2.3 Company C 
Company C is a well-known and long-established multi-national organisation, providing 
information services mainly via the Internet to a range of companies and individuals. The 
department we worked with provides membership facilities, managing payments and 
controlling access to the company’s services. 
7.2.3.1 C’s Developers 
We were introduced to the company by C1, an experienced software tester, who had an 
interest in encouraging security. The team members involved were testers, managers and 
programmers. The membership system is a mature software, but there is a policy of 
continuous improvement; currently the system is migrating to a micro-services 
architecture. All the team were competent and experienced professionals, but in contrast 
to company A we noted more emphasis on inter-departmental politics. 
During the interventions, C company changed policy on testing, disbanding the separate 
QA team; three of the staff we had been working chose to take redundancy. Two of these 
we managed to contact, and they agreed to exit interviews by video and telephone. As 
researchers, we found arrangements difficult to make (probably due to the 
reorganisations), and managed only one follow-up session after two months, and to ensure 
it took place we held that on the customer site rather than by video. 
7.2.4 Interview Participants 
To help identify the effects of the interventions, we interviewed team members in each 
company both before and after the process. We agreed up to six interviewees with each 
company, enough to provide a full range of roles, and requested accordingly a cross 
section of the roles and experience within each team. Table 12 shows the interviewees, 
with the role, gender and an estimate of the professional experience of each.  
We have included quotations in the remainder of the paper, in italics. Where the speaker 
can be identified, we have cited the appropriate ID. In the recordings of group sessions, 
however, it was rarely possible to identify individual speakers, and quotations are cited 
with role and context accordingly, e.g. ‘Developer, Threat Assessment.’ We have edited 
the quotations to protect confidentiality and indicate context: square brackets show 
additions and replacements; ellipses show removals. 
Throughout the rest of this chapter we refer to the author, who carried out the 
interventions, as the Intervener. 
For a variety of reasons (equipment failure, researcher’s omission) three sessions were 
not recorded: the first follow-up Discussion for Company A, the first follow-up 
Discussion for Company B, and the Threat Assessment for Company C. As mitigations, 
the author kept notes and a copy of any outputs from those sessions. Where referenced, 
these are indicated in brackets as ‘(not recorded)’. 
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7.3 How the Sessions Went 
This session analyses the intervention sessions themselves, without considering their 
longer-term impact.  
7.3.1 Intervention Time Requirements 
Referring back to Figure 39 in Section 6.2.7, the timeline needed for the interventions, it 
will be seen that, despite the long-elapsed time, the total effort required from the 
intervener was relatively short: a total of two days (plus counting travel time). What is 
more, at least four hours of that were research interviews and not part of the intervention 
itself. So, the total effort spent for the interventions was less than one working day. 
Adding another day for preparation – scheduling, preparing materials for the workshops, 
etc. – the total time spent by the intervener on the interventions was less than two working 
days for each company. In terms of team effort involved, the participant numbers and 
times involved were roughly as shown in Table 13. 
  
Table 12: Interviewees from Each Company Team 
Organisation Identifier Role Gender Experience 
Company A A1 Architect Male 17 
 A2 Programmer Male 2 
 A3 Programmer Male 14 
 A4 Programmer Male 3 
Company B B1 Manager Female 25 
 B2 Manager Female 13 
 B3 Developer Male - 
 B4 Developer Male - 
Company C C1 QA Female 7 
 C2 Manager Male 13 
 C3 Programmer Female 3 
 C4 QA Female 10 
 C5 Developer Male 10 
 











1.5	 15	 4	 16	
Threat	modelling	
workshop	
1.5	 15	 4	 16	
Follow-up	1	 1	 6	 4	 	
Follow-up	2	 1	 6	 4	 8	
Exit	workshop	 1	 10	 4	 	
Total	participant	
hours	
	 67	 24	 56	
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We can therefore summarise the cost of this set of interventions as shown below: 
Participants Total time 
Intervention facilitator: 15 person hours 
Development team: 20 - 70 person hours 
 
The cost of the interventions, therefore, is relatively small, and is within the scope of a 
wide range of organisations. 
7.3.2 Effect of the Incentivisation Session 
All three groups engaged well with the Agile App Security Game (Section 6.2.3), with 
each group discussing the security choices at length. Participants reported different 
benefits, though. Some saw it as teaching about security decisions: 
The game was fun, I did enjoy the game. And it was proving as per usual, 
that you can't... whatever you do, you are going to lose somewhere (A3) 
I think what it proved is how challenging it is to get this right. It actually 
hammered home that circumstances that we all work through every single 
day, which is this balancing act, between how much time you have got, vs 
what is being demanded from you, from some customer somewhere. (C2) 
Others as encouraging communication and knowledge exchange: 
Yes, that was good. It really got everybody talking. And it could be linked 
back to things that were happening within [Company C]. 'Yeah, we do 
something like that, we do this and this' or 'yeah, no, we don't do anything 
about that - and we really should'. (C1) 
7.3.3 Effect of Threat Assessment  
The Threat Assessment workshop generated some ways of thinking and conclusions that 
were unexpected for the participants: 
I never really thought about 'who would', so much, until you put up 'why 
would somebody and who would they be' (A4) 
Company A, in particular, identified two kinds of threat that were totally different from 
the ‘anonymous hacker exploiting one of their coding mistakes’ that they had been 
envisaging: customers viewing each other’s data; and hackers exploiting out of date 
components. They also identified a range of further possible issues: 
I find it a little concerning that there are so many attacks that we 
traditionally haven't mitigated against. … Stuff like social engineering. 
(Participant, Threat Assessment) 
At the time of the first workshop, Company B were starting to work on a website for their 
company. Like many developers they had not considered it in terms of security, and were 
surprised to find when they thought about it that there were issues: the need to store 
personal details of applicants, for example. Indeed, the discussion prompted a significant 
change in their website software architecture and their rules for team members: 
A big take-away for me, is that we started with a much grander idea of we 
needed to be doing, and there was all this personal data... and now we have 
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said oh no, we just need email! And more important is things like making 
sure that people's software on their computers is up to date! (B1) 
The teams in Company C had a much greater a priori understanding of the security issues; 
indeed, C1 had been handling security alerts and issues as part of her day-to-day role. So, 
though the Threat Assessment session did identify some possible issues (such as physical 
access to developer workstations), the main impact of the workshop was the sharing of 
knowledge between people with different roles: 
I don't think we came up with any extra, really. I think we were kind of ... 
apart from us talking about it more, we have not really been able to 
influence a lot of other change. But it was good to get everyone talking 
again, and thinking about it. (C1) 
7.3.4 Effect of the Follow-up Discussion Sessions 
The discussion sessions varied far more between companies than the other two sessions, 
because of the different needs of the projects.  
With Company A, in the first Discussion the architects requested a prioritisation session 
(not recorded). Using a shared ‘Trello’29 board, the architects and Intervener prioritised a 
list of possible security enhancements derived from the Threat Assessment session. While 
the intervener contributed information about industry security decisions, the main point 
made was that these prioritisation decisions were for product management, with the role 
of security and development experts merely being to provide context for the decisions.  
The second discussion session with Company A followed more of the pattern the 
researchers were expecting: a discussion of the new security activities the team were 
implementing, and a discussion of the advisability of disk encryption for the server: 
What [are] the advantages of database encryption, and what wouldn't [it] 
give us, compared to application level encryption… and [what are the] risks 
with encryption itself? (Architect) 
With Company B, the first session (not recorded) was a similar discussion, discussing the 
security improvements arising from the first Threat Assessment session and comparing 
industry practice. By the time of the second session, however, the team had moved on to 
starting a new project, so the session became an ad-hoc Threat Assessment session, using 
a shared Google Doc30. The following are examples of the threats they identified relating 
to public voice input for their product: 
Don’t want swearwords to appear in the output. 
Microphone (voice recognition) or app overhearing someone else’s talk.  
Someone dominating the [microphone]. Could set a time limit…. 
Commands that might damage the database. NOSQL. (Shared document) 
While not all the items identified may need addressing, the concerns show a promising 
understanding of the wider nature of security threats. 
With Company C the follow-up discussion sessions required considerable persuasion on 
the part of the researchers to organise; possibly with the considerable internal experience 
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manage, they felt little need of further external input. The single session we arranged also 
felt less positive than any of the other sessions with any company – we now know this 
was probably an effect of the redundancies. The discussion served as a review of the 
current security improvements in action, but mostly covered relationships with other 
departments: improved security enthusiasm from product management: 
[In a recent strategy meeting] those that ultimately decide what we do, and 
in what order actually quite happily went: 'well if it is a security issue, we 
should fix it', whereas normally it is a case of 'well, we have got these 
deadlines to hit, and we have got this stuff to deliver’ (Participant) 
And a dysfunctional relationship with the security department: 
There is a lot of stuff, security-wise, that doesn't seem to have a home, 
doesn't seem to have an owner. The Security Team is happy to shout about it 
when it suits them, but I wouldn't necessarily suggest that they own it, or 
help you particularly. (Participant) 
7.3.5 Additional Sessions 
Company A at their request had an extra presentation by the intervener. This followed the 
Entry Interviews and described the 8 interventions, the process we were planning to use 
and the relationship to the OWASP Top Ten issues. This contributed to the success of the 
interventions with Company A – indeed the exit interviews from B and C suggested such 
a session: 
[I would like to have included] more visual presentations. I mean, we used 
the cards, and the discussions were beneficial but maybe a visual element to 
that maybe a video or a presentation would help us explore in a different 
way. (B3) 
Maybe from my perspective it would have great to get a bigger picture of 
what the programme was about. “So, this is going to be across three 
different stages, and first we will have …” (C3) 
Both Company A and Company B had an exit workshop (not formally analysed) when 
the lead researcher was on-site for the exit interviews. In the case of Company A, this was 
a discussion of how to evaluate risk for different security threats; for company B, a 
discussion of the education value of the sessions and possible security-based careers for 
the students involved. 
7.3.6 Team Interactions  
It is instructive to examine how the nature of the discussions in the workshops varied 
between companies. Figure 40 contrasts different styles of interaction (by both developers 
and Intervener) during the workshops and discussions with each company, showing the 
proportion of dialog devoted to some of the most important categories of discussion. The 
workshops varied considerably in the proportions of time devoted to the main activities: 
knowledge presentation, to finding issues and vulnerabilities, and to addressing the issues 
discovered. This reflects differences in culture, structure and projects between the teams.  
As Figure 40 shows, Company A saw the largest proportion of time presenting knowledge 
– people stating facts and information about security and the products – probably because 
of the high level of software expertise and the presence of security knowledge within the 
team. Company B, with the least experienced team, had less knowledge to share and 
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found it easiest to concentrate on possible attacks. Some of Company C’s team had 
extensive knowledge both of their systems and of security aspects, but this knowledge 
wasn’t well distributed across the team, so a good deal of the session constituted 
Presenting Knowledge by team members. Company C’s group identified no detection 
mechanisms, perhaps because detection and handling intruders was the responsibility of 
a separate security department. 
In all three companies we observed examples of an effective way of presenting 
knowledge, Storytelling (shown separately in the diagram), narrating how a participant 
addressed or was affected by security issues [82]. 
A particular revealing measurement in terms of culture is the amount of Banter, friendly 
joshing and jokes, involved: Team A’s high performing and relaxed culture had a good 
deal; Team C’s more formal culture evinced little, and Team B, with a large disparity in 
status between participants, had none.  
The differing proportions reflect different emphasis in the workshops. For Team A, the 
novelty was discovering the true nature of their security threats, while addressing them 
would be business as usual and so required less discussion. For Team B, starting from 
virtually no security knowledge and working on less security-critical projects, it was more 
important to find ways to deal with the smaller set of risks they did identify. And for 
Team C, with good security expertise but poor communication between teams, most of 
the benefit was in pooling knowledge fragmented among the participants, and hence 
discussion was fairly evenly spread between the three main activities. 
7.4 Outcomes 
This section explores the objective outcomes in terms of identifiable improvements in the 
development process and product security for each team, addressing the first research 
sub-question: 
RQ 4.1 What security improvements and changes were made in the development teams’ 
ways of working and developed products in the short term due to the 
intervention? 
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7.4.1 Outcomes for Team A 
There were at least two significant improvements in Team A’s product and process 
security as a result of the interventions. Beforehand, the developers had been thinking of 
security improvements as line by line improvements in the code they themselves had 
written. Afterwards, they understood that their most effective security improvements 
were likely to be elsewhere: 
I find it a little concerning that there are so many attacks that we 
traditionally haven’t mitigated against. (A Workshop) 
Specifically, they made three changes. First, in a form of Configuration Review, they 
introduced a component security checker to their build cycle and embarked on a program 
of updating and replacing components according to their security vulnerabilities. 
We [have built] the OWASP dependency checker into our build process, … 
and established a process for how we deal with new vulnerabilities in 
existing libraries or adding new libraries or upgrading libraries. (A1) 
Second, they identified their own existing customers as competitors with each other, and 
therefore potential ‘attackers’, and identified that the permissions functionality was 
therefore a major privacy issue; making fixes in this area was likely to give security wins: 
I have a … task to check user permissions, and check that a user has access 
to that specific entity or a set of those entities (A2)  
Thirdly, they introduced a monthly focus on the OWASP ‘Top Ten’ vulnerabilities, one 
at a time. This approach had been mooted prior to the interventions but was only carried 
out after the initial workshops:  
[A team architect] puts out a ‘we’re working through this one this week’, 
and he puts up a link and it has got everybody’s name next to it, and you 
read through it, and then there is more information if you want. You can ask 
questions, and we have got a good internal issue tracking board. Any kind 
of potential thing, big or small, goes on there, and it can get prioritised into 
our work properly. (A4) 
And in one of the discussion sessions they established that the prioritisation of security 
features required product management, not development, decisions: 
That is where the priority call would come from. I think [Product 
Management] do understand it, … but there is always going to be that 
element of weighing up (Group Session) 
An unusual and intriguing approach they also tried was having one of the team be a covert 
‘saboteur’, occasionally introducing security defects to see if the review process would 
find it; in practice, though, they found it problematic: 
One team did the saboteur exercise … It was a bit mixed. The saboteur 
didn’t enjoy being a saboteur... (Group Session) 
7.4.2 Outcomes for Team B 
Team B, with little prior security experience, had more potential improvements in process 
and in product security. As a result of the first Threat Assessment process they made 
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several changes. They abandoned plans to store personal data in a website server 
database: 
We said about the form, that it would send an email [instead of saving 
personal data on the server]. (B1) 
In addition, they introduced improved security and backup for development workstations 
and code repositories, against the threat of malicious code modifications or access to 
personal data: 
[We did] an audit on our computer systems: on our laptops… and the 
laptops that the students are bringing. We do scans, and make sure that the 
antivirus and anti-malware protection is all up to date. (B1) 
I also update my data a lot more, I back it up, not just to a file server but 
with a USB. (B2) 
Later, as they started further projects, they introduced their own Threat Assessments: 
We developed a threat model at the start of our [later] project, and it is 
used in the code reviews and testing. (B1) 
These seem to have been effective; for example, they identified a need to secure their API 
key management, an example of Configuration Review: 
We need to make sure that … those [API] keys don’t become public, and 
that all students know that we have to do that. (B1) 
7.4.3 Outcomes for Team C 
There were no identifiable improvements to Team C’s process or product directly 
attributable to the interventions. The primary reason for this is that their security 
knowledge and practice as a team were already good: better than they may have realised: 
I’m not sure too many changes were made. (C1) 
While some changes were made as a result on ongoing security improvements: 
I’m much happier because we started working with Two Factor 
Authentication… for our client… admins… (C5) 
the participants did identify improved communication and understanding as resulting 
from the interventions: 
I think it got everyone talking about security a bit more, especially within 
our team... There was a lot of security things going on that I didn’t know 
about. (C1) 
7.4.4 Security Learning as a Result of the Interventions 
As discussed in Section 7.1.1, we looked for participants’ appreciation of the importance 
of Assurance Techniques, especially Threat Assessment. Table 14 shows the results of 
the corresponding analysis, along with brief descriptions of each participant. The top lines 
(A1–C5) consider the exit interviews for each participant and identify how many 
statements indicated internalised understanding of each assurance technique. The bottom 
three lines consider group discussions towards the end of the process and show the 
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number of participant statements that showed similar understanding. Deeper shades of 
blue highlight higher counts. 
Since the Intervener was not promoting Penetration Testing and Code Review, there was 
no attempt to analyse the discussion for them. Surprisingly, only A1 showed appreciation 
of the Incentivisation Session. So, none of these are shown in the table. 
As Table 14 shows, though both teams B and C implemented many of the assurance 
techniques, many of the individuals we interviewed did not evince a strong understanding 
of the reasons and approach to do so for future projects. Note however that since this 
understanding was estimated from participants discussion and there were no explicit 
interview questions about each technique, the omission may not reflect the true 
understanding of the participants involved. 
However, members of the Team A gained a good understanding of the techniques; we 
can conclude they did not implement Automatic Static Analysis as a positive decision 
based on the value of using it—an example of good security process. The leaders of teams 
A and B indicated they had learned aspects of future Product Negotiation:  
I guess, one challenge, as always, is playing what we, as architects, believe 
are the most pressing security concerns, against what customers are asking 
for in terms of dealing with security concerns. (A1) 
I would …feel confident to be able to talk to people about our security 
policies and how we manage security (B1) 
And that they appreciated the need for Threat Assessment: 
[If I was advising a team on security] I think brainstorming threats and 
vulnerabilities and assets is really helpful. (A1) 




































































A1 Architect 17 1 4 3 3 3
A2 Programmer 2 2 2
A3 Programmer 14 1 3 2
A4 Programmer 3 2 1




C1 QA 7 1 1 1 1
C2 Manager 13 1
C3 Programmer 3
C5 Programmer 10 1 3
A Team discussion 6 1 11 6 2
B Team discussion 2 3 4
C Team discussion 4 1
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And one of the things that I think we probably are doing, as a result of being 
part of this process, is that auditing, that thinking things through first, what 
are our security issues, what are our risks, and how we are going to deal 
with those, in terms of the design. (B1) 
7.5 Outcomes after One Year 
The additional interviews after one year for A and B allowed us to address: 
RQ 4.2 To what extent did the changes made in the development teams’ ways of working 
persist over a one-year timeframe? 
7.5.1 Outcomes after One Year for Team A 
A year later, secure development had become increasingly important to sales (Product 
Negotiation): 
With every sale we will get stringent questions around security. … I think, 
increasingly, there are more questions around development processes, and 
application security. And clearly, without being able to answer those 
questions satisfactorily, we wouldn’t be able to sell. (A1) 
Configuration Review is now part of their development process: 
The OWASP dependency checker is very much embedded in our process. 
We have never yet got it to the point where all the dependencies are green! 
But we do now appear to be at the point where it is a regular part of our 
process to check for new vulnerabilities that have been found, and to add 
upgrades for those libraries that contain known vulnerabilities, within, 
either, the next release, or the release after that, depending on how much 
other pressure there is on our road map. (A1) 
Disappointingly, the two innovative forms of On-the-job Training instigated by the teams 
independently of the workshops had not continued: 
Sprint by sprint [we were] picking up one of the OWASP Top Ten, and 
getting all the developers to review it, and identify issues where we weren’t 
meeting those things. That, sadly, has fallen by the wayside … [because] we 
didn’t have the bandwidth on our road map to deal with the things that 
people were highlighting. (A1) 
[The secret saboteur] carried on for a few sprints, I think it didn’t work out 
quite so well, when somebody got accused of being the saboteur, when 
actually it was just a genuine mistake they made! It then became very 
embarrassing for that person. I think that fell by the wayside, slightly! (A1) 
They were, however, considering using an Automated Static Analysis tool: 
One of the things on our backlog is bringing in SonarQube which might 
potentially identify security issues in the code. (A1) 
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7.5.2 Outcomes for Team B after One Year 
Since the emphasis for Team B is on training, it was encouraging to find after one year 
that they had continued finding ways to instigate development security. Specifically, they 
now had Incentivisation Sessions, and they were teaching Threat Assessment: 
We are just starting a new project, so part of the induction, and part of the 
on-boarding for all the students, is that we do a little bit of security training, 
and we do a threat modelling exercise. (B1) 
They now had security Code Reviews: 
And then, as far as our code reviews are concerned, [we are] actually 
looking at security aspects, at every stage. So, each time we are doing a 
code review, security is one of the things on the form to tick. (B1) 
And they had various forms of On-the-job Training: 
We had a few other students who come in at a later stage, and [B4] did a 
nice ‘Brown Bag’ talk on security. And we are passing that on. (B1) 
Particularly gratifying for us was that the intervention helped identify an aptitude in one 
participant for security work, and to inspire a choice of career:  
And [B4] who was going to be a struggle because of his Maths and English, 
his options going forward are quite limited, but he is… about to start a 
Level 2 Traineeship in Cybersecurity! Something that came out of your 
research was really how interested he is in it. (B1) 
7.5.3 Techniques Adopted 
Table 15 summarises the above outcomes: shaded cells indicate new assurance techniques 
in use as a result of the intervention process. As discussed in Section 7.1.2, throughout 
the analysis we were careful to distinguish changes arising from the interventions from 
those due to pre-existing plans or other external factors; so, for example, Team A’s trial 
of On-the-job Training and plans for Automated Static Analysis are not credited to the 
interventions.  
Table 15: Summary of Techniques Adopted after One Year 
	 Team	A	 Team	B	 Team	C	
Incentivization	Session	 	 In	regular	use	 	




Product	Negotiation	 In	regular	use	 	 Already	in	place	






Penetration	Testing	 Already	in	place	 	 Already	in	place	
Code	Review	 Already	in	place		 In	regular	use	 Already	in	place		
 
Chapter 7: Package Trials (Magid) 
Charles Weir - October 2020   131 
7.6 Blockers and Motivators 
The previous two sections show the outcomes from using the interventions, but provide 
little indication of what was happening to lead to those outcomes. The large amount of 
data available in the form of transcripts of the workshops—including the follow-up 
session—allow us to address: 
RQ 4.3 What aspects of software development as practiced by the teams supported or 
hindered adoption of the various security techniques? 
Using the same open coding as before, we analysed the interviews and workshops to 
identify ‘blockers’, problems that threatened to prevent adoption of the practices; and 
‘motivators’, incentives for practicing secure software development. In total, we 
identified 44 mentions of blockers and 27 mentions of motivators.  
7.6.1 Problems and How They Were Overcome 
Analysing the workshops and interviews in more detail, we identified several problems 
encountered in carrying out security enhancements. We have termed these ‘blockers’, and 
against them we have identified corresponding ‘motivators’ – benefits or practical 
solutions – that helped team members to overcome them. Table 16 shows a selection of 
the most important such blockers and their corresponding motivators. 
 
Table 16: Blockers and Motivators 
Blocker Motivator 
The significant work involved in 
upgrading a range of components, and 
modifying the code to support revised 
APIs where required for the upgraded 
versions.  
We haven't necessarily got to 
as much of it as we would 
have liked to. Hopefully, the 
architect guys… [will] try 
and feed some of those 
stories in. (A3) 
The satisfaction of seeing ‘red lights’ turn 
green as the components were updated: 
You've got lights that you can 
turn green - it becomes 
relatively straight forward to 
go through turning them 
green, one after another until 
they are all green (A1)  
Also, the improved support and 
documentation in later versions of the 
components: 
Usually the APIs are clearer. 
… The older versions of 
documentation are now 
extinct (A3) 
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Blocker Motivator 
More generally, the additional work 
involved in implementing and 
prioritising security enhancements: 
[Only] a certain amount of our road 
map time is given to architecture. And 
we have ended up diverting most of 
that time to addressing security 
vulnerabilities in one way or another, 
since you first came. And there is still 
more to do. The downside of that is, 
obviously, that we don't address other 
architectural concerns like 
performance, or code quality. (A1) 
The benefits of security as a feature, 
whether tick box support for the audits of 
potential customers, or actual unique 
selling propositions when compared with 
others. 
I think it has come at just the right time 
for us, because … the world is moving 
forward in terms of expectations 
around security… [and] we are getting 
more customers for whom security is a 
bigger concern (A1) 
The difficulty of learning from existing 
security sources. 
I still find reading the OWASP stuff 
difficult. (A3) 
Learning as a group. 
We’ve adopted this idea of focussing 
on a particular one of the OWASP Top 
Ten each release. I think that went 
pretty well in the first release. (A1) 
Certain security services not being 
available to a target user base. 
We could use … Facebook logins… 
but it could be blocked by the firewall 
by proxy … and a lot of our target 
audience is people in colleges and 
schools, who wouldn't necessarily be 
able to get to that. (Participants, B 
Threat Assessment) 
Alternative providers 
No college … would block access to 
Google… And … you can set up a 
Google account with any email 
address as well. (Participants, B 
Threat Assessment) 
Unhelpful company policy on tool 
provision. 
So AlertLogic is your classic 
enterprise solution for something like 
this, where … it takes 5% of all the 
resources on the machine, and is 
really hard to set up, doesn't work 
when containers are involved, and 
takes six months to roll out a patch'…   
So, I was like 'why don't we use 
something new' and [management] 
were like 'nooo'… 'We have already 
paid for this other one'! (Participant, 
C Follow-up) 
Using additional tools to the company-
specified ones. 
We ended up using two: an open 
source one, Falco, which sends us 
slack alerts if it detects any weirdness 
on [our microservices architecture], 
and Alert Logic. (Participant, C 
Follow-up) 
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Blocker Motivator 
Friction with other departments over 
security issues. 
So, people would end up doing the 
work, and then having to get sign off 
from the Security Team after it, or 
having to make changes to it, and 
everything else! So, between 
Development and Security Team there 
is a lot of friction which obviously 
doesn't help. (C1) 
Proactive interaction over security issues: 
[In my new company] a member of the 
Security Team is involved, when we 
are planning the development work, 
and then after we have deployed it, it 
goes into our [release testing] 
environment, and the Security Team 
have a week with it to test it, from their 
side, to check there is no 
vulnerabilities. (C1) 
7.6.2 Categorising Blockers and Motivators 
The blockers and motivators fit broadly into the following categories: organisational 
aspects, supporting tools and the product/business themselves. Figure 41 shows to what 
extent each was referenced by participants from each company: blockers are shown to the 
left; motivators to the right. The following Sections 7.6.3 to 7.6.5 explore each category. 
7.6.3 Organisational Blockers and Motivators 
Under organisational aspects we found blockers in management issues such as no clear 
ownership of security in the organisation, and time and workload management. This is 
essentially the key scarce resource in organisations, and poor management of employees’ 
time and workload will override any personal, positive factors [152]. Participants from 
Team C described a dysfunctional relationship with a security team that was required to 
sign off on products but gave no guidance to developers and was not approachable for 
 
Figure 41: Mentions of Blockers and Motivators, by Company 
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help. Their security team apparently practiced an internal ‘security through obscurity’ 
approach, which makes learning from security issues difficult for developers: 
It was almost as if this information was kept confidential, on a need to know 
basis, and unfortunately it means that [development] teams will find it 
difficult to learn from the event. (C2) 
This is reflected in the substantial number of organisation blockers identified by Team C 
in Figure 41. Two participants from Team A also noted that while the security education 
received in the organisation was interesting and helpful, it was frustrating that there was 
no space for reflecting on it or practicing it when developing.  
At the same time, management can also provide a motivator. In Team B security aspects 
were integrated into the development processes and acknowledged in planning:  
“We needed to put it into our procedures, not just into our thoughts, but into 
our ... you know, 'this is the way we work; this is what we do'. This is what I 
have got out of it.” (B1). 
One participant in Team C reiterated this point by considering holistic thinking about the 
product to generate security understanding and motivation. Another participant suggested 
that security targets should be part of performance indicators for employees in order to 
motivate work on security. 
7.6.4 Supporting Tools as Blockers and Motivators 
In terms of supporting tools, Teams A and C used a large number of tools, games and 
procedures to support their secure software development processes. A few of these 
approaches were abandoned due to their poor design: one game in Team A caused 
embarrassment to individuals, and made employees feel uncomfortable (see Section 
7.5.1). Two participants noted the complexity of their infrastructures and the difficulty of 
integrating and configuring off-the-shelf security solutions, especially when legacy 
software is involved. In particular, encryption, key management and cloud computing 
platforms were mentioned as aspects where achieving security was unreasonably 
difficult.  
Yet at the same time, outside influences were also perceived as motivators for security. 
In Team C, compliance checks, certification and recent relevant legislation have all 
caused an increased interest in security in the organisation, and this has driven security 
improvements. The participants also mentioned changes in architectures as motivators for 
security improvement, as in the participant’s opinion improved features and improved 
security often co-occur. The developers are also keen to release their code to the public, 
motivating a greater focus on security:  
Our problem, I think, here is that we have a tendency to want to make our 
code repositories public, as a means of helping the wider world. The 
problem with that is that you automatically put yourself in a vulnerable 
position. (C2)   
7.6.5 Business Function Blockers and Motivators 
The third category of issues centre on the team’s business function. Team A noted that 
customer’s security policies and requests for customisation of the product are significant 
barriers to maintaining secure code and good policies. In Team C security was reported 
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to be difficult to sell. Yet in Team A security customers were actively requesting security, 
making them a motivator for secure software development. The recent increase in news 
coverage on security is also seen as a motivator in both companies:  
Some of it could be good old-fashioned scaremongering due to what has 
happened in the press, but if that is what works, then fine, we'll take that. 
Because the reality is, it was the stuff that needed to be done.” (C2) 
7.6.6 Tension Between Blockers and Motivators 
All three organisations had motivators in the categories where blockers were present. But 
these motivators where not created in response to the blockers, but rather as independent 
encouragements for secure software development.  
The implication for development teams is the need both to encourage the motivators, and 
to resolve the blockers. Since most were outside the immediate control of the developers, 
this is an organisational, rather than a developer, opportunity for improvement.  
7.7 Discussion and Next Steps 
This section returns to the research question: 
RQ 4 What security outcomes did the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ package have, 
and what aspects contributed most to those outcomes?  
It explores how the answers to RQ 4.1, RQ 4.2 and RQ 4.3 in the previous sections 
provide a basis for the next stage of the research. 
7.7.1 Estimate of Impact 
While it is early to know the long-term impact, it is unlikely that that Company A’s teams 
will remove their component security evaluation and upgrade process, nor lose the benefit 
of the permissions improvements. Whether the remaining security enhancements 
discussed in the first follow-up session get incorporated is, correctly, a business rather 
than a technical decision; it is promising that the architects are asking the right questions 
(about risk evaluation) to support business in making that decision.  
Similarly, we know from feedback (Section 7.5.2) that Company B’s project leaders now 
include security in their project planning, instructions for students, and general company 
management; and their students are more aware of security issues.  
Some key learning points, especially that security is more than avoiding the OWASP Top 
Ten in your code, will remain with all the participants from Companies A and B. 
In the case of Company C, the most we can say is that the interventions contributed to an 
existing trend of increased security awareness. 
7.7.2 How the Interventions Worked 
The impact of the interventions differed between teams: not only in the nature of the 
security issues addressed; but also, in the teams’ responses to the interventions and in 
how they benefitted. Team A introduced better development processes; Team B gained 
an awareness of several specific security improvements and the need for Threat 
Assessment; and for Team C the interventions prompted better communication and 
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understanding. Sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.3 explored the differences in the ways the teams 
responded to these interventions. 
The successes identified came through the developers’ choices. As the Expert Survey 
concluded (see Section 4.14), to be effective a program needs to motivate rather than 
simply direct the teams involved. And, indeed, the interventions were successful to the 
extent that they could change the developers’ thinking, understanding and motivation. 
The interventions involved, predominantly, conversations between developers, allowing 
them to learn mainly from each other, and to motivate themselves rather than respond to 
outside pressures. Table 15 and Table 14 suggest that this was an effective motivation 
and learning approach.  
Indeed, by contrast to the results of earlier studies based on interventions using 
Penetration Testing as a motivator [134,172], in this study Table 15 shows that for both 
Teams A and B the long term impact after one year was still important.   
7.7.2.1 Interaction with Other Stakeholders 
The analysis of blockers and motivators identified during the interventions (section 7.6) 
found that a large majority of both involved interactions with either the business function 
or other aspects of the organisation. It follows to improve development security it will 
help to work explicitly on these interactions. 
Of the key assurance techniques identified by the expert survey (Section 4.4), two are 
related to such interactions: Product Negotiation, and to a lesser extent, Threat 
Assessment. We conclude that exploring ways to enhance these two techniques by 
addressing blockers and encouraging motivators has the potential to deliver further 
improvements. 
7.7.2.2 Learning Points for Developers 
Table 17 highlights three learning points for software developers from the above 
discussions: the effectiveness of team activities, key assurance techniques, and the 
importance of organisational issues. 
7.7.3 Impact of the Active Developer Model 
Several aspects of the interventions suggested the effectiveness of the Active Developer 
Model, as follows. 
Company A discovered security and privacy threats and acted as ‘customers’ for security 
enhancements independently of their company’s security specialists (Section 7.4.1), only 
becoming demotivated when they were disempowered from carrying out the mitigations 
they suggested (Section 7.5.1).  
Company B lacked security specialists to provide an alternative to the Active Developer 
Model; yet participants B1 and B2 adopted security principles enthusiastically (Section 
7.4.2), and the discovery of B4’s aptitude for software security thinking even led him to 
a career in the area (Section 7.5.2).  
Though the impact of Developer Security Essentials in Company C was limited, the fact 
that their software security practices were effective was itself a vindication of the Active 
Developer Model; since their relationship with the security specialists in the company 
were dysfunctional (Section 7.6.1), the success of the software security can only be 
attributed to being driven by the developers. 
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7.7.4 Future Work on Assurance Techniques 
The importance suggested by Section 4.4 of a small number of assurance techniques 
provides an incentive for further research on those techniques. While Automated Static 
Analysis and Penetration Testing have received a good deal of research attention, 
participant comments, especially Blockers and Motivators, suggest areas for inquiry for 
others: 
Threat Assessment Participants requested example expert assessments for different 




Several Blockers suggest a need for improvements to tools and 
to vulnerability databases to support more fine-grained 
component analysis.  
Code Review Traditional line-by-line code review may not be optimal for 
security issues: one participant, for example, described instead 
asking developers to show in their code how they addressed 
specific security issues. There is a need for experimentation 
investigating the merits of different approaches.  




All the workshops derive their effectiveness more from 
discussions between participants than from any information 
provided by the intervener, and as Section shows the nature of 
these discussions was different for each team. So, the success of 
these interventions can be attributed to the team nature of the 
activities, and on the participants bringing their own unique range 
of expertise and knowledge to them. Whether or not a given team 
uses the specific workshops described here, we conclude that 
there is benefit in regarding software security as a team, as much 
as an individual developer, process. 
Focus on Key 
Assurance 
Techniques 
In an example of the Pareto Principle, that 80% of the benefit 
often derives from 20% of the input [42], the results of this 
chapter show that introducing three assurance techniques that are 
within the scope of most development teams, out of out of twenty 
in use by industry, are together capable of delivering a large 
impact. We conclude that teams will benefit from concentrating 
first on these techniques, namely Threat Assessment, 




As Figure 41 shows, some 40% of mentions of issues by 
participants, both of Motivators supporting security improvement, 
and Blockers discouraging it, are ascribable to organizational 
issues. Whilst this finding will not surprise any security 
professional, it emphasizes the need to regard the promotion of 
software development security as a systemic, rather than purely a 
development team, matter.  
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Product Negotiation Participants requested methods to express specific security 
improvements as organisation benefits; and ways to identify the 
probability of different security breaches. From Section 7.7.2.1, 
we also conclude a need also to find ways to identify and address 
blockers and motivators during the process. 
Incentivisation 
Session 
Alternatives to the Agile Security Game include Capture-the-
flag games, Penetration Test-based sessions, and case study-
based training. While this work proves the success of the first, 
research would be valuable to compare other approaches in 
differing situations.  
On-the-job Training The interventions provide only a one-off security improvement. 
Games such as the ‘covert saboteur’ in Team A offer 
opportunities for developers to develop their skills further. 
However, as we saw, the effectiveness of such approaches 
depends on personal aspects and team dynamics (Section 6.2.1). 
Research is needed to provide low-time-cost ways to continue 
the team security improvement process. 
7.7.5 Viral Distribution? 
For the interventions to have a longer-term impact, we wanted participants with the 
intervention work not only to improve their own projects, but also to understand how to 
take the interventions and use them themselves in other contexts.  
As discussed in Section 7.4.4, the results were generally disappointing, though the leaders 
of Teams A and B did show understanding of Threat Assessment and Product 
Negotiation.  
7.7.6 Next Steps 
We identified three key areas for future work on the interventions. First, the participant-
driven nature of the workshops meant that not every technique was covered for every 
team: Team B did not discuss Automated Static Analysis, Penetration Testing, nor Code 
Review, for example. One participant suggested a checklist or take-away sheet after the 
first day’s presentation: 
I think maybe some sort of tick sheet in terms of “have you got these things in place?” to 
take away, that might be a good addition (A1). 
Second, for the program to scale to a wider number of participant teams, we needed 
intervention leaders who appreciated the aims of the different sessions, such as the 
importance of an Incentivisation Session to achieve team motivation. Yet Table 14 
suggests that this knowledge was not successfully conveyed to many of the participants. 
Nor did any participants learn how to use the Developer Security Essentials intervention 
themselves. We identified a need to motivate and teach some participants to lead the 
intervention. 
Third, an important area for improvement was in Product Negotiation: both in methods 
to express specific security improvements as organisation benefits (Section 7.7.4) and to 
gain the time and ‘mind-space’ to use effectively the security learning the team had gained 
(Section 7.6.3). We considered that an extended workshop might be a suitable way to 
support developers in doing this. 
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In terms of the methodology used for the trials, we identified two improvements to make: 
1. There were too few companies involved for us to deduce much about the effects 
of different contexts on the effectiveness of the intervention. Involving more 
would give more scope for such deductions.  
2. The changes resulting from the interventions were discovered at haphazard; the 
analysis approach derived example improvements but did not necessarily provide 
consistency between companies. For further work, we wanted a more consistent 
analysis of the understanding gained and techniques implemented. 
These improvements were incorporated into the next project. 
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8 Further Trials (Magid 2) 
This chapter describes a further project, Magid 2, involving a second round of trials with 
an improved Developer Security Essentials package.  
This project reflected an emphasis on making the intervention potentially scalable for use 
by large numbers of organisations. Its research question was therefore: 
RQ 5 Which aspects of the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ intervention are effective 
at improving security when used independently by teams from a variety of 
cultures and different types of organisation, and why? 
The three most salient changes from the previous project are: 
Independent Facilitators: We trained one or two facilitators from each organisation, and 
they then managed the intervention. The purpose of this was to transfer the ability and 
confidence to run the workshops to the facilitators, potentially allowing them to run 
further workshops without the support of the research team.  
Variety of Cultures and Types of Organisation: In this project we carried out the 
interventions with many more groups: eight as compared with three in the previous 
project. In addition to the aspects of organisation, such as size and security capability, we 
also identified organisation culture types for each group.  
Support for Product Negotiation: A further ‘Threat Sales’ workshop was added after 
the ‘Threat Assessment’ workshop, to help developers in representing security and 
privacy issues as business factors. 
Section 8.4 gives more details. 
8.1 Choice of Methodology 
Whilst Canonical Action Research (CAR) had worked well as a basis for the previous 
cycle of trials, in attempting to use it for a second cycle we came across a ‘showstopper’: 
CAR focusses on the changes to the ‘clients’, and  does not support changes to the list of 
clients. Specifically, in CAR, the invariant across cycles is the client (occasionally, a list 
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of clients). Here the invariant was different: we were using the same intervention with a 
different set of clients. CAR could not handle the Magid 2 project. 
While the techniques of CAR—recording the interactions involved, double coding them 
and analysing the results—still remain suitable for evaluating the intervention, the 
philosophy and overview guidance do not.  
Accordingly, we moved to using Design-Based Research with CAR techniques, as 
described in Section 3.6. Sections 3.6.3 to 3.6.5 describe the practical aspects of doing so 
to support designing an intervention. 
8.1.1 Ethical Issues 
We obtained Ethics agreement for this project from the Lancaster University Faculty of 
Science and Technology Research Ethics team approval as a continuation project from 
the previous one.  
Two of the companies involved required the deletion of transcripts and audio at the end 
of the research project (for confidentiality reasons). Because the coding record within 
NVivo itself has possible future research value, we want to do this without destroying the 
codes assigned. We therefore plan to extract and anonymise any quotations, delete the 
relevant audio files, and overwrite all non-space characters in the corresponding 
transcripts in the NVivo tool with ‘x’s to preserve the coding while satisfying the 
companies’ requirements. 
8.1.2 Data Analysis in the Magid 2 Project 
Section 3.6.4 describes the generic approach we used to evaluate the Developer Security 
Essentials intervention; and Section 3.6.5 describes the evaluation of that approach. The 
‘Aspects’ were assurance-related techniques, such as ‘Pen testing’. We started with the 
list from the Expert Survey (4.4) and added further techniques as they were mentioned in 
the interviews. 
The ‘Levels’ were the degree of engagement for each technique as follows:  
No mention The technique was not mentioned (though it might have been known 
or used). 
Aware Knowledge and understanding showed of the technique. 
Planned Existing plans to incorporate the technique into development. 
Using The team have used the technique. 
Established The team use (or consider for use) the technique in each new project 
they take on. 
None of the participants nor teams indicated in any of the discussions that any of the 
assurance techniques were dropped or used less as a result of the interventions—even 
though if this had happened it could have been a positive result, representing better using 
of resources. We therefore concluded that in cases where the After engagement value was 
apparently less than the Before one, this only meant that the interviewees had not happen 
to discuss that level of engagement as much in the After interviews31; and therefore that 
 
31 In this project, this happened in less than half a dozen cases out of over a hundred, and in each case only 
by one level of engagement (3 rather than 4, for example). 
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it would be misleading to show it as a decrease in engagement. We therefore removed 
such decreases by increasing those After engagement values to the corresponding Before 
values.  
As in the previous project (see Section 7.1.2), we were careful in coding to distinguish 
new assurance technique engagement attributable to the interventions, from engagement 
due to other external factors such as customer demand or other security specialists. We 
did not code these latter increases in engagement levels at all. 
8.2 Participating Developer Groups 
The eight different organisations were selected opportunistically. As in the previous 
project, the individual members we interviewed are identified using the team letter and a 
number: ‘D1’. However, in this case not all of the organisations involved are companies, 
and in many cases the workshop participants came from several different teams. In this 
discussion, therefore, we refer to the set of participants in a single Developer Security 
Essentials intervention as a ‘group’. We use an identifying letter for each group, and the 
sequence of letters continues from the previous project, hence are D – K.  
Several recruitment methods were used, as follows: 
University: used the support of the Lancaster University ‘Academic Centre of Excellence 
in Cyber Security Research’ (ACE-CSR) team with its connections to government, and 
the Lancaster School of Computing and Communications Business Engagement Team 
and their contacts with companies near Lancaster.  
Personal: used business contacts developed by the author in previous work in industry.  
Conference: used leads from running the ‘Agile App Security Game’ (section 7.3.2) as 
a workshop at several UK developer conferences: AgileNorth, Agile Cambridge and 
Agile Manchester.  
As in the previous project, a selection of the participants was interviewed, including the 
facilitator and usually a team leader, both before and after the interventions.  
All of the developers interviewed were male, as were all managers and testers; only the 
three product managers were female.  
From the previous project with teams A-C, it was known that the culture of the teams 
would have a definite impact on the nature of their interaction in workshops. Accordingly, 
we have added a categorisation of the organisation culture. This was a subjective estimate 
by the author based on the team’s behaviour during the workshops, using a taxonomy 
defined by Charles Handy [80] to describe the power of individuals’ roles and functions 
within an organisation.  Table 18 summarises that taxonomy; it derives from the 
Provenmodels website [116]. 
8.2.1 Summary of Participating Groups 
Table 19 summarises the groups, showing the organisation sizes (Small for less than 100, 
Large for greater than 5000); the culture of each team as discussed in the previous 
sections. It indicates the number of participants, the way in which the team was recruited. 
It also shows ‘Security Maturity’, an estimate of their ‘secure software capability 
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maturity’ [90] by the author based on public information about the organisations and the 
groups’ discussions during the workshops, as follows:  
Low: Little or no awareness or activity related to software security 
Medium: Aware of and addressing security issues, typically including some 
developers with good security knowledge. 
High: Experts at software security, within an organisational culture that assigns it 
a high priority. 
For each intervention, the group designated one or two ‘facilitators’ (D1, E1, etc), and it 
was these facilitators who arranged and led the interventions. Since the skills and 
aptitudes of these facilitators were likely to be important, the table shows their roles and 
indicates, by the use of the plural, how many were involved. 
The table shows how the different means of recruitment introduced groups with 
corresponding cultures. The author’s prior contacts with companies tended to be with the 
CEOs of Small to Medium Companies (SMEs); the workshops would only happen where 
such CEOs have influence over technical training for their teams; accordingly, we find 
the groups recruited tended to be Zeusian in nature. Similarly, the conferences which led 
to recruitment were in the ‘Agile Cambridge’, ‘Agile Manchester’ series: conferences 
targeted at senior technical development professionals, particularly ‘scrum masters’: a 
Table 18: Organisation Cultures (after Provenmodels [116]) 
Zeus 
 
Power is concentrated in the hands of one individual, the top boss. 
Control radiates from the centre’s use of personal contacts over 




A strong role culture places a premium on order and efficiency. Power 
is hierarchical and clearly defined in the company's job descriptions. 
Decision making occurs at the top of the bureaucracy.  
Athena 
 
Power is derived from the expertise required to complete a task or 
project. The work, itself, is the leading principle of coordination. 
Decision making occurs through meritocracies. Employees move 
frequently from one project or group to another.  
Dionysius 
 
Organisations exist for individuals to achieve their goals. Employees 
see themselves as independent professionals who have temporarily lent 
their services or skills to the organisation. Management is considered an 
unnecessary counterweight and given the lowest status. Decision 
making occurs by consent of the professionals.  
 
Table 19: Participating Developer Groups 
 Org. size Culture Security 
Maturity Si
ze
 Facilitator(s) Recruited 
D Large Athena Low 10 Managers University 
E Large Apollo High 12 Security specialist University 
F Small Zeus Low 3 Manager University 
G Medium Zeus Med-High 10 Managers Personal 
H Small Zeus Medium 8 Developer Personal 
I Medium Athena Medium 14 Manager + Developer Conference 
J Large Apollo High 14 Security specialists Conference 
K Medium Athena Medium 16 Developers Conference 
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role involving the facilitation of software developers. We speculate that such 
professionals tend to favour Athenian cultures, since these give experts the most power 
in structured organisations (see Table 18); though Group J turned out to be marginally 
Apollonian rather than Athenian. 
Figure 42 visualises some of the information from Table 19, adding the roles and numbers 
of interviewees for each workshop. Each group is represented by a ring, with an area 
proportional to the number of participants. The colours of segments in the ring indicate 
interviewee roles. The leaders and their roles are indicated by the squares (for a single 
leader) or rectangles (for two leaders) inside each ring; the colours show their normal 
roles. The locations of the rings indicate the size of the organisation involved (x axis) and 
the Security Maturity of the teams prior to the interventions (y axis). 
Recall that we interviewed only a subset of the participants in each group. The colours of 
the ring segments represent the interviewee roles, not the overall participant roles. Since, 
however, we requested a representative sample of participants for the interviews, it is 
probable that the proportions of roles of the participants are similar to those shown here.  
The visualisation shows the wide range of group sizes, organisation sizes and security 
maturity involved in the project. Unsurprisingly, only groups in large, security-adept 
companies had access to security professionals, and thus only groups E and J had these 
as facilitators. We had requested that product managers and testers join the groups; as 
Figure 42 shows, this happened only in the smaller companies, possibly because in small 
companies product managers and testers are closer to the development team, and more 
amenable to taking part in group activities. The smaller companies F and H didn’t have a 
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separate QA function; so, as shown, only the medium sized companies G and I had testers 
join the workshops32. 
8.3 Research Sub-Questions 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.6, the method used for the research was Design-
Based Research. Specifically, we used DBR for the overall philosophy, and used the data 
gathering and analysis techniques of Canonical Action Research (Section 3.5).  
The two cycles of the DBR method (Figure 9 in Section 3.6.2) require separate research 
questions for the Design Practice cycle and the Design Theory cycle, as discussed in the 
following sections.  
8.3.1 Design Practice Questions 
The Design Practice cycle in DBR requires measurement of the effectiveness of the 
artefact—in our case, the intervention: 
RQ 5.1 To what extent did the groups learn about and adopt different security-
enhancing activities as a result of the Developer Security Essentials 
intervention? 
We also wanted an indication for which kinds of teams the intervention is likely to be 
most useful. Though the small sample size precludes any statistical validity, such an 
indication is better than nothing to suggest where to focus effort in encouraging teams to 
adopt the intervention: 
RQ 5.2 How does the impact of the intervention vary with different company sizes, team 
cultures, facilitation styles, security expertise, and kinds of participants? 
Specifically, one aspect we can influence, even if not fully control, is the facilitation style 
used with the intervention in future:  
RQ 5.3 How does the impact of the intervention vary with different facilitation styles? 
8.3.2 Design Theory Questions 
Second, the DBS Design Theory cycle requires theoretical hypotheses to test. The 
previous project had taught us that improving Product Negotiation between developers 
and Product Management was important for improving security (Section 7.7.6). 
Returning to the positive approach derived from Appreciative Inquiry that had been 
successful in the Expert Survey (Section 4.1), we concluded that identifying the benefits 
to the organisation of mitigating security and privacy issues might be a good way to do 
this.  
As researchers, we were not in a position to quantify any actual resulting security 
improvements, but we could establish whether process improvements were made or 
additional resources allocated. This gives a research question as follows: 
RQ 5.4 Can having developers consider the positive benefits of security and privacy 
mitigations lead to security improvements in the development process? 
 
32 Company K did not mention a separate QA function. We believe much of their testing was through 
automated tests created by developers. 
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In order to identify the positive benefits of security and privacy mitigations, we needed 
participants to do two things: 
• Estimate the risk and impact associated with each identified threat 
• Identify positive benefits to the organisation (or customers) from mitigating the 
major threats. 
Originally we considered teaching participants how to estimate risk and impact; and 
approaches to identifying such benefits, possibly using examples in a ‘patterns’ form [68]; 
but then we wondered if developers might be able to do both tasks without specific 
teaching. The corresponding hypothesis, then, was: 
Teams of developers can produce both adequate risk and impact 
assessments and benefit analyses with minimal guidance. 
The research question, therefore, was simply, whether this is true: 
RQ 5.5 Can teams of developers produce both adequate risk and impact assessments 
and benefit analyses with minimal guidance? 
8.4 Method Implementation 
8.4.1 Changes to the Intervention Package 
From the previous round of trials, we had identified changes to make (Section 7.7.6): 
1. A checklist or take-away sheet after the first day’s presentation; 
2. Intervention leaders to appreciate the aims of the different sessions; 
3. Participants to learn to facilitate the sessions; 
4. Improvement in Product Negotiation to express specific security improvements 
as organisation benefits and to gain the time and ‘mind-space’ to use effectively 
the security learning the team had gained; 
5. Involving more companies; and 
6. Improved analysis approach to provide consistency between companies, 
analysing the understanding gained and techniques implemented. 
To achieve this, the major changes to the Intervention Package, Developer Security 
Essentials, were: 
1. An initial training session for the facilitators by the researchers. 
2. Improvements to the instructions for the Agile Security Game, so it could be set 
up and run without researchers present.  
3. A checklist of assurance techniques for discussion towards the end of the main 
workshops. 
4. A further ‘Threat Sales’ workshop after the ‘Threat Assessment’ workshop. In 
this the facilitators asked the participants to take the three or four highest priority 
issues and justify them in terms of positive impact for the organisation. 
8.4.2 Threat Sales Workshop 
In this workshop participants split into groups, and each group addressed a different threat 
from the most important five or so identified in the previous workshop (Section 7.1.1). 
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We made the task approachable for developers by avoiding discussion of ‘sales’ or 
‘persuasion’, two activities that developers tend to avoid33. Instead the participants were 
split into groups, each looking at one instruction for the participants was: 
Choose one of the threats and work out positive ways in which addressing 
that threat will benefit the organisation.  
The thinking behind this was straightforward. Product Management professionals deal 
predominantly with competing enhancements to products; their mental map is less geared 
to handling risks to the business (which is a senior management role). So, for security 
improvements to be assessed by product managers, they must be expressed in terms of 
benefits.  
Each group discussed the threat they had chosen and wrote notes on a whiteboard or 
flipchart page. A representative from each group then presented their conclusions to the 
other participants. 
8.4.3 Practical Approach 
The sessions were similar in structure to the previous round of interventions (Section 
7.1.1). The entry and exit interview protocols were the same (Appendix F, Appendix G) 
After the entry interviews, however, we added an extra session of 30 – 60 minutes with 
one or two people from the organisations involved who were prepared to learn to be 
facilitators. In that, we discussed the motivation for each of the Incentivisation Session, 
the Threat Assessment and the Threat Sales workshops, and instructed the facilitators how 
to lead each one.  
The Threat Sales workshop followed the Threat Assessment workshop after a suitable 
(typically half hour) break. 
Figure 43 shows a typical timeline for the intervention. The ‘Facilitator Training’ session 
also included entry interviews for the facilitators.  
 
33 The author spent 10 years at Penrillian trying to get professional developers to do sales activities; few 
were willing despite pay and other incentives.  
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8.5 Research Numbers 
The eight interventions generated 21 hours of interviews, which were transcribed 
manually; and 47 hours of training, workshop and follow-up sessions, which were 
transcribed mechanically using Sonix. The final code book contained 2859 references to 
51 codes. 
The Inter-rater Reliability metrics, calculated as discussed in Section 3.6.5, were as shown 
on the first row of Table 20. The initial ‘Active ratings’ metric of 0.18 indicate only slight 
agreement. On discussion and investigation, the coders identified several causes for this:  
• In the Before interviews, and some of the After ones, there was deliberately no 
attempt to ask interviewees about their use of assurance techniques, in order to avoid 
bias in the responses. This meant that each coder had to carefully interpret what was 
said for evidence of Assurance Techniques, and different interpretations were often 
possible. 
• The most common cause of discrepancies was one or other coder overlooking a single 
indication of Assurance Technique use. For example, an offhand comment by an 
interviewee while discussing something else, “…Which goes in the standard tool 
chain after Fortify…”, might be picked up by one coder as Incorporation for Static 
Analysis Tools, and not by the other coder who would thus produce a rating of Not 
Mentioned for Static Analysis Tools  
• There was a lack of shared understanding of some Assurance Technique definitions. 
For example, should an intention to repeat the workshop with the same team in a year 
be coded as ‘Further Workshops’? 
The coders addressed the last point above by agreeing more precise definitions for several 
Assurance Techniques; and addressed the first two points above by comparing coding on 
the cases where there was a substantial disagreement. They then independently amended 
their coding based on that discussion, giving the results shown on the second row of Table 
20. 
In the amended coding, the ‘Active ratings’ cases now show ‘moderate’ agreement. This 
is as good as can reasonably be expected, given that the issues identified above. On 
investigation, discrepancies appeared mostly to be assignable to one coder missing 
something, so the combination of the coding from both is a valid approximation to the 
ground truth. 
8.6 Practical Results 
Recall from Section 3.6.2 that Design-Based Research has two sets of outcomes: first the 
practical outcomes in terms of measurements of the effects of the artefact in the trials and 
deductions in terms of future improvements for the artefact; and secondly new theory 
derived from the trial data.  
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This section explores the first set of outcomes: practical ones, addressing the first research 
sub-question: 
RQ 5.1 To what extent did the groups learn about and adopt different security-
enhancing activities as a result of the Developer Security Essentials 
intervention? 
It describes first the resulting list of techniques based on the full analysis; then each of 
the groups undertaking the Developer Security Essentials intervention, and the results 
from each34. Each section introduces the organisation and teams involved and discusses 
the group’s reasons for wanting the intervention. It then describes the intervention as it 
happened for that group, then provides the results of the analysis of the transcriptions of 
all of the sessions.  
8.6.1 Resulting List of Techniques 
Table 21 shows the full list of Techniques derived from the coding. It divides them into 
categories: Vulnerability Finding, techniques to find specific vulnerabilities in created 
software; Process Improvements, to create an environment to better support the creation 
of secure code or reduce the impact of security issues; and Education, to teach participants 
and stakeholders about the previous techniques. Most of the Techniques were introduced 
in Chapter 4, but the coders identified five further techniques for security improvement 
from the discussions and interviews, each used by several of the teams; these are 
highlighted. They also found that that one previously used Assurance Technique, 
Incentivisation Session, did not reflect the way participants discussed their secure 
development improvement; instead participants discussed Further Workshops. 
Incentivisation Session was therefore omitted.  
The resulting full set of assurance techniques is described below: 
Automated Penetration 
Testing 
Using an automated tool to look for common, easily 
exploited, vulnerabilities in a website or web service.  
Automated Static 
Analysis 
Using automated tools to look for common vulnerabilities in 
source or binary code. 
Configuration Review Choosing secure components and frameworks, and keeping 
them up to date 
Code Review Scheduled meetings or pair programming to analyse code for 
security defects 
Penetration Testing Having a Security Specialist look for vulnerabilities 
accessible via the web. 
 
34 In other chapters the participant descriptions and results were separated. Given the large number of 
groups here, it is easier for the reader if they are kept together.  
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Threat Assessment Design-level analysis of possible attackers, motives, and 
vulnerability locations (a.k.a. Threat Modelling). 
Product Negotiation Empowering product management to make security 
decisions. 
Contingency Plan The advance creation of a plan to handle security incidents. 
Security Champion Having a development team member, not usually a security 
expert, with a particular interest in security. They act as the 
go-to person for security issues within the development 
team.  
Standardisation The creation of standard security configurations, ways of 
working, or ‘Secure Development Lifecycles’, plus auditing 
processes to validate these. 
On-the-job Training Mentoring or informal workshops, used regularly with the 
development team 
Further Workshops Using the entire Developer Security Essentials package with 
other teams, or for the same team in a new project or with 
new members. 
 
8.6.2 Group D Results 
Group D are a project team within a university, funded by a government grant to promote 
business innovation. Group D’s role is to developing proof of concept products and 
support applications, according to the requirements of specific businesses. The group had 
been in existence for only a year at the time of the intervention. Although members 
worked on several different projects at a time, all worked together as a team.  
Unsurprisingly, the culture bears some resemblance to a start-up, but its situation within 
a university, the grant-based funding and perhaps the fact that the staff were on fixed-
length contracts gives a more formal and disciplined feel to their ways of working. 
Though academic organisations are often Dionysian, within the team the culture appeared 
Athenian, with a respect for technical expertise and management experience.  
The group were aware of the importance of software security but had little practical 
knowledge; hence their request for the workshops. There were two projects considered in 
the D Threat Assessment workshop. First was a data collection app to package grassland 
information for remote analysis by an agricultural specialist, their client. Second was an 
app to support managing personal and medical information for patients of a medical 
services company. Unusually, the Threat Assessment ideation session found almost no 
concerns with the first project, so in that session the team moved on to discuss the second 
project.  
Figure 44 shows the levels of adoption of the various kinds of assurance technique (see 
Section 3.6.4) before and after the intervention.  
Since the group’s role was creating proof of concept applications, they realised that the 
actual implementation of security features and of security hardening was not important 
for them; what was important was that they supported their clients in implementing secure 
solutions when the clients came to implement the deployable applications. Thus the two 
techniques most important to team D were Threat Assessment (determining the security 
requirements) and Product Negotiation (conveying the analysis and importance of 
security to their clients).  
Group D’s projects tended to be relatively small, typically a few developer months, and 
so the three months of the intervention provided time for several new projects starting; 
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the ‘Established’ rating for those two assurance techniques reflects that both were 
incorporated into the new projects and into the group’s process for further projects. 
8.6.3 Group E Results 
Group E work for a government department delivering software for sensitive government 
applications. The group was set up in the past couple of years, and many of its developers 
are less experienced than the average for the industry. The session leader E1, by contrast, 
was a highly experienced security specialist, now working on software development 
security. His role was to provide security support to a number of groups like group E, so 
his contribution to each project was relatively limited. E1 was keen to find ways to help 
the development teams he supported with security, and he requested the Developer 
Security Essentials Workshops accordingly.  
Confidentiality restrictions limited what could be discussed in the presence of researchers. 
E1 chose this particular group because their product was a form of data store, and though 
it was designed to handle sensitive data, its functionality and design could be discussed 
without compromising confidentiality. Indeed, to avoid the need for security clearance 
for the researcher, the workshop took place in an insecure ‘public’ space: a meeting room 
in a serviced office building.  
The group was divided into two teams, working on distinct aspects of the product; 15 
people attended the workshop. The group culture was professional and fairly formal. 
Since the group’s raison d’être was their ability to deliver a security product, E1’s role 
gave him considerable authority. The group at the time had nobody in the product 
management role. The culture appeared Apollonian, with a clear sense of hierarchy. 
The workshops showed a particular style of facilitation for the Threat Assessment session 
best described as ‘directive’. The conversations were dominated by the facilitator and 
other participants tended to listen respectfully. This was a big contrast to the previous 
team, D, where everyone participated relatively equally. 
Figure 45 shows the impact of the intervention. The largest difference between Before 
and After was in Product Negotiation: prior to the interventions, both development teams 
had regarded security as an absolute; every security feature and requirement had to be 
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implemented without question. That attitude remained after the intervention; what 
changed was that the teams realised that some security aspects were needed earlier than 
others. The teams were using an agile development process, and now negotiated with 
their clients about the order of delivery of security features relative to other features.  
E1 was pleased with the results of the intervention, and planned further uses of the 
workshop with other teams. 
8.6.4 Group F Results 
Group F were from a small surveying company that had created a specialist mapping 
product used by a large number of clients. The company’s role is to carry out the mapping, 
store the maps in a Geographical Information System (GIS) database, and provide the 
database entry and reporting facilities for clients to store their data associated with the 
maps. They provide this through a web-based front end, and use servers hosted on their 
office site.  
The company and product are long-established, and the company remains dominated by 
the Managing Director, who did not participate in the workshops. Group F have a 
manager, F1, with development skills, and a single full-time developer, F2. The product 
manager, F3, also took part in the workshops. The culture was fairly relaxed and informal, 
though it was clear that the managing director was involved in all significant decisions (a 
Zeusian culture). The team have been working together for several years, and seemed 
easy with each other.  
Several years before, one of the developers involved with creating the web-based version 
of their product had had a doctorate in software security, and the underlying design and 
implementation reflected an understanding of security issues. However, none of the 
current team had any knowledge of software security. At the time of the workshops they 
anticipated a future sale to a government organisation, with possible contractual 
requirements for security.  
Figure 46 shows the impact of the workshops. F1 took trouble to extract benefit from the 
discussions, creating a table of the threats identified from the Threat Assessment session 
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and returning to it in follow-up sessions. The Threat Assessment session identified several 
issues with the manual creation process of new customer accounts.  
The government sale did occur, and the team used that Threat Assessment as a basis for 
Product Negotiation concerning which mitigations were now required for the new 
government customer and therefore got implemented; this Using of Product Negotiation 
is reflected in the figure. 
8.6.5 Group G Results 
Group G are from a web applications developer employing some 50-100 people, mainly 
development and product management staff. They produce a variety of applications for 
clients, ranging from stand-alone websites to front-ends supporting complex back end 
systems owned by the client. The two leads were G1 the group CTO and G2 the 
Development Manager.  
The group came from several teams and included two product managers and a couple of 
Quality Assurance (QA) staff. Most of the participants were relatively experienced and 
correspondingly senior in the organisation. The CEO (not a participant) was still 
responsible for strategy and clearly involved in most aspects of the company: a Zeusian 
culture.  
G1 and G2 had a particular reason for wanting the Developer Security Essentials 
Workshops. They were each personally expert in software security, and had a good 
knowledge of what was required in the websites their teams developed. However, 
increasingly they were finding that the effort their teams needed to ensure security was 
not reflected in the financial rewards the company received; neither was normally 
involved in pre-sale negotiations, and they had had recurring problems with being 
expected to provide costly security enhancements ‘for free’. They wanted to address this 
problem. 
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Figure 47 shows the impact of G’s workshops. Given the problem being addressed, the 
Threat Assessment and Threat Sales workshops did not go into much technical detail.35 
Instead, they looked at ways to reflect security requirements through the pre-sales and 
contracts processes. They came out with an impressively simple way to discuss security 
cost-benefit with a client:  
The problem here is that it is a difficult conversation to have once a client’s 
signed off on a project… It should it should be done at the business 
development stage. People in Biz Dev should be coming to you .. and saying 
“Right, I've got this client on board. Here we go. There’s three packages: 
our gold level hosting package, our bronze and our silver. Do you think they 
fit into any of these categories?”  So, then we can go back to them as an 
additional add-on as we do with other little bits like maintenance … and just 
say “we've got these three packages and we reckon you fall into the bronze 
package” or “you fall into the silver package. It will be an extra blah blah 
blah, but we also do blah as standard and then these are the additional 
extras that you can buy…” [G Product Manager, Threat Sales Workshop] 
This idea of Gold, Silver and Bronze packages was taken up enthusiastically. G1 later 
expanded it to five options to include other aspects of security; at the time of the exit 
interviews he was creating a guidance sheet for the sales and marketing team.  
8.6.6 Group H Results 
Group H work for a small company selling a range of Internet of Things (IoT) devices 
and their associated infrastructure. Though the company has been established providing 
research services for some 30 years, it is only recently that they have moved to be a 
product-based company, so the company has some of the attributes of a successful start-
up.  
 
35 Nevertheless, Automated Pen Testing and Static Analysis were introduced as a direct result of the 
workshops.  
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The group all work as a team; product management is effectively shared between H1 the 
CEO, who decides strategy (so another Zeusian culture), and H3 the CTO, who makes 
the day-to-day decisions on what functionality to implement. The workshop lead H2 was 
a developer with a particular interest in security.  
The group justifiably considered themselves good at software security; the service they 
provide has a strong security component and security is part of their Unique Selling 
Proposition (USP) against Asian competitors capable of providing cheaper hardware. 
They viewed the workshops as a team-building style exercise to provide a measure of 
reward and entertainment to the participants.  
Figure 48 shows the impact of the intervention for group H. They planned further training 
and possible workshops.  
8.6.7 Group I Results 
Group I are a well-established company providing the infrastructure required to allow a 
commodity trading market to function. The market uses internationally-agreed standards 
for the encryption and signing of trading messages, and this company provides systems 
with information on prices, bids and offers, and supports trades between users and with 
other participants in the market. It is a mature and respected company in its field, and the 
participants showed a relaxed confident attitude to development. Though they have 
considerable internal expertise in security, much of their security requirements have been 
satisfied in the past through perimeter security; only relatively trusted people have had 
access to the software. Now they have the possibility of delivering cloud-based services 
as well, where perimeter security will be less relevant. 
Of the two workshop leaders, I1 has a largely managerial role; I2 has the most technical 
(and security) experience of the development teams in the company. Their purpose in 
running the workshops was to help developers and product management engage more 
effectively with security. Current versions of the product exist in a firewalled ‘virtual 
community’ where all systems owned by the trading companies are connected by VPN 
and are inaccessible from the wider Internet; future versions may be cloud-based. 
The culture of the teams appeared relaxed and professional; there was no reference at any 
time to senior management, suggesting an Athenian culture. 
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The group engaged enthusiastically with the workshops. Indeed, the day after the 
workshops at which the researchers were present they decided that the outcomes from the 
Threat Assessment and Security Sales were insufficient; they re-run both workshops to 
gain a more complete idea of the threats and possible impact on customers. They also ran 
the full suite of workshops separately with further development teams. 
Figure 49 shows the impact of the workshops. As discussed above, they found value in 
the Threat Assessment and Product Negotiation, and both were incorporated for the 
future, along with further training and workshops.  
8.6.8 Group J Results 
Group J were from a well-established large company providing web interfaces for 
retailers. The particular group involved had the responsibility of creating tools and 
services to support deployment, and comprised about a dozen staff. The company has 
development sites in Eastern Europe, and a policy of moving capable staff around, so the 
group had more staff originating from outside the UK than any of the others involved in 
this project. Unlike any of the other organisations except Group E, this company has a 
separate security function employing professional security experts; it also has a policy of 
assigning the security experts directly to the teams, and of training developers as security 
experts. The culture of the group was serious, with little banter among the teams except 
in the breaks, and an awareness of hierarchy in terms of both management and technical 
experience. That suggests an Athenian or Apollonian culture; there seemed emphasis on 
management control, so this text assigns the culture as Apollonian. 
The two assigned leaders for the workshops were both security specialists: J1 was the 
security specialist assigned to the group; J2 was more recently a developer and is in 
training as a security specialist. The group manager, who arranged our involvement, did 
not participate in the workshop, though J5, who manages one of the teams, did so. Their 
purpose for the workshops was to help the communication between security specialists 
and developers. There was a further technical expert, a programmer/system architect not 
introduced specifically to the researchers, who joined and contributed largely to the 
Threat Assessment and Security Sales Sessions. 
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Figure 50 shows the effects of the intervention. As shown, the teams were expert at 
software security; while some of the participants may well have learned from the 
workshops there is no measurable improvement in the development process as a result. 
Both groups E and J, the ones led by security professionals, showed a particular style of 
facilitation for the Threat Assessment session best described as ‘directive’. The 
conversations were dominated by the facilitators (and in the case of J, one participant who 
had not been interviewed, and who appeared to have a system architect role). With Group 
E, the other participants tended to listen respectfully; with Group J, we observed several 
of the participants, unable to participate, getting on with their email instead.  
8.6.9 Group K Results 
Group K were from a well-established company with a few hundred employees providing 
tools for developers: some such tools are installed locally on client sites; others are cloud-
hosted. The group had a strong emphasis on agile development processes, team 
interaction and structured workshops. The team style was correspondingly Athenian, with 
managers providing a coordinating role and professionals given considerable autonomy. 
The atmosphere was cheerful with some banter and an enthusiastic approach from the 
participants. 
All the participants were developers; the two workshop leaders K1, K2 were amongst the 
most experienced in the group. Both had considerable experience in facilitating 
workshops, and brought their own approaches to brainstorming and analysing the results 
of brainstorming sessions. In particular, the techniques they used to engage participants 
were considerably more effective at getting participants’ active engagement than those 
that had been used by the researchers or facilitators in most of the other groups, as follows. 
For the Threat Assessment, they had each participant independently write down threat 
ideas on Post-It notes; then discuss them in groups. Participants then brought the notes 
they had created over to a whiteboard, where they sorted them together by type of threat 
and attacker, using location on the whiteboard to indicate similarity.  
For the Risk Assessment, they had each participant annotate the post-it notes with 
coloured dots: dots of one colour for the ones they deemed most likely, and of another 
colour for the most impactful, as in Figure 51. During the break between workshops their 
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facilitators then used this ‘crowd-sourced’ 
calculation to assign the threat post-its to a 3x3 matrix 
on a different whiteboard, as shown in Figure 52. 
This had ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ impact on the x-
axis; and ‘likely’, ‘fairly unlikely’ and ‘unlikely’ on 
the y-axis. Based on that, the facilitators then chose 
several threats to consider for the Threat Sales 
workshop—in  this case the threats in the rightmost 
two squares in the top row. 
For Security Sales, they took the stickers with the 
four most important identified threats, put them at 
different corners of the room, and had the participants 
group themselves next to their preferred topic; the 
participants self-organised to have similar numbers 
for each. Each group then worked out their ‘pitch’ for 
that threat and presented it to the others. 
As shown in Figure 53, the researchers’ analysis shows an increase in awareness in the 
teams of some of the assurance techniques. 
8.6.10 Summary of Results 
To gain an overview of the effectiveness of the 
interventions, this section analyses the changes in 
engagement levels seen in each group as a result of the 
analysis. By assigning ordinal ratings to the 
engagement levels as shown in Table 22, one can 
calculate an indication of the ‘Impact’ of the 
intervention—the  extent to which the intervention 
affected the group’s use of the technique.  
Note that this ‘Impact’ calculation is merely an 
indication: a two-unit Impact (change in engagement) might be from No Mention to 
Table 22: Engagement Levels 







Figure 52: Whiteboard 
Showing Risk and Impact 
 
Figure 51: Whiteboard with Dots by Post-it Notes 
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Planned, or from Planned to Established; these changes are not semantically equivalent. 
Equally, the number of samples (8) is insufficient for meaningful statistical analysis. 
However, we can reasonably assert that a large average Impact value represents more 
change than a small one.  
Figure 54 summarises the results discussed in Sections 8.6.1 to 8.6.9, providing a 
summary answer to: 
RQ 5.1 To what extent did the groups learn about and adopt different security-
enhancing activities as a result of the Developer Security Essentials 
intervention? 
The size of each bubble indicates the engagement level; the colour shows the change 
attributed to the intervention: amber for a change of 1 to 2 levels; red for 3 to 4 levels. As 
in earlier diagrams, the more concrete Assurance Techniques are nearer the top.  
As the figure shows, the use of Threat Assessment and Product Negotiation was 
dramatically improved in a majority of groups; use of Penetration Testing and Use of 
Checklists were not affected at all. Group J showed little change as a result of the 
intervention; all the others did see at least some changes. 
The results showed enhancements in the security activities and understanding in all the 
teams, albeit only a minor enhancement in the case of highly experienced group J. Groups 
I, J chose to carry out further workshops independently from the researchers, and D, E, 
F, G and I all showed major improvements in their use of Threat Assurance and Product 
Negotiation. 
8.6.11 Technique Adoption by Different Categorisations of Group 
This section addresses the second research sub-question:  
RQ 5.2 How does the impact of the intervention vary with different company sizes, team 
cultures, facilitation styles, security expertise, and kinds of participants? 
Table 24 calculates average impact values for different categorisations of the groups. The 
deeper shadings show the higher values in each categorisation; the red-green colours have 
no significance except to distinguish different categorisations. The line separators in the 
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first column delineate the types of assurance technique (Vulnerability Finding, Process 
Improvements, and Training). The figures on the bottom line show the average increment 
over all assurance techniques for each category. 
As shown, medium-size companies were most likely to plan further workshops; large 
companies were more likely to adopt Product Negotiation. Groups with Athena cultures  
(Section 8.2.1) were the most effective in adopting Threat Assessment and Product 
Negotiation.  
Table 23 does the same as Table 24, but for a different set of categorisations: the security 
maturity of the group; whether or not product management was present; and the job title 
of the lead facilitator. Unsurprisingly, we see the groups with a low and medium initial 
security maturity achieved the biggest average impacts. Interestingly, though, we see that 
groups with product managers showed notably higher average impacts than those 
without; and those facilitated by managers achieved better impacts, especially in the 
process-related assurance techniques, than those facilitated by technical staff. 
 
Figure 54: Changes in Assurance Technique Usage for All Groups 
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Table 24: Impact Averaged by Organisation Size and Team Culture 
























Count in each category 8 3 3 2 3 2 3 
Automated Pen Testing 0.5  1.3  1.3 
  
Automated Static Analysis 0.6 0.3 1. 0.5 1.3  0.3 
Configuration Review 0.1 0.3    0.5 
 
Code Review 0.4  0.3 1. 0.7 
 0.3 
Penetration Testing      
  
Threat Assessment 1.6 1. 2.3 1.5 2.  2.3 
Product Negotiation 2.1 2.7 2. 1.5 1.7 2. 2.7 
Contingency Plan 0.4   1.5 1. 
  
Security Champion 0.3  0.7   
 0.7 
Standardisation 0.1   0.5 0.3 
  
On-the-job Training 1.  1.3 2. 1.3 
 1.3 
Further Workshops 1.3 0.3 2.3 1. 1.3 0.5 1.7 
Average 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.8 
 
 


































Count in each category 2 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 
Automated Pen Testing  1.  1.  1.   
Automated Static Analysis  0.8 1. 1. 0.3 1.3   
Configuration Review 0.5    0.3  0.5  
Code Review  0.3 1. 0.5 0.3 0.5  0.5 
Penetration Testing         
Threat Assessment  1.8 3. 2.3 1. 3.  0.5 
Product Negotiation 2. 1.5 3.5 2. 2.3 3. 2. 0.5 
Contingency Plan   1.5 0.8  0.8   
Security Champion  0.5  0.5  0.5   
Standardisation  0.3  0.3    0.5 
On-the-job Training  1.5 1. 2.  1.5  1. 
Further Workshops 0.5 2.3  1.8 0.8 1.3 0.5 2. 
Average: 0.3 0.8 0.9 1. 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.4 
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Finally, Table 25 shows a similar impact comparison, but this time showing how all of 
the categorisations in Table 24 and Table 23 compare when averaged over each of the 
three different kinds of technique: Vulnerability Finding, Process Improvement and 
Training. It shows that the training ones were adopted to a greater extent than the process 
ones, and both much more than the vulnerability collecting ones. We observe those led 
by managers were more likely to adopt process-based techniques; and that those with 
Athena cultures appear more likely to adopt training-based techniques, and relatively 
unlikely to adopt (additional) vulnerability-based ones.  
We considered also investigating the different effects of the interventions on different 
kinds of participants: developers, testers, managers and product managers. However, the 
interviews and workshop transcripts did not distinguish the impact on individuals, but 
only on the entire team, which made this investigation impractical. 
8.6.12 Which Forms of Facilitation Worked Well 
Considering the final Design Practice research sub-question: 
RQ 5.3 How does the impact of the intervention vary with different facilitation styles? 
It was particularly clear to the researchers was that two of the three workshops, namely 
Threat Assessment and Threat Sales, varied very widely in effect, even though the recipe 
was fundamentally the same for all the groups.  
Appendix K provides brief descriptions of the two workshops for each group, including 
assessments by the researcher for the ‘energy level’ in the room for each session, and 
brief reasons for why there was that energy level. Figure 55 summarises these 
descriptions. It shows the average impact (as in Table 25 in Section 8.6.11) plotted against 
Table 25: Impact of Different Categories of Intervention 
  All Vulnerability Process Training 
All  0.7 0.3 0.9 1.1 
Organisation 
Size 
Large 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.2 
Medium 0.9 0.5 1.0 1.8  
Small 0.8 0.3 1.0 1.5 
Team Culture Zeus 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.3  
Apollo 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3  
Athena 0.8 0.1 1.1 1.5 
Security 
Maturity 
High 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Medium 0.8 0.4 0.8 1.9  
Low 0.9 0.4 1.6 0.5 
Product 
Manager  
Yes 1.0 0.5 1.2 1.9 
No 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.4 
Lead facilitator Manager 1.1 0.6 1.5 1.4 
Security 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 
 Developer 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.5 
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the average energy in the room for the two workshops, categorised by the approach used 
by the facilitators. These approaches were: 
Dominating The facilitator(s) wrote up a board of ‘ideas’, but did most of the talking 
themselves, with interjections from the most experienced participants. 
Leading The facilitator(s) ran a more traditional brainstorming session, writing 
ideas up on a board but not contributing much otherwise themselves. 
Hands-off The facilitator(s) specified a format for the workshop and enforced 
procedure, but otherwise stayed out of the discussion or acted as equal 
participants themselves.  
As the diagram shows the workshop energy did depend on the facilitation approach. 
Interestingly, though, the average impact (in terms of increases in engagement with 
assurance techniques) also rises with increasing workshop energy.  
Both sessions led by security specialists involved a dominating style, and surprisingly, 
both were at the lower end of the impact; this was mainly because both groups had already 
adopted most of the techniques (Sections 8.6.3 and 8.6.8), but may also reflect the low 
level of energy achieved in the workshops. 
8.7 Theory Results 
Turning to the theoretical outcomes from Design-Based Research (Section  3.6.2), this 
section explores the two Design Theory research questions, RQ 5.4 and RQ 5.5 (Section 
8.3.2). 
8.7.1 Positive Benefits of Security and Privacy 
Consider the first theory-based research question: 
RQ 5.4 Can having developers consider the positive benefits of security and privacy 
mitigations lead to security improvements in the development process? 
 
Figure 55: Impact vs. Energy, Categorised by Facilitation Style 
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To address this, we looked for cases where the Threat Sales activity (Section 1) did lead 
to ‘security improvements in the development process’. 
Group D identified in the Threat Sales discussion that the threat and risk assessment itself 
was a valuable asset to their clients as part of their Proof of Concept developments. They 
now incorporate a security discussion into every project they do in their ‘handover 
document’36. 
Now, after the workshop I think it was, we redesigned our handover 
template, which is where we now have a specific section for security. 
Even in the case of the project that I've just finished, … even though it 
wasn't live code, we wanted to make the client aware that there was some 
security implications just with the data. (D4) 
Group F realised that they could ‘line up’ security improvements to be incorporated in 
the enhancements when new clients wanted them: 
Yes, we are in a promising looking situation at the moment in terms of we 
have picked up some new contracts, and these are local authority contracts 
as well, so they will require us to implement pretty much everything that we 
had listed… I think the good thing is that if everything is detailed in the 
specification before we have even started implementation, then at least we 
are aware of what we need to do, how much effort it might be, rather than 
trying to deliver something for a fixed cost, and realise towards the end that 
“oh, we need to do all these things that we didn't cost or anticipate” (F1) 
Group G identified the ‘Gold, Silver, Bronze’ approach to selling security enhancement 
costs to their clients. 
To make that process a lot simpler for our sales team, [G1] did a lot of the 
leg work and setting up a Gold, Silver and Bronze package to say “right, 
answer these 10 questions”, and then you would get a points score, and 'you 
fit in within this bracket, and this is the package that you need'. The work 
that Mike has done to start that process going has been brilliant. From then, 
[it’s] up to the company (G6) 
Group I subsequently included security requirements in discussions with new clients.  
I feel a bit more confident, perhaps, if someone asks me a question saying 
“why aren't you doing this?” I can go: “I don't think we should because the 
threat is this, and there is these things, and these things, so therefore it is 
not worth it”. So, we are giving the Product Owners some more insight into 
why you would do this stuff, and where the value is. (I1) 
While we do not have evidence that the Threat Sales activity generated value in every 
case, the experience of Groups D and F, in particular, indicate that the activity of getting 
developers to consider the positive benefits of security can help get resources allocated to 
security improvements. We conclude, therefore, that the answer to RQ 5.4 is yes, having 
developers consider the positive benefits of security and privacy mitigations can lead to 
security improvements in the development process. 
 
36 Source: discussion in September 2020 between the author and D3. 
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8.7.2 Skills Not Associated with Developers 
Consider the second Design Theory research sub-question: 
RQ 5.5 Can teams of developers produce both adequate risk and impact assessments 
and benefit analyses with minimal guidance? 
The Threat Sales workshop (Section 8.4.2) required the participants to establish the three 
or four highest priority threats; and for each, to find mitigations and then work out positive 
ways in which addressing that threat will benefit the organisation. That required two 
forms of analysis not normally associated with developers: 
• Risk assessment: to identify the highest priority issues required an assessment 
of the probability of each threat identified in the Threat Assessment workshops; 
developers are not normally risk assessors.  
• Sales promotion: Developers are not normally expected to promote 
enhancements; nor indeed to influence product management, other than 
through effort estimates.  
Like every step in the development of these workshops, therefore, the Threat Sales 
workshop was an experiment; while the researchers had hoped that developers in the 
workshop would be able to assess risk and find positive ways to represent security to their 
stakeholders, they had no a priori reason to believe that they would. Indeed, other security 
researchers had assumed that the risk assessment process would require interaction with 
professional risk assessors37 ; and we are not aware of other work investigating the 
interaction of product management with security requirements.  
The next two sections explore what happened related to each skill.  
8.7.3 Risk Assessment 
For the risk assessment, we suggested to the facilitators that they used a low-granularity 
approach, classifying the risk of each threat as low, medium or high.  
Surprisingly, none of the teams had any trouble doing this. Even Group D, who are 
producing proof of concept apps for companies and are therefore not domain experts for 
their products, had little difficulty: 
We’ve identified huge risks that they need to consider before they ever get 
anywhere near an actual working product. (Participant, Group D) 
Team E, whose security considerations prevented them discussing details of their product 
during the workshop, learned and took away the prioritisation process: 
We had a follow-on session afterwards where we took everything away, … 
and sat down and thought “what do we need to do next”. (E3) 
For Group F, F1 produced a table of risks and impacts based on their discussion. Group 
G had no problem with risk assessments, since G1 and G2 were familiar with the 
likelihood of attacks on the websites they managed. Group H simply had their most expert 
members (H1, H3) identify the most likely by placing asterisks on the flipchart of 
identified threats. Group I did similar. Group J had J1 and J2 (facilitators and also security 
experts) do the assessment.  
 
37 Source: discussion with NCSC researchers. 
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Perhaps the most interesting approach was Group K as described in Section 8.6.9. Their 
facilitators had the team write the threats on post-it notes and had each participant 
annotate them with coloured dots: dots of one colour for the ones they deemed most 
likely, and of another colour for the most impactful. The results were notably consistent. 
In summary, all the groups found effective ways to allocate a working risk probability to 
each of the threats they identified. 
8.7.4 Threat Sales 
Still more difficult for developers, one might have thought, would be devising ways to 
persuade product management professionals to allocate appropriate development 
resource to security improvements. 
In larger groups, this process happened in several sub-groups, with each sub-group 
tackling a different threat.  
The outcomes were surprisingly satisfactory: 
• Group D identified that the threat and risk assessment itself was a valuable 
asset to their clients. 
• Group E realised that while every security enhancement was essential, the 
ordering of their implementation could be altered to suit the client’s needs. 
• Group F ‘lined up’ security improvements to be incorporated in the 
enhancements when new clients wanted them.  
• Group G identified the ‘Gold, Silver, Bronze’ approach to selling security 
enhancement costs to their clients. 
• Group H identified that their security story was a major Unique Selling Point 
against competitors. 
• Group I subsequently included security requirements in discussions with new 
clients.  
• Group J devised several functionality and process improvements for their 
(internal) customers. 
• In Group K, each of four subgroups delivered a convincing sales pitch for a 
security improvement.  
It seems reasonable to conclude that developers generally do have the necessary skills 
and insights required to devise ways to persuade product management professionals to 
allocate resource to security improvements. 
We conclude that the answer to RQ 5.5 is yes, teams of developers can produce both 
adequate risk and impact assessments and benefit analyses with minimal guidance. 
8.8 Discussion  
8.8.1 Security Process Improvements 
The workshops concentrated on two aspects of security: using Threat Assessment to help 
participants focus their security effort on the appropriate threats; and encouraging 
Stakeholder Negotiation by finding ways to present security requirements as positive 
opportunities to product management. It was therefore encouraging, if unsurprising, that 
the results in Figure 54 (Section 8.6.10) show that all the groups completed the 
intervention with an understanding of the two assurance techniques, and, in a large 
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majority of cases, the incorporation of those techniques into the groups’ ways of working. 
Even more encouraging was that for half the groups involved this represented a large 
improvement over their previous practice. 
Indeed, the majority of groups ended up incorporating, or at least using, all of the 
assurance techniques identified as important from the expert survey in Chapter 4: 
Automated Static Analysis, Configuration Review, Code Review, Penetration Testing, 
Threat Assessment and Product Negotiation.  
Given the purpose of the new intervention package was to encourage others to use the 
package and lead sessions, it was encouraging that two companies did so; it was 
disappointing that a larger number had not got around to it after several months, even if 
they expressed intentions of doing so. 
8.8.2 Variation of Results with Different Situations 
The categorisations of Impact in Table 24 and Table 23 (Section 8.6.11) show several 
points of interest: 
Sessions facilitated by managers appear more effective than those facilitated by 
developers or security specialists:  This may reflect better training in facilitation-related 
skills given to managers; it may also reflect greater power amongst managers to introduce 
new techniques.  
The presence or absence of a product manager in the group had negligible effect on 
the use of Stakeholder Negotiation: This was a surprise. The author had expected a 
product manager would encourage emphasis and therefore improvements in this, but the 
results do not show that effect. Surprisingly, though, looking at the bottom line, we see 
that the presence of a product manager did encourage the incorporation of other assurance 
techniques. This suggests there is good reason to encourage product managers to attend 
such sessions if possible. 
Different cultures may favour improvements in different types of assurance 
techniques: The Zeusian cultures (Section 8.2.1) showed most improvement in 
Automated techniques and Threat Assessment; the Athenian ones in Threat Assessment 
and Product Negotiation. One might attribute the latter improvements to ‘agency’: 
Athenian cultures give the most ‘agency’ to the developers themselves as individuals, and 
thus once they accept the need they are the most able to implement Threat Assessment 
and Product Negotiation; assurance techniques like Automated Static Analysis, though 
they may well be less effective in practice, will appeal more to Zeusian cultures: as the 
‘magic bullets’ supposedly popular with management.  
Table 25 shows a point of interest when it comes to approaching other companies to use 
the interventions: 
Medium sized companies, with moderate security knowledge, showed most tendency 
to adopt the interventions: The explanation is probably that such companies cannot 
afford a team of security specialists, but also will none the less have demanding customers 
who do need security, and also have ‘latent’ security knowledge amongst the team 
members that is brought out by the Developer Security Essentials workshops.  
8.8.3 Best Facilitation Approaches 
From Section 8.6.12, Figure 55, we see that, overall, the less participation by the 
facilitator in the workshops the more impact the intervention tended to have. The best 
Using Workshops to Improve Security in Software Development Teams 
168  Charles Weir - October 2020 
facilitators, those who created the most energy in the workshops, were those who used a 
hands-off approach.  
From observation of the workshops, we believe that the developers are learning and 
changing most when they are speaking, and discussing the security issues, not when they 
are told answers by a facilitator, nor even merely faced with a leader with a whiteboard 
marker. Best therefore is for a facilitator to create a good format and let the workshop 
delegates get on with it, only intervening with occasional information or in response to 
requests. This may also explain the finding in Section 8.8.2 that groups facilitated by 
managers tend to be particularly impactful, if the manager has the skill to use hands-off 
styles of facilitation, and is accepted as part of the team.  
We conclude that, for maximum effectiveness, future versions of the Developer Security 
Essentials workshops should encourage facilitators to avoid taking a dominating role, and 
instead to provide a framework for the workshops, and support the developers themselves 
in driving the outcomes. 
Particularly useful, then, is the approach used by Group K, as described in Section 8.7.3. 
Their session involved virtually no input from the facilitators other than coordination of 
the workshop process, and indeed, little security knowledge input from the researcher 
present. This approach, therefore, offers a possible basis for a prescriptive set of 
instructions for future facilitators, avoiding the need for the ‘train the facilitator’ sessions 
with the researchers. 
8.8.4 Skills Not Associated with Developers 
Sections 8.7.3 and 8.7.4 show that, surprisingly, developers found it easy both to assess 
the impact and likelihood of successful threat activities; and to think up ways of ‘selling’ 
security improvements to Product Management.  
While we have no way of validating their assessments of either, we observe that there is 
good reason to believe that their assessments will be sufficient for the purpose: 
• In the case of risk assessment, the consequence of getting one risk assessment 
wrong is much less than the consequence of not doing it at all. Since for all the 
teams, except perhaps Group E, there were no professional risk assessors 
available within the organisations to carry out the risk assessment, there is a 
strong argument for using what they produced. 
• In the case of sales, in groups (F, G, H and I) where Product Managers were 
present, the Product Managers engaged very well with the process and found 
it valuable. This suggests that others may also find the results useful.  
We conclude that there is no need for future versions of Developer Security Essentials to 
provide more sophisticated training in either risk assessment or sales; most teams will be 
able to carry out both workshops without it. 
8.8.5 Impact of the Active Developer Model 
A further implication of  Figure 55 (Impact vs. Energy, Categorised by Facilitation Style) 
in section 8.6.12 concerns the Active Developer Model.  
The diagram shows that the most effective workshops were those where developers acted 
virtually independently of the facilitators, generating their own conclusions and actions 
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as a result; the least effective were those where the facilitator did most of the talking and 
the developers had a passive role.  
While the small sample of 8 results does not permit statistical proof, this result is 
supportive of the Active Developer Model, which predicts that independent, self-
activated developers will deliver better security than those ‘told what to do’. 
8.8.6 Limitations 
As with any research based on what are effectively multiple case studies, there are 
limitations in what can be deduced from this. Another series of trials might produce 
different results, since there are many factors outside the control of the researchers. 
The coders did identify two specific limitations in the analysis process: identification of 
assurance techniques, and identification of the target group.  
It was difficult in the coding process to identify assurance techniques and their level of 
adoption. Section 8.5 discusses some of the reasons for this; probably the most important 
issue was that the Before interviews did not ask explicitly about techniques, in order to 
avoid ‘priming’ the participants. In future research, we would recommend that, given 
such priming would be relatively small and short-term, it would be of more value to ask 
explicitly about assurance techniques beforehand. 
The identification of the target group, developers, was an issue in the situations where 
security experts were also involved: groups E and J. Security experts are likely to be 
knowledgeable in all the assurance techniques mentioned here; they are also unlikely to 
change behaviour or knowledge as a result of the workshops. This research, however, is 
interested only in the impact on software developers. In Group E, the security expert E1 
was separate from the developers, so it was straightforward to identify the extent to which 
the developers and the development team changed. However, in Group J, the security 
experts J1 and J2 were themselves experienced software developers, and were themselves 
working in the teams, so it was difficult for researchers to distinguish knowledge and 
intentions expressed by the experts from knowledge and intentions in the rest of the team; 
it may be that the intervention provided more benefit to the other Group J developers than 
Figure 54 suggests. 
8.8.7 Future Work 
The Developer Security Essentials package used in these trials has a practical limitation: 
it requires time input from a researcher to train the facilitators. This severely restricts its 
scalability to a wider audience of development teams, and hence the academic impact it 
can have.  
The findings in the previous sections are helpful in addressing this: 
1) The workshops are effective even when the contribution of the facilitator is 
limited to enforcing the procedures; they may not require them to have security 
expertise (Section 8.6.12).  
2) One of the groups devised an effective template for the Threat Assessment and 
Threat Sales workshops suitable for step-by-step instructions (Sections 8.6.9, 
8.8.3). 
This opens the possibility of a new version of the package that needs no direct input from 
a researcher, and therefore can scale without limit.  
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The next step for the researchers is to create and trial such a package. However, a ‘remote’ 
trial of this kind offers several challenges to address, as follows: 
Self-sufficient Support Materials: Supporting materials, such as instructions and the 
cards required for the Agile App Security Game, will need to be understandable and 
usable without the support of a researcher. 
Participant Recruitment: to reach a larger number of development teams without the 
personal involvement of the researchers may require collaboration with marketing 
experts.  
Data Collection: Without researchers present at the workshop in person the pre- and 
post- intervention interviews become problematic. In some cases these interviews might 
be carried out by phone or videoconference, but simpler and more scalable would be an 
online questionnaire based approach.  
8.9 Conclusions 
Recall the research question for this work: 
RQ 5 Which aspects of the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ intervention are effective 
at improving security when used independently by teams from a variety of 
cultures and different types of organisation, and why? 
The Magid 2 trials showed that Developer Security Essentials intervention led to security 
process improvements with all the groups who used it (Section 8.6.10). In particular, there 
was a strong improvement in the use of Threat Assessment to help participants focus their 
security effort on the appropriate threats; and Stakeholder Negotiation to encourage 
Product Management to allocate resource to threat mitigation (Figure 54). 
All three workshops of the Developer Security Essentials were effective at helping 
improving security; developers proved adept even at risk assessment and creating positive 
representations of security improvements (Section 8.8.4). 
The intervention had most impact where the workshops were facilitated by managers 
(Section 8.8.2) or in a ‘hands-off’ manner (Section 8.8.3). The Active Developer Model 
(Section 4.3) explains this: these are the arrangements that give the development team 
most ‘volition’—that empower the development team most (Section 8.8.3).  
The workshops were adopted most by medium sized companies; those that will have 
latent security expertise but no formal security function. They had least impact with very 
security-expert companies and when led by security specialists (Section 8.6.11), though 
this may reflect the lack of scope for improvement (Section 8.6.12). 
The findings from this project promise a new version of the package that can scale without 
limit, and pave the way to the creation and trial of such a new package (Section 8.8.7). 
The author is currently working on a project to do exactly that.  
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9 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter discusses conclusions from the research, both in terms of practical results 
and improvements to the package and in terms of wider theory gained. It contrasts work 
by other researchers, and outlines a range of further work to take the research forward. 
9.1 Research Summary 
At the start of the work on this thesis, the author expected that the answer to the research 
question 
RQ 1 What is needed to make a cost-effective and widely applicable intervention to 
help UK software development teams achieve better software security? 
would be some kind of tool or knowledgebase: a code analysis tool to alert the developers 
to possible errors, a website or book to teach them appropriate process tools, or a training 
course to transfer security skills.  
This proved incorrect. While there is no doubt that all of these approaches are excellent 
ways to support software developers in improving their security, they all failed on the 
‘widely applicable’ criteria; the industry survey described in Chapter 4 showed there were 
barriers stopping them from reaching the developers who needed them. Yet the online 
survey described in Chapter 5 showed there is definitely a need to overcome these 
barriers; fewer than two thirds of developers in teams were using any assurance 
techniques regularly. 
Instead, therefore, what proved necessary before any of these tools could be of value to 
the developers in a team was something to ‘sensitise’ the developers to the importance of 
security and privacy. Chapter 6 describes the original creation of the package to do this 
and the thinking that led to it being a series of workshops.  
Chapters 7 and 8 establish that the particular package we created, Developer Security 
Essentials, is remarkably effective. There is of course no reason to suggest that it is the 
only, or the best, such package that can be created. What we can say, is that it has a 
definite impact on the teams that use it, and a small cost, which justifies encouraging a 
large number of teams to use it.  
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The rest of this chapter summarises the detailed findings from the research, and suggests 
ways in which this impact might be realised. 
9.2 Research Questions Revisited  
Returning to the original research questions introduced in Section 1.6, the main thesis 
question RQ 1 led to a range of subsidiary questions RQ 2 to RQ 5. This section explores 
the answers to each of these subsidiary questions in turn, leading to an answer to the main 
question. 
RQ 2 What interventions can change the environment for members of the development 
team to achieve good security, considering cost-efficiency, motivational factors, 
choice of tools, supporting processes, culture, awareness, training and skills?  
Chapter 4 identified that effective interventions are those that conform to Active 
Developer Model: that developers must drive the security improvements themselves. 
Most of the effective such interventions are known by Security Specialists as ‘Assurance 
Techniques’, and of these, five are particularly cost-effective: Threat Assessment, 
Configuration Review, Automatic Static Analysis, Code Review and Penetration Testing. 
A further change to development process, Stakeholder Negotiation, also contributes 
largely to improved security; and two interventions,  Incentivisation Session and On-the-
Job Training, are effective in helping change the environment (Section 4.14). 
RQ 3 To what extent, and how, does a perceived need for security and privacy lead to 
security-enhancing activities and interactions in an Android development team 
and result in better software security? 
A survey of successful Android developers (Chapter 5) found a high level of reported 
security need for the app development, but less use of practical security assurance 
techniques such as the five discussed above, with less than 50% regularly using them; 
though of the third to a half of such developers working in teams nearly 80% used them 
regularly.  
The use of such techniques was in proportion to the perceived need, as was the 
involvement of security specialists (though less than a quarter had this), and the frequency 
of app security updates. We found little relationship, however, between these factors and 
the density of security defects in the resulting apps; we believe this reflects the inability 
of the current generation of binary analysis tools to analyse libraries effectively and 
separately from the main app code. Surprisingly, we did find more Cryptographic API 
issues in apps whose development team worked with security specialists or champions, 
probably since the specialists and champions correctly enforce much more Cryptography 
use.  
Reportedly, app security improvements have been largely driven by developers 
themselves; GDPR has had a minor impact (Section 5.5). 
RQ 4 What security outcomes did the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ package have, 
and what aspects contributed most to those outcomes?  
In the first year’s trials of the Developer Security Essentials package (Chapter 7), two of 
the three organisations’ teams achieved substantial improvements both in the security of 
their products and in their development process with respect to security. In particular, 
after a year or more, the first had identified that the choice of security improvements to 
make was a commercial, not a technical, question and had moved to a risk-based decision 
process; the second had incorporated security throughout their development training and 
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process. The third company, a much larger organisation with a dysfunctional relationship 
between developers and security specialists, found that the interventions contributed to 
security awareness, but made no objectively detectable improvements as a result. 
The main aspects that made the package effective were the extent to which it increased 
awareness rather than simply directed the teams involved. The effective teams were those 
who were able to do the following (Section 7.7.2.2): 
Apply Team Activities to Security: The workshop effectiveness came from discussions 
between participants rather than information from the intervener. 
Focus on Key Assurance Techniques: Specifically, Threat Assessment, Automated 
Static Analysis, and Configuration Review provide a large benefit for relatively low cost. 
Address Organisational Issues: Nearly half the Motivators supporting security 
improvement, and Blockers discouraging it are ascribable to organisational issues, so 
addressing these can make a large contribution. 
RQ 5 Which aspects of the ‘Developer Security Essentials’ intervention are effective 
at improving security when used independently by teams from a variety of 
cultures and different types of organisation, and why? 
A second round of trials with 8 further organisations showed that the Developer Security 
Essentials intervention led to security process improvements with all the groups who used 
it (Chapter 8), especially in the use of Threat Assessment to help participants focus their 
security effort on the appropriate threats; and Stakeholder Negotiation to encourage 
Product Management to allocate resource to threat mitigation. All three workshops were 
effective at helping improving security; developers proved surprisingly adept even at risk 
assessment and creating positive representations of security improvements.  
The intervention had least impact with very security-expert companies and when led by 
security specialists, though this may reflect the lack of scope for improvement. They had 
most impact where the workshops were facilitated by managers or in a ‘hands-off’ 
manner, probably because these arrangements empower the development team most.  
9.2.1 Main Research Question 
The previous questions were all derived from considering the original research question: 
RQ 1 What is needed to make a cost-effective and widely applicable intervention to 
help UK software development teams achieve better software security? 
From the above findings, we conclude that what is needed in any such intervention are 
the following properties: 
• It sensitises a development team to the importance of security and privacy issues 
in developers, and enables them to make their own choices as to the best ways to 
address them.  
• It helps the developers understand that every project has unique requirements 
related to security and privacy; and teaches them Threat Assessment approaches 
to establish and assess those requirements. 
• It introduces them to the four further assurance techniques that are most effective 
in removing security issues during development: Configuration Review, 
Automatic Static Analysis, Code Review and Penetration Testing. 
• It supports the developers in what we have termed ‘Stakeholder Negotiation’: 
finding ways establish the business value, or lack of it, for addressing security 
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requirements; and hence supporting good business decisions about where to spend 
effort and money on security and privacy improvements. 
From the experimental work described in this thesis, we can add the observation that the 
following two techniques provide a good basis for such an intervention: 
1. Workshops, in which the developers carry out structured discussions. 
2. Regular On-the-job Training sessions afterward to act as a ‘nudging’ reminder.  
9.3 Main Contributions  
As introduced in section 1.5, the main new contributions of this research are the 
following: 
1. The Active Developer Model 
2. Favourite Intervention Techniques 
3. Measurement of Assurance Technique Use 
4. Proof of Concept of an Intervention Package 
5. Pioneering Use of Design-Based Research 
6. Business Benefit of Security 
The following sections explore each of these in more detail. 
9.3.1 The Active Developer Model 
While Chapter 4 could only propose the Active Developer Model as a candidate theory, 
as discussed in Section 3.2, given our pragmatic approach such a theory can be accepted 
for future use if it helps understand a complex situation, if deductions made using it are 
all confirmed, and if using it to plan research or interventions leads to desired outcomes.  
Section 4.3.2 shows how the Active Developer Model helps understand the complex 
situation of interventions to support security, by helping explain which interventions will 
be successful in terms of their Sensitisation, Support and Affordability.  
All the deductions of the Active Developer Model explored (post hoc) in Sections 7.7.3 
and 8.8.5 were borne out in the Magid 1 and Magid 2 projects, also corroborating the 
theory.  
Finally, Sections 6.2.1 and 6.3 show how the theory was used to plan the design of the 
Developer Security Essentials: in particular, emphasising the need for an Incentivisation 
Session. Since the intervention was generally successful (Section 8.6.11), this supports 
accepting the theory. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the Active Developer Model theory is valuable for 
intervention design, and to recommend its use in future.  
9.3.2 Favourite Intervention Techniques 
Section 4.14.1 identified eight intervention techniques favoured by security experts 
working with development teams: 
Incentivisation Session to motivate security improvement; 
Threat Modelling to identify the risks and benefits to the organisation from 
security issues; 
Product Negotiation to prioritise and justify effort and expense on mitigations; 
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Component Choice to use tools to identify weak or out-of-date components; 
Auto. Static Analysis to facilitate the removal of certain classes of code-level 
vulnerabilities; 
Code Review to find more sophisticated vulnerabilities, where the culture 
permits; 
Penetration Testing to view the software from the point of view of an attacker; 
and finally, 
On-the-Job Training to keep the team actively considering software security 
9.3.3 Measurement of Assurance Technique Use 
Chapter 5 provided evidence of minimal use of security assurance techniques by 
developers in the particular domain of Android App development. Specifically, less than 
half of the developers use any assurance techniques regularly; less than two thirds of those 
working in teams do so.  
The survey also provide evidence of the need for interventions that did not require 
security professionals; less than a quarter of those developers had access to such 
professionals. 
9.3.4 Proof of Concept of an Intervention Package 
Chapter 7 provided an ‘existence proof’ that a simple ‘intervention package’ structured 
as a facilitated series of workshops can improve the security of software developed by a 
team. 
Specifically, the first phase of trials of the Developer Security Essentials package led, for 
two of the three organisations involved, to improvements in both project security and 
understanding among the more experienced team members of the need for assurance 
techniques (Section 7.7.1) 
9.3.5 Pioneering Use of Design-Based Research 
As Section 3.6 explains, Design-Based Research has been used mostly in the field of 
education research. While the creation of an intervention in the field of Developer-centred 
Security is arguably a form of education, we are not aware of any other researchers using 
Design-Based Research in this field. 
As Chapter 8 shows, Design-Based Research proved an effective basis for trialling, 
evaluating, and deducing theory from the creation of a Developer-centred Security 
intervention. 
9.3.6 Business Benefit of Security 
Perhaps the most exciting outcome for future research was, first, the identification of the 
importance of representing security enhancements in terms of their business benefit 
(Section 7.7.6); and second, the discovery that teams of software developers were both 
capable and happy to identify these business benefits when asked to do so (Section 8.8.4) 
While there is considerable current interest in establishing the economics of software 
security and privacy enhancements at organisations’ board level38, there has been little 
 
38 The UK NCSC recently awarded a number of small grants for research around this topic. 
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research into economic behaviour at the developer level, and this offers an exciting scope 
for further research. 
9.4 Uniqueness of this Research 
There has been little academic research into interventions to support software developers 
in addressing security and privacy issues. Secure Development Lifecycles have had little 
attention since 2010; possibly since many developers rejected them (Section 2.2.2). While 
there has been some work on how to encourage the adoption of tools, this has not 
translated into practical interventions (Section 2.2.3). 
Several researchers explored consultancy-based, training-based, and literature-based 
interventions, but without finding any formulae for success (Section 2.2.4). Though there 
have been some encouraging experiments with ways to improve the interactions between 
Security Experts and others (Section 2.2.5), and to improve security behaviour in 
company employees (Section 2.2.7), none of these have been presented in a way that 
would support anyone else in using the techniques. 
The ‘Motivating Jenny’ project has explored motivational means to encourage developer 
teams in doing security. Encouragingly, their conclusions based on ethnographic 
techniques were similar to the conclusions in this thesis based on industry survey (Section 
4.14). Their interventions do promote security (Section 2.2.6); however only the research 
described in this thesis puts any objective measurement on the effectiveness of an 
intervention.  
9.5 Future Research Agenda  
The findings in this thesis point to two further areas of future research: the 
microeconomics of security and privacy improvements; and the mass deployment of the 
Developer Security Essentials package. The next two sections explore these topics. 
9.5.1 Microeconomics of Security and Privacy Improvements 
An important theme throughout the thesis has been ‘Product Negotiation’. It is the only 
‘new’ intervention technique, in that it derived from the analysis of experts’ and 
participants’ comments rather than from other research (Sections 7.7.2.1,  8 Introduction, 
1, 8.7.1). Section 8.7.4 shows that developers had less trouble than we had expected in 
identifying microeconomic benefits to security. However, we have no evidence as to how 
effective their use was of the technique: how the subsequent discussions with product 
management, customers and other stakeholders went. Nor do we know what might 
improve the process of identifying benefits, analysing them and discussing them.  
So, a future research project will address these questions, asking research questions such 
as: 
What makes effective discussions between developers and other 
stakeholders about security and privacy issues? 
The research project will, naturally, need to define ‘effective’ in appropriate 
microeconomic and commercial terms, and will generate suitable interventions to 
improve the effectiveness of such discussions.  
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9.5.2 Mass Deployment of Developer Security Essentials  
The current Developer Security Essentials package, though effective at improving 
development teams’ software security in the short and long term, has a practical 
limitation: it requires time from a researcher to train the facilitators. Yet to have an 
appreciable impact on the security of UK software, the package needs to be saleable to a 
much wider audience of development teams; the findings from the last set of trials show 
that this is possible (Section 8.8.7). 
A further research project, therefore, will convert Developer Security Essentials to a form 
suitable for mass deployment, and measures its success. By adding detailed and 
approachable instructions, full materials, and a supporting website, it will be made 
suitable for any development team to use at any time, potentially allowing viral and mass-
market spread throughout the UK developer community. By collaborating with marketing 
experts, the package will be promoted to a wide range of development teams. And to 
measure the intervention’s effectiveness in this form, the project will create online survey 
mechanisms and support for surveying participants beforehand and afterwards, to collect 
data from as many users of the intervention package as possible. 
9.6 Conclusion 
The research described in this thesis has established software developers themselves as 
the best drivers for software security and privacy improvements; established the need for 
improvements in at least one developer population; identified requirements for a 
lightweight intervention to improve software security; created such an intervention; and 
iteratively trialled and improved it with many software development teams.  
Mass deployment of the Developer Security Essentials intervention will improve the 
cyber security of software developed throughout the UK and worldwide, reducing harms 
to both individuals and organisations. As the trials have proved, the effect of a large 
number of software development teams using the Developer Security Essentials 
intervention will be improvement in security-related activities in development projects, 
with a resulting improvement in the security and privacy of the software on which we all 
rely.
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 Most	Cited	DCS	Publications		
The following table shows the most frequently cited Developer Centred Security papers. 
It gives the identifier used in Figure 3, Section 2.1.2; the paper type (C for conference 
paper, J for journal paper, and B for professionally-edited book); the reference, the 
Google Scholar citation count at 12 March 2020, and a calculation of the corresponding 


















Acar+16 You Get Where You’re Looking For: The Impact of Information Sources on Code Security C [3] 127 32 
Acar+16a 
You Are Not Your Developer, Either: A 
Research Agenda for Usable Security and 
Privacy Research Beyond End Users.  
C [4] 43 11 
Acar+17 Security Developer Studies with GitHub Users: Exploring a Convenience Sample.  C [5] 38 13 
Acar+17a Developers Need Support, Too: A Survey of Security Advice for Software Developers C [6] 32 11 
Anderson08 Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems B [9] 3574 298 
Assal&Chiasson18 Security in the Software Development Lifecycle. C [13] 25 13 
Ayewah+08 Using Static Analysis to Find Bugs J [15] 422 35 
Balebako&Cranor14 Improving App Privacy: Nudging App Developers to Protect User Privacy.  J 
[19] 63 11 
Balebako+14 The Privacy and Security Behaviors of Smartphone App Developers.  J [20] 82 14 
Christakis&Bird16 What Developers Want and Need from Program Analysis: An Empirical Study C [34] 75 19 
Derr+17 Keep Me Updated: An Empirical Study of Third-Party Library Updatability on Android.  C 
[45] 49 16 
Devanbu&Stubble-
bine00 Software Engineering for Security: A Roadmap.  C 
[46] 579 29 
Fahl+13 Rethinking SSL Development in an Appified World C [57] 144 21 
Faily&Flechais11 Persona Cases: A Technique for Grounding Personas.  C [58] 97 11 
Felderer+16 Security Testing: A Survey.  J [59] 69 17 
Fischer+17 Stack Overflow Considered Harmful? the Impact of Copy&Paste on Android Application Security C [60] 95 32 
Green&Smith16 Developers are Not the Enemy!: The Need for Usable Security APIs J [76] 82 21 
Hilton+17 Trade-Offs in Continuous Integration: Assurance, Security, and Flexibility C [85] 70 23 
Howard+09 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security: Programming Flaws and How to Fix Them B 
[88] 200 18 
Johnson+13 Why Don’t Software Developers Use Static Analysis Tools to Find Bugs?  C [92] 348 50 
Nadi+15 Jumping Through Hoops: Why do Java Developers Struggle with Cryptography APIs C 
[117] 99 20 
Naiakshina+17 Why Do Developers Get Password Storage Wrong?  C [119] 39 13 
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Nguyen+17 A Stitch in Time: Supporting Android Developers in Writing Secure Code.  C [123] 39 13 
Perera+16 Privacy-by-Design Framework for Assessing Internet of Things Applications and Platforms.  C [131] 47 12 
Schumacher+05 Security Patterns: Integrating Security and Systems Engineering B [148] 868 58 
Shostack14 Threat Modeling: Designing for Security B [154] 462 77 
Sindre&Opdahl05 Eliciting Security Requirements with Misuse Cases J [155] 1235 82 
Steel+06 Core Security Patterns B [160] 328 23 
Tuma+18 Threat Analysis of Software Systems: A Systematic Literature Review J [170] 22 11 
Votipka+18 Hackers vs. Testers: A Comparison of Software Vulnerability Discovery Processes.  C [180] 19 10 
Xiao+14 Social Influences on Secure Development Tool Adoption: Why Security Tools Spread.  C [199] 62 10 
Xiong&Lagerström19 Threat Modeling – a Systematic Literature Review J 
[201] 11 11 
Yang+16 What Security Questions Do Developers Ask? A Large-Scale Study of Stack Overflow Posts.  J [202] 38 10 
Yoder&Barcalow98 Architectural Patterns for Enabling Application Security C [203] 453 21 
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 Expert	Survey	Interview	Questions	
Introduction – establish context 
What is your current role, and what do you find yourself doing day-to-day? Tell me about 
a typical day at work? 
Briefly, how did you first get involved with secure software development? 
Exploration 
What’s your interest in security? What do you do about it, and how do you deal with it 
day-to-day? 
What do you want to achieve when you’re helping a team improve software security? 
How do you define and measure success? 
What is the most successful intervention technique you’ve found? Where do you 
concentrate your efforts? 
Can you think of a particular triumph in your work – where you’ve worked with a team 
that has improved their security? How did you achieve that? 
Have any of your teams used code checking tools? How happy were you with their 
effectiveness at finding problems; and their ease of use? 
What do you find effective as motivation for secure development?  
How do you frighten developers into security, or emphasise the positive aspects? 
To what extent are laws and standards helpful in getting teams to be effective at software 
security? How do you find out about them and keep up to date?  
When new people join an existing team, how do you motivate them and how do they learn 
what’s required? Do you encourage double checking of contributions from new people 
or treat them ‘as usual’? 
What are the best ways you’ve found to get teams to tackle specific things:  
• Security coordination with other teams? 
• Reviews and penetration testing?  
• Designing to get feedback from the users? 
• What else? 
Have you had a nightmare scenario? Or consider this nightmare scenario. You’re working 
with a team that’s just learned they have a security flaw in a website that’s very heavily 
used. Have you even had a situation like that (no details required)? What did or would 
you do to help the team tackle it? 
Vision 
Let’s imaging we’re a few years in the future, and the problem of getting teams up to 
speed with app security has been licked; it’s now a part of everyday software development 
life. How was it done? What were the first small steps? 
Clarification (as appropriate) 
And how did you achieve that?  
Oh, I see. Could you give an example? 
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 Agile	App	Security	Game	Facilitator	
Instructions	
These are an abbreviated version of the full instructions. References to documents and 
PDFs refer to the full set of materials [184]. 
Preparation in Advance 
1. Calculate how many players you’ll have, and so how many teams of 3-6 players 
you’ll need. 
2. Print the two side PlayerInstructions.pdf sheet, one per player, preferably 2-
sided.  
3. Print from CardsFourToPage.pdf a set of task cards for each team, on A4 paper, 
one sided and ideally on light card (black and white is fine, colour better). Then 
cut them out, preferably with a guillotine (or see below).  
Setup on the Day 
4. Arrange the room with separate tables with 2-6 chairs around each table. Make 
there’s a piece of blank paper and pen for each team. 
5. Set up a projector/display visible to all the players, showing the presentation. 
6. Sort out cards in advance into individual mini-packs of a set of each (A, B, C, or 
D), with cover. A packs have 8 cards; B, C, and D have 4 cards. 
The workshop has an introduction, up to four 
rounds, or ‘sprints’, and a wrap-up session.   
Table 27 suggests a timetable for a typical 90 
minute session. Adjust timings according to 
how the teams are getting on in each step. 
Introduction (5 min) 
Organise the players into teams of 2-6 
people, each team sitting at chairs around a 
table, as shown in Figure 51. Give each 
player a set of Player Instructions. 
Tell the participants that they are taking the 
role of agile product managers for the 
MoneyZoom product; their role is to decide 
on the stories for the development team to tackle each sprint. In the first couple of sprints 
each team will be able to complete 11 story points. Stories chosen from previous sprints 
will remain part of the product and available to mitigate attacks. Stories not chosen in a 
given sprint will remain on the backlog as candidates to be chosen in later sprints. 
The workshop then proceeds in ‘sprints’. Each sprint is as follows. 
 
Figure 56: Playing the Agile App 
Security Game 
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Sprints 1 – 4 (10 – 25 minutes each) 
1. Hand out the cards to each team as shown in Table 26. (there may be more one 
set of cards to hand out). The players then select their tasks to carry out. Note 
that you don’t take cards away at any point – cards that haven’t been used 
remain in the ‘backlog’ for future sprints. 
2. Allow the players time to discuss and decide. Typical timings are as in Table 27, 
but depend on the teams. Remember the point of the game is the discussion, not 
to win; if there’s a good deal of discussion taking place and time permits, allow 
the teams longer. 
3. When they’ve selected the cards, get each team to write down the two letter IDs 
for each card they’ve selected on the sheet of paper.  
4. Then show the attacks for the corresponding sprint on the presentation (or read 
them out from the Attacks and Mitigations document). The teams see which 
attacks succeeded on them. Note that card sets C and D do NOT correspond to 
sprints 3 and 4, but instead are given out after the team choses particular 
activities.  
Wrap-up (10 min)  
Ask the teams how they did and what they feel they learned from it. 
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 Threat	Assessment	and	Sales	Instructions	
This appendix gives abbreviated facilitator instructions for the second two workshops, 
using some of the techniques identified from the giving for Group K. Section 8.6.9 
provides illustrations.  
Workshop Setup in Advance 
1. Ensure there is a project for each participant to discuss. Each project should have 
at least 3 participants who know it well enough to discuss possible security 
problems. For participants with no such shared projects (or who have reasons 
not to discuss them), use the ‘MoneyZoom’ project from the previous Agile App 
Security Game workshop, and ensure each such participant has a printed 
description available from the previous workshop. 
2. Arrange tables for participants so each table has 3-6 participants, all familiar 
with one project. 
3. Place a large number of various coloured post-it notes and appropriate (sharpie-
style) pens on each table. 
4. Set up whiteboards and flip charts (one for each project to be discussed the 
participants and one extra). 
5. Have a few (whiteboard/flipchart) marker pens in two contrasting (allowing for 
colour blindness) colours. E.g. Black and red, or blue and red.  
6. Locate a timing device (e.g. mobile phone, physical timer, or Google Search 
“countdown timer”). 
Running the Threat Assessment Workshop 
Adjust the timings according to how the teams are getting on in each step. 
Step 1: Ideation (30 min) 
Arrange the participants in groups around tables so that each group can discuss a single 
project.  
Write up on a board/flipchart/screen: 
Who might do what bad thing to whom? 
Person – Thing – Reason 
Ask the groups to think about their project, and ‘ideate’ answers, writing down the person-
thing-reason combinations on the post-its. Encourage everyone to write (duplicates will 
be combined in the next step).  
Remind them that not every bad thing is malicious; sometimes security or privacy issues 
happen due to accident or misunderstandings. Encourage them to discuss the issues, and 
to gather as many completed post-its (‘threats’) as they reasonably can.  
Step 2: Organisation (15 min) 
Assign a whiteboard/flipchart to each project. Have the table participants all bring the 
post-its to their corresponding board; and, working together, cluster them into ‘topics’, 
posting related ones close together and duplicates on top of each other.  
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Step 3: Evaluation (15 min) 
This step identifies the most important threats.  
Ask each participant to pick the threats (post-its) that are (a) most likely, and (b) most 
damaging. And to use the marker pen to make a dot of one colour (black, say) next to the 
each of the three they consider most likely; and a dot of the other colour (red, say) next 
to the three they think most damaging.  
When they’re done, take a photo of each of the resulting boards, for reference.  
Step 4: Summary (10 min)  
This requires only a few people; it might be best done in the interval before the next 
workshop. 
For each project, create a three by three ‘Risk-Impact’ grid on a board/flipchart page, 
labelled with ‘Low/medium/high impact’ along the top and ‘Likely/fairly 
unlikely/unlikely’ down the left. If you need to use the same board, move the post-its out 
of the way and use the photo as the record of the numbers of dots.  
Get the Technical Leads or a responsible couple of people from each project to use the 
dots next to each post-it to position a selection of the threats on the grid. A dozen or so is 
a good number to aim for.  
The threats towards the top right are the most important ones to consider in the 
corresponding projects. 
Threat Sales Setup in Advance 
From the matrix of threats created in the previous workshop, select the most important 3-
5 to discuss. There should be at least three participants to discuss each one; if participant 
numbers are limited, use a smaller number and have each participant discuss more than 
one (which will take longer). 
Put the corresponding post-its widely separated on the walls of the room (perhaps one on 
each wall).  
Running the Threat Sales Workshop 
The timings are approximate. Adjust them according to how the teams are getting on in 
each step.  
Step 1: Selection (5 min) 
Have the participants form groups next to the post-its according to their preferences for 
the threats they each would like to discuss, arranging themselves so that appropriate 
numbers are next to each one. 
Step 2 Finding Mitigations (30 minutes):  
Ask the participants to think ways to address the threat (a ‘mitigation’, in security jargon), 
ideally with an idea of the effort required, or a means to discover what effort is required. 
This only needs to be sketchy. 
Display the checklist from https://www.securedevelopment.org/handbook/checklist/, and 
invite the participants to consider them as possibilities. 
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Step 3: Promoting the Solutions (30 minutes) 
After a suitable break… 
Tell the participants that the mission for each group, then, is to make a case for product 
management to address the threat.  
Specifically, we want to know the positive benefit to the organisation of addressing the 
threat. This often requires some ingenuity. 
Ask the participants to appoint a recorder to produce a poster from the conclusions. 
Step 4: Presentation (5 minutes per group)  
Ask each group to select a presenter, and have each present the selected poster to all the 
groups together. Record the poster contents and notes of the presentations for reference 
later. 
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 Magid	Trials	Entry	Interview	Questions	
Introduction – establish context 
• What is your current role, and what do you find yourself doing day-to-day? 
What’s your involvement with this project?  
Exploration	
• Have you considered security for this project yourself? What’s been done so far?  
• In what ways do you consider security important for this product? 
Experience	
• What’s the last time you came across a security issue in a project? Can you 
describe the issue? 
• How did you deal with that issue? 
• How confident are you about that solution? 
Vision	
• Let’s imagine the project’s finished, and it’s been an excellent piece of work. 
What do you feel you’ll have done related to security and privacy to get it that 
way? 
Clarification (as appropriate)	
• Oh, I see. Could you give an example? 
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 Magid	Trials	Exit	Interview	Questions	
Introduction – establish context 
• Now that we’ve been working together for a while, this is a discussion to see 
how things have progressed in the project. 
Exploration 
• What do you think has changed? 
• What are your feelings about the change in the project? 
• What did you make of the three activities we did: game, workshop, follow-ups? 
• In what way might you have a better story on security now?	
Experience 
• What changes did you make as a result of the workshops and discussion? 
• What exactly did you do? 
• How did you go about implementing the changes? 
• Why you chose to do those things? 
• What is it that’s better now as a result? 
• Would you do something similar again?  
• What would you do differently? 
• How does this relate to these specific threats you’ve identified (from the threat 
modelling workshop)? 
Vision 
• Let’s imagine there’s a team starting a similar project now, and you’re advising 
the team coming in to help them improve their security. What would you 
recommend that’s the same as we did, and how would you recommend 
improving it?  
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 Online	Survey	Invitation	Email	
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 Online	Survey	Questions	
The following are the survey questions. Some questions were skipped if appropriate (marked with 
*). The answer formats are abbreviated as follows: 
YN Yes or No 
SS Single Selection. 
MS Multiple Selection 
LSS Likert-Style Scale: Extremely, though to Not at all. 
0-100 Slider selecting an integer 
N Integer 
In addition, ‘?’ indicates an ‘I don’t know’ option, and ‘O’ an ‘Other’ option, where the 
participant could enter open text. In Q10 and Q21, the option descriptions give the 
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 Survey	Score	Calculations	
This section describes how scores were calculated from the survey answers. 
Likert-Style Scales were encoded as:  
Extremely … (4), Very … (3), Moderately … (2), Slightly …(1), Not … at all  (0)  
Assurance Technique Score: sum of all five sub-questions of Q21, each encoded as 
shown.  
Developer Knowledge Score: LSS encoding of Q14 




No 0 2 
Yes 1 3 
 
 
Requirements Score: sum of LSS encodings for Q12 (Secure against malicious 
attackers), Q12 (Protects users' privacy) and Q13 
Security Update Frequency Score: This required an Update Frequency Estimate of Q10 
encoded as shown multiplied by Q11 (Security bug fixes) and divided by 100. The score 
was Log (this value plus 1).  
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 Workshop	Styles	and	Assessments		
	 Threat	Assessment	 Threat	Sales	 Approach	
D	
Energy:	Low,	then	
Moderate	
Failed	to	find	any	
interest	in	first	project;	
second	had	almost	too	
much.		
Energy	Moderate-High.	
Saw	relevance	for	
customer	reports	
Flipchart,	listening	
facilitator	
E	
Energy	Low,	except	
from	‘moderator’,	who	
did	most	of	the	talking.		
Energy	moderate.	Saw	that	
order	of	activities	might	
change,	even	if	every	
security	issue	must	
ultimately	be	resolved.	
Flipchart,	facilitator	
dominates	
F	
Energy	moderate;	
Constructed	a	good	
asset	for	the	future.		
Energy	low-moderate.	
Future	sale	an	incentive,	
but	not	an	immediate	issue	
for	the	team.	
Flipchart,	listening	
facilitator	
G	
Energy	moderate.	The	
issues	discussed	were	
topical	for	several	of	
the	participants.	
Testers	not	very	
engaged.	
Energy	moderate-high:	the	
approach	was	a	good	way	
forward.	
Flipchart,	listening	
facilitator,	group	
discussions.	
H	
Energy	moderate.	
Extensive	discussions,	
but	little	new	findings.		
Energy	low-moderate.	
Dominated	by	H1	who	
wanted	white-paper	
representations	of	the	
USPs.	
Flipchart,	listening	
facilitator	
I	
Energy	high.	
Enthusiasm	for	this	
new	way	of	looking	at	
their	issues.	
Energy	moderate.	Product	
management	interested	in	
addressing	client	security	
demands.		
Peer	discussion	
J	
Energy	very	low.	
Overlong	session,	
dominated	by	
conversation	between	
moderator	and	one	
developer.	
Unmemorable.	No	
particular	new	selling	
points	detected.		
Whiteboard,	
dominant	facilitators.	
K	
Energy	high.	Very	well	
facilitated,	used	post-it	
technique	to	involve	
everyone.		
Energy	high.	Used	‘chose	
corner	of	room’	and	
breakout	sessions,	
presented	to	rest	of	team.	
Some	interesting	new	
ideas.	
Minimal	
intervention,	framed	
by	facilitators.	
Specialists	did	3x3	
for	likelihood	and	
impact.		
 
 
 
